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Ceasefire 
I 
Put in mind of his own father and moved to tears 
Achilles took him by the hand and pushed the old king 
Gently away, but Priam curled up at his feet and 
Wept with him until their sadness filled the building. 
 
II 
Taking Hector's corpse into his own hands Achilles 
Made sure it was washed and, for the old king's sake, 
Laid out in uniform, ready for Priam to carry 
Wrapped like a present home to Troy at daybreak. 
 
III 
When they had eaten together, it pleased them both 
To stare at each other's beauty as lovers might, 
Achilles built like a god, Priam good-looking still 
And full of conversation, who earlier had sighed: 
 
IV 
'I get down on my knees and do what must be done 
And kiss Achilles' hand, the killer of my son.' 
Michael Longley, 1994 
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Abstract 
The management of conflict has long been of concern to social scientists, urban 
planners and community-minded citizens. While differing mechanisms of managing 
ethno-national or ethno-linguistic tensions exist, few studies advance our understanding 
of how conflicts are actually managed – in other words, the study of ethnic peace. In this 
study I draw on the experiences of two differing examples of ethnic peace: Belfast and 
Brussels in the expectation that other contested cities such as Kirkuk, Jerusalem, Nicosia 
or Mostar, who may one day consider power-sharing as a form of governance, may 
learn from what have been categorised as sites of successful power-sharing. While there 
are few studies of ethnic peace, fewer studies again seek to understand the role of the 
elite level bureaucrat in sustaining this peace. This dissertation fills this gap in the 
literature, investigating the politician-bureaucrat relationship within the contested 
urban environment of two differing mechanisms of consociationalism. The dissertation 
ascertains the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite and further, 
through determining core beliefs of interviewees, establishes how this discretion is 
employed. Methodologically, the dissertation draws on a multi-method approach, 
consisting of semi-structured interviews and a method well established in Psychology 
but relatively new to Political Science: Q Methodology. The empirical findings show that 
the bureaucratic elite influence the conflict management process. While bureaucrats are 
found to share a number of core governance beliefs, a number of categories of 
association can also be identified. These categories are not based on a primary identity, 
but a secondary learned identity. The findings therefore also propose that a professional 
or societal attachment can supersede a primary attachment within the public 
administration of a contested society. In a number of instances, bureaucrats are found 
to actively represent these secondary learned attachments over their primary identities. 
The findings define bureaucratic activity in two instances of ethnic peace, as well as 
contributing to the literature on active representation. Moreover, it is suggested that 
the role of the bureaucrat in the conflict management process requires much more 
scholarly attention if political level power-sharing agreements are to be sustainable.  
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Introduction 
1 
 
1.1 Overview 
This dissertation relies on the theory of representative bureaucracy to investigate the 
role of the elite level bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management. I firstly investigate 
the extent to which elite level bureaucrats influence the policy process within two 
different mechanisms of successful consociational power-sharing. I then determine 
what motivates these bureaucrats to act in instances where they have discretion. The 
differing consociational models of Brussels and Belfast provide the empirical basis for 
the study1. Despite the rise of the ethno-national state, over 90% of world states are 
comprised of at least one significant minority group2 (Smooha, 1978, Connor, 1973, 
Gurr, 1993). Understanding how differing ethnicities can peacefully coexist within a 
common state or society therefore remains a challenge for political scientists and 
practitioners alike3. The challenge is even greater in instances where the authority and 
legitimacy of the state are themselves contested by these different ethno-political 
groups. While a multitude of lenses have been used to view and understand the 
contested society, few studies inform us of how these ethnically heterogeneous 
societies actually co-exist. As acknowledged by Stanfield (1996: 15), we know ‘virtually 
                                                 
1 Within this dissertation Brussels refers to the territories governed by the sub-state actors the Brussels 
Capital Region and the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. Belfast refers to the Belfast Urban Area, not to 
be confused with the Belfast Metropolitan Urban Area. In each case I am not interested in the 
administration at the ward or commune level.  
2 See Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs, 27:1 (Summer 
1973), pp. 1-21 in which the author states: "All but fourteen of today's states (of the 135 selected cases) 
contain at least one significant minority and half of the fourteen exceptions are characterized by that so-
called irredentists situation in which the dominant ethnic groups extends beyond the state's border." 
3 While various interpretations of the term ‘ethnic’ are debated, I do not address this debate in this 
research- for the purposes of this research Belfast and Brussels are considered ethno-political conflicts. 
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nothing’ about how ethnically differing peoples manage to coexist peacefully. Wake-
Carroll and Carroll (2000:120) reiterate Stanfield’s assertion reminding us that ‘we need 
to know a great deal more about the ways in which diverse ethnic communities are 
sometimes able to coexist in relative harmony’. Further, in one of the seminal 
contributions to conflict management literature of the previous decade, Varshney 
(2002:6) reinforces this belief, maintaining that ‘until we study ethnic peace, we will not 
be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict’. With the intention of learning from 
instances of ethnic peace, my research questions are therefore set within two (most 
different) examples of successful consociational power-sharing.  
While few studies investigate ethnic peace, fewer studies again explain the role 
of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. Both Esman (1997: 
528) and Brown (1999: 369) submit that the literature on ethnopolitics ignores the 
importance of public administration to the conflict management and development 
process. Further, Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978:10) argue that ‘no political system is 
likely to flourish, or even survive if it fails to develop an effective administrative 
component’. Much of the conflict management research to date examines the barriers 
to conflict management, largely focusing on the effects of poor decision-making such as 
inadequate social inclusion policies, divisive construction or planning projects or 
unequal access to education or health resources for certain ethnic groups. Further 
studies examine political level cooperation within the contested society (Cfr. Chapter 
Two). Conflict management literature rarely identifies the bureaucracy as a dependent 
variable. Put differently, research tends to focus on what policies to implement or 
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implementation processes as opposed to the policy implementers themselves. Within 
both the developed and developing society, the bureaucracy has emerged as a principal 
partner in contemporary governance. This research within the uncontested society has 
found the bureaucrat to be central to the governance process (Niskanen, 1971). 
Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) highlight the important contribution of the bureaucrat 
to capacity development within the developing society. A large number of research 
briefs have consequentially investigated bureaucrat activity within these contexts. At 
the same time, the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining conflict management 
mechanisms is less understood. This may be due to the perceived inability of the 
bureaucrat within the contested society to influence policy outputs and outcomes. A 
contested society within a contested state is indeed distinctive, and a bureaucrat’s 
influence in the policy process may not be as substantial as their counterparts in more 
cohesive societies. The role of the bureaucrat in achieving the utopian goals of good 
governance has been documented within developing4, and developed societies. How 
the bureaucrat ‘fits’ within the governance structures of a contested society is less 
understood. 
The literature on good governance within the contested society is indeed 
abundant. This literature does not however consider the perspective of the bureaucrat 
in trying to understand how power-sharing actually works. Among others, research by 
Stanisevski and Miller (2009: 568/9) in Macedonia concludes that ‘the involvement of 
governmental organisations in managing intercultural tensions could assist in the 
                                                 
4 See: Public Administration and Development Special Issue, 2010: 30 for more detailed analysis on 
developing capacity within developing environments. 
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stabilisation of the peace, resolution of conflicts and in enhancing the social inclusion of 
minority voices’. Little is known however about the role of the primary governmental 
organisation – the bureaucracy – in this process. If governmental organisations such as 
the public administration were to increase their involvement in the conflict 
management process as suggested, how would they behave? This can only be 
determined by going beyond existing research frameworks which are designed to 
measure governance structures or indicators. Establishing the motivations guiding 
bureaucrat role perceptions will develop a clearer understanding of the effects of 
bureaucrat actions on both conflict management and governance. To provide this 
insight, a different research approach to the conflict society is required. The public 
administration lens allows for a more complete understanding of the politician-
bureaucrat relationship. Approaching conflict management from this public 
administration perspective we can document how power-sharing actually succeeds from 
the perspective of the bureaucrat. To do so, I rely on two well established fields of study 
from the public administration literature: representative bureaucracy theory and 
bureaucrat typology research. The reasons for adopting this approach are presented in 
the following paragraph. To summarise, ‘the relationship between politicians and 
administrators is the cornerstone to understanding the governance process and has 
always been highly debated in the public administration literature (Hansen and Ejersbo, 
2002: 733). Scholarship has not however extended to studying this relationship under 
power-sharing conditions of governance. The role of the bureaucrat in sustaining 
conflict management mechanisms has not been adequately explored by public 
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administration or conflict management scholars. Within developing and developed 
societies, the bureaucrat is seen as a significant actor in the policy process. In this 
dissertation I am interested in determining the extent to which the elite level 
bureaucrat can influence the policy process within the power-sharing society and if so, 
what guides or motivates the bureaucrat’s actions. In other words, my interest is in 
determining the importance of the bureaucrat within the politico-administrative axis of 
consociational forms of governance. 
The oft-applied policy-oriented governance approach to conflict management, 
while informative in describing what policies to implement, or identifying obstacles to 
conflict management/policy implementation, does not tell us how policies will be 
implemented. This research departs from this largely atheoretical and normative 
literature, viewing conflict management through the theoretical lens of representative 
bureaucracy. This theoretical approach provides a more robust insight into how 
bureaucratic structures are employed or exploited by the bureaucrat. It identifies if 
policy making can be skewed by the bureaucrat within the power-sharing society and if 
so, how it is so. This dissertation provides a contribution to understanding the role 
perceptions of the elite level bureaucrat within societies where differing ethnopolitical 
groups manage to peacefully coexist. This public policy approach to conflict 
management provides a more meaningful insight into the operating of consociational 
forms of governance. 
Achieving good policy making, or good governance, within a power-sharing 
society is paramount to successful conflict management. In order to achieve the goal of 
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good governance, it is necessary to develop administrative capacity. While more 
normative prescriptive studies have approached good governance in terms of what 
policies to implement, the representative bureaucracy approach allows us to 
understand the behaviour of bureaucrats within the policy-making and conflict 
management process and hence determine the role of the public administration in 
sustaining conflict management. If the bureaucrat within the consociational society is 
found to possess similar levels of discretion to their counterparts within more cohesive 
societies, the factors guiding this discretion need to be understood. As will become 
evident throughout the dissertation, more importance needs to be attributed to how 
rules and policies are skewed by the bureaucrat, vis-à-vis the policies themselves. 
Within the contested society we cannot look at the role of the bureaucrat in the good 
governance process in isolation to the role of the bureaucrat in managing conflict. For 
example, questions of bureaucratic legitimacy, while present in uncontested societies, 
have greater repercussions within contested societies. Existing governance research 
does not tell us how the two related roles, conflict management and good governance, 
interplay. As alluded to above, perhaps the reason for the absence of scholarly interest 
is explained by the fact that the bureaucrat within contested societies does not 
significantly influence outputs and outcomes and therefore has only minimal 
involvement in the governance process. The research therefore pays close attention to 
determining the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite.  
Various mechanisms of governing contested societies exist, ranging from 
coercive domination or hegemonic control by one group over another on the one hand 
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to power-sharing5 (Lijphart, 1969) and power-dividing (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005) on 
the other. While hegemonic systems tend to rely on majoritarianism, both power-
sharing and power-dividing rely on a willingness of differing ethno-national/ethno-
linguistic groups to cooperate. The consequent complex administrative structures make 
analysis of administrative behaviour and administrative capacity complex. In this 
research I therefore limit the scope to consociational forms of power-sharing. Within 
consociationalism I draw on two most different examples. Comprehensive power-
sharing, as is the case in Belfast, is most likely the more recognised approach – power is 
shared in all aspects of the governance process. In Belfast, one political and bureaucratic 
organisation governs the city. Alternatively however, the Brussels model demonstrates 
that power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. The limited power-
sharing in place in Brussels provides an example of successful ‘limited’ power-sharing, 
admittedly amidst a less successful national approach to power-sharing. Within the 
Brussels mechanism of power-sharing functions are divided and managed separately by 
each linguistic group with power only being shared in certain agreed policy areas – in 
other words power is shared at the lowest common denominator (LCD). Each linguistic 
community governs its own affairs in education, health and culture. Power is shared in 
policy areas such as economics, employment and transport. Four separate political and 
bureaucratic organisations operate exclusively within Brussels6. Thus the research 
                                                 
5 See The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy by Arend Lijphart in The Architecture of Democracy: 
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, Andrew Reynolds (ed) (2002) for an 
expanded definition of power-sharing 
6 Other governments have competency to provide services within Brussels but these are excluded from 
our research as they also have competencies within other Belgian Regions and Communities.  I have also 
excluded municipal level actors from the research.  
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examines the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management under two most 
differing mechanisms of consociation.  
In this first section I have outlined the necessity to understand the role of the 
bureaucrat in the policy process within the contested society. To date much of the 
governance research within the contested society has measured the bureaucracy by its 
perceived effects. While it is indeed most necessary to understand what policies to 
implement, it is also necessary to investigate how they will be implemented. A 
representative bureaucracy approach differs from the traditional more normative and 
atheoretical governance approach in that it can describe how bureaucrats actually 
behave within a particular set of institutional/governance structures. The public 
administration theoretical approach therefore allows us to determine if, and how, policy 
is skewed by the bureaucrat. Both Belfast and Brussels demonstrate two different 
structural mechanisms of consociational power-sharing. These two cases provide the 
empirical basis for investigating the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining ethnic peace. 
 
1.2 The concepts – definitions, clarifications and limitations 
While good governance is presented as a win-win pareto-efficient aspiration7, the 
constituent elements of good governance are less understood. Various international 
organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have their own good governance principles 
                                                 
7 There are no losers in good governance – in good governance there does not need to be a looser for 
there to be a winner. It is therefore difficult to be against ‘good’ governance.  
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and criteria8; however this dissertation is not concerned with these definitions, how 
they are interpreted, nor indeed the merit attributed to them. I am more concerned 
with how these principles may actually be achieved. My concern in this dissertation is 
therefore with just one aspect of the good governance doctrine: developing 
administrative capacity; in other words, understanding the role perceptions and 
motivations of bureaucrats. This concept of developing administrative capacity however 
is noted by Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010: 2) by its vagueness and multiplicity of 
definitions and approaches. They broadly define ‘capacity’ as: ‘being able to achieve a 
desired collective purpose’ and surmise five capabilities that contribute to ‘system 
capacity performance’ (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010: 3). These include the capability 
to commit and engage, the capability to carry out technical service delivery and 
logistical tasks, the capability to relate and attract support, the capability to adapt and 
self-renew and finally the capability to balance diversity and coherence.9 Without 
developing administrative capacity, achieving the other aspirations of good governance 
remains improbable. In this dissertation I examine the importance of administrative 
capacity, not only to good governance but to successful conflict management. 
Many definitions of the ‘administration’ or the ‘bureaucracy’ have been 
developed, however for the purpose of this research Meier and O’Toole’s (2006:1)10 
simple definition will suffice: bureaucracies are ‘hierarchical institutions that provide 
capacity and expertise to accomplish social tasks’. (See Downs, 1967:2 for necessary 
                                                 
8 An excerpt from  Weiss (2000) on various international organisations interpretations of ‘governance’ is 
included as annex 1.1 
9 Brinkerhoff and Morgan’s interpretation of these concepts is included as Annex 1.2. 
10 For more advanced definitions of bureaus see Weber, Essays in Sociology, ch. 8 Albrow Bureaucracy, 
pp44-5; See also Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967 p24 
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characteristics of a bureaucracy and p3/4 for necessary characteristics of a bureaucrat) 
The focus of this dissertation is on the bureaucratic elite. While the role of the street 
level bureaucrat in the governance process has been well documented by Lipsky (1980) 
and others, the bureaucratic elite are also found to influence resource allocation 
(Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978, Knox and Carmichael, 2006, Carmichael, 2002). It is 
the role perceptions of the bureaucratic elite that are the focus of this study.  
Investigating two most different mechanisms of ‘successful’ consociational 
power-sharing generates an understanding of the role of both the bureaucracy and the 
individual elite-level bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. Rather 
than focusing on identifiable reform projects or bureaucratic outputs, outcomes and 
effects on society, an analysis of conflict management from the perspective of the 
bureaucrat provides a more complete understanding of the role of the bureaucrat in 
sustaining conflict management mechanisms and in introducing governance reforms. By 
filling this gap in the literature, the dissertation can identify the importance of the 
bureaucrat to sustaining conflict management. Existing research acknowledges that 
developing administrative capacity is a precondition for good governance. If 
administrative capacity is to be developed within emerging power-sharing societies, 
what can be learned from bureaucracies and bureaucrats within existing power-sharing 
regimes? By presenting a comprehensive set of empirical analyses on the bureaucrat-
politician dichotomy, this research presents data on how successful examples of 
consociational power-sharing actually work in practice. Accordingly it has two aims: (i) 
to determine the politico-administrative environment in which the bureaucrat works 
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within two most different mechanisms of consociationalism, and (ii) to subsequently 
determine what motivates bureaucrats in instances where they have discretion. I am 
not concerned with the city-state relationship, nor am I concerned with the differing 
legislative competencies of our two cases. My interest is in determining the relationship 
between the political level and the administrative level and how this relationship 
sustains conflict management. Further, I investigate this relationship from the 
perspective of the bureaucrat, paying close attention to how the bureaucrat perceives 
his/her role.  
Other factors of course influence conflict management and governance. 
Bureaucrats themselves may potentially interact with community groups, national 
politicians, supranational politicians, world leaders and global and regional organisations 
such as the OECD, IMF or EU. While such interactions do influence the management of 
conflict, they are not the direct focus of this research. Where relevant, such interactions 
are however referred to; however the aim of the dissertation is to define the day to day 
management of the city, focusing on the bureaucrat-politician relationship. I examine 
this relationship through a public administration lens. The dissertation draws on two 
most different examples of consociational power-sharing. This approach provides an 
opportunity to investigate the influence of the power-sharing mechanism on bureaucrat 
behaviour and consequentially on conflict management. In other words it provides an 
opportunity to investigate if the type of conflict management mechanism can be an 
explanatory factor in determining bureaucrat behaviour. Overall, the primary added 
value of this research is that the reader will understand the role of the bureaucratic elite 
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in sustaining power-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the study provides an insight 
into how power-sharing actually works in practice from the viewpoint of the bureaucrat. 
Societies choosing consociationalism as a mechanism of conflict management will be 
able to learn from the experiences of these two different consociational experiences. 
The dissertation also applies representative bureaucracy theory, determining to what 
extent the bureaucratic elite actively represent a secondary identity over a primary 
identity. The contributions to the literature are developed in section 1.6. 
 
1.3 Conceptual Framework: Representative bureaucracy 
 
Nearly seventy years ago, Donald Kingsley (1944) first articulated the idea of 
representative bureaucracy. His thesis was based on the premise that the British 
bureaucracy was successful in implementing the policies of the political elite as they 
both shared similar norms and values, originating from their shared (primary) socio-
economic backgrounds. As developed in chapters two, five and six, Kingsley’s thesis has 
been expanded upon by numerous scholars of public administration as a mechanism to 
understand what guides bureaucrat discretion within the bureaucracy. This in itself was 
for many years controversial, as in traditional Weberian doctrines of public 
administration the bureaucrat was supposed to serve, not represent. Nonetheless the 
appeal of representative bureaucracy grew. Within the developed uncontested society, 
bureaucratic discretion has been acknowledged to exist within the public 
administration. Mosher (1968) significantly advanced the theory differentiating 
between active and passive representation. Passive representation refers to the extent 
to which a group’s representation in society is reflected within the composition of the 
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bureaucracy. Active representation on the other hand refers to the extent to which the 
individual bureaucrat acts on behalf of this identity. Hannah Pitkin (1967) describes this 
as the difference between that which the bureaucrat is (passive) and that which the 
bureaucrat does (active). In the past much importance was attributed to the principal – 
agent theoretical approach to political control research. Of late representative 
bureaucracy has also provided insight into the balance of power within the politico-
administrative axis. In one of the leading works on political control Meier and O’Toole 
(2006: 69) suggest that:  
‘without understanding the values held by the bureaucracy relative to 
the values held by the political institutions, one cannot determine 
whether correlations between policy outputs and political actions are 
the result of political control or simply the result of administrative 
units doing what they would have done anyway. Because the theory 
of representative bureaucracy explicitly relies on bureaucratic values, 
it works well in determining the extent of political control.’  
 
The theory of representative bureaucracy fits very well with the aims of this 
dissertation. Not only is the theory informative in establishing the power dichotomy 
between the political and bureaucratic level but it also seeks to explain the motivations 
of bureaucrats. As the role of the bureaucrat in both sustaining consociation 
mechanisms of conflict management and in the governance process is unknown, the 
dissertation seeks to further understand this power dichotomy. Within the uncontested 
society a substantial body of literature acknowledges that the bureaucrat possesses 
significant levels of discretion in the allocation of resources. The extent of bureaucrat 
discretion within the consociation society is less understood. Throughout the 
26 
 
dissertation I investigate the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite 
within the consociational society.  
I am also interested in how this discretion is employed. Literature from 
uncontested societies suggests that active representation exists within the public 
administration. Scholars differ however in their empirical findings as to what 
bureaucrats actually actively represent. Studies by Rehfuss (1986) indicate that an 
organisational identity supersedes a primary (gender and racial) identity within the 
workplace. As we will see later in the dissertation, (Cfr. Chapters Two/Six) he finds male 
and female bureaucrats to ‘share a management ideology’ (Rehfuss, 1986: 459). If this 
were the case within the contested society we would then expect bureaucrats to 
actively represent an institutional or organisational identity. However, others such as 
Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland, (2002), and Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) 
suggest that under certain circumstances bureaucrats actively represent their primary 
identities within the bureaucracy. If this were the case within the contested society, it 
would be expected that each minority would represent the interests of their 
counterparts in society; for example in the case of Kirkuk, Turkmen would represent 
Turkmen interests, Arabs would represent Arab interests and Kurds would represent 
Kurdish interests. What therefore causes bureaucrats to actively represent on behalf of 
a particular identity? Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2009) find that it 
is not the institution that determines the extent to which a bureaucrat will actively 
represent his or her co-ethnics in society, but that the environment in which the 
institution is set plays a significant role. They find Blacks within southern American 
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states to represent Blacks in society more so than Blacks in northern states. Their 
findings would therefore tend to support the assertion that within the contested society 
we would expect bureaucrats to actively represent their primary identities. Further, in 
more vociferously contested societies such as Belfast, active representation on behalf of 
a primary identity should be more likely than in less vociferously contested societies 
such as Brussels. Lim (2006) too acknowledges that minority representation increases as 
their numbers increase within the bureaucracy. However, differing from his 
counterparts, (and building on Rehfuss, 1986) he submits that this is due to the 
traditional minority altering the norms of the traditional majority and not due to direct 
representation by the minority on behalf of their representatives in society. Despite 
disagreement among public administration scholars on what bureaucrats actively 
represent, and the causes of active representation, agreement exists that active 
representation exists, be this on behalf of institutional norms or primary identities. 
Further, whichever study one subscribes to, the belief that identity guides behaviour is 
accepted11. 
In his seminal work on representative government Niskanen submits that ‘any 
theory of the behaviour of bureaus that does not incorporate the personal preferences 
of bureaucrats...will be relevant only in the most authoritarian of environments’ (1971: 
5, emphasis added). Similar deductions can also be made from the literature within the 
contested society. The large majority of public administration research within the 
contested society concerns the numerical representativeness of various ethnicities 
                                                 
11 As these concepts will be new to many readers, this representative bureaucracy literature is 
reintroduced and applied to the different research questions addressed in each of the relevant chapters. 
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within the various levels of the administration (passive representation – see chapter 
two). Dresang’s (1974) study of the 1970’s Zambian bureaucracy provides an exception, 
demonstrating that bureaucrats represent an organisational identity, not a personal 
identity, while a later normative study by Mengistu and Vogel (2006) suggests a national 
identity should replace a tribal identity within the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Both studies 
go beyond the study of passive representation, examining instead who bureaucrats 
actually represent. Most noteworthy however is that both studies (within conflict 
management research) validate the claim that identity is an important factor in guiding 
bureaucrat decision-making in instances where bureaucrats have discretion.  
Thus far I have demonstrated that existing research within both public 
administration (representative bureaucracy) and conflict management supports the 
assumption that identity guides behaviour. Existing literature indicates that a bureaucrat 
may represent either an organisational or a personal identity/attachment. However if 
we further advance representative bureaucracy, merging representative bureaucracy 
research with bureaucrat typology research it becomes clear that bureaucrats may 
represent something other than either their primary identities or organisational 
identities. Reissman (1949), Downs (1967), Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) and 
Selden, Brewer and Brundy (1999) draw on different research methodologies to 
generate different ‘types’ of bureaucrat, based on bureaucrat role perceptions. 
Emerging from this literature we see that a number of bureaucrat typologies possess 
allegiances not to their primary identities or the organisation but to professional norms 
and values – attachments to a particular policy area or to a particular social objective. 
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These attachments can of course be more or less altruistic in nature, depending on their 
content. Merging these two research areas provides the theoretical basis for a 
bureaucrat to actively represent a professional set of norms and values. European 
integration researchers have established that epistemic communities, or communities of 
experts, may emerge at the European level (Haas, 1992; Mitrany, 1975). Radaelli and 
O’Connor (2009) find elite level bureaucrats from a variety of EU nation-states to 
possess shared governance beliefs. To what extent is this the case within the contested 
society? As further developed in chapter six, the bureaucrat may possess simultaneous 
attachments to his/her personal community, to the organisation, or to a professional set 
of values. Alternatively the bureaucrat could be completely responsive to the political 
level. While deductions from research within the uncontested society would lead us to 
believe that bureaucrats within the contested society represent their primary identities, 
this has yet to be tested. Findings from bureaucrat typology research indicate that 
alternative attachments may exist. In one of the only studies of active representation 
within the contested society, Mengistu and Vogel (2006) propose that a ‘national’ 
identity could supersede these primary identities in guiding resource allocation. This 
study finds no evidence of a shared national identity emerging among bureaucrats 
within our two contested societies. Relying on bureaucrat typology research the 
dissertation examines the extent to which a shared professional attachment or identity 
exists among bureaucrats. 
To summarise, existing scholarship does not inform us of the role of the 
bureaucrat within the power-sharing society. Studies from the uncontested society 
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however have found identity, norms and values to determine how discretion is 
employed by the bureaucrat. Based on existing public administration and conflict 
management research, this study therefore assumes that identity guides behaviour. 
Representative bureaucracy research from the uncontested society submits that a 
bureaucrat may actively represent an organisational identity or a primary personal 
identity (usually race or gender). However findings from bureaucrat typology research 
indicate that the bureaucrat may also actively represent professional attachments. 
Within the consociational society, do the bureaucratic elite have similar discretion to 
their counterparts within the uncontested society and if so what guides this bureaucrat 
discretion? Looking at the bureaucratic elite within two most different models of 
consociationalism, this dissertation advances this understanding.  
 
1.4 Research design 
This comparative project seeks to add to our understanding of the differing mechanisms 
by which consociational power-sharing is governed. The case study draws upon 
document analysis, semi-structured elite interviews, surveys, and a mixed-methods 
technique, relatively new to political science but well established in psychology: Q 
methodology. These methodologies have been chosen as they have been systematically 
employed in the measurement of attitudes, norms and values and are particularly 
effective in:  
(i) determining the nature of the politico-administrative axis and 
(ii) determining what norms and values guide the bureaucratic elite in 
instances where they have competency to act 
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The primary phase of this research project combined both primary and secondary 
document analysis with some exploratory interviews with key personnel in each city. 
Collaboration with academics in Belfast and Brussels also proved an integral element to 
the research.12 Contact was also made with key players within both academia and the 
bureaucracy within two other cities – Nicosia and Beirut so as to gauge reaction to the 
type of research question guiding the research. This is important as it is hoped that 
other divided societies where divisions still manifest themselves as violence, may learn 
from the experiences of both Belfast and Brussels. As part of the fieldwork, I also made 
a point of travelling to every ward in each city, walking around observing daily life within 
the ward, the facilities available within the ward and casually talking with members of 
the community on how they perceived service provision within their community. As my 
intention was to determine how the bureaucracy affects conflict within these power-
sharing structures, this aspect of the research contextualised the interviews. It allowed 
for a greater understanding of areas referred to in interviews and allowed the gathering 
of more nuanced information which otherwise could not have been communicated. The 
second phase of the research began in the early autumn of 2009, where 20 interviews 
with senior bureaucrats within Belfast City Council were conducted. During the spring of 
2010, 21 interviews with the bureaucratic elite of Brussels’ four public administrations 
were conducted, together with a number of political and civil society representatives.  
Kerr (WP.9 Conflict in Cities, 2009) provides a comprehensive ‘rough guide’ to 
elite interviewing within contested environments. In cases such as the bureaucratic 
                                                 
12 In Belfast – Prof. James Anderson, Prof. Liam O’Dowd, Prof. Madeline Leonard and Dr. Milena Komarova 
and in Brussels Prof. Rudi Janssens, Dr. Joost Vaesen and Dr. Guy Baeten 
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elite, the population may be easily identified. A sample frame can be easily constructed, 
and a probability sample can be drawn. Similar to Selden et al (1999), Reissman (1949) 
and Rehfuss (1986), a multi-stage strategy to identify interviewees was pursued. First, 
the universe was established. Given the nature and scope of the project, interviews 
were targeted on the basis of seniority of position (ie. All of those at director level). In 
both Belfast and Brussels, a number of senior managers were also interviewed. 
Interviews with senior management were selected on the basis of two criteria. Firstly, 
Hindera (1993:421) submits that when measuring the bureaucracy, chosen departments 
must incorporate ‘measurable decision-making’ that is both ‘discretionary and 
allocative’. Secondly, following Meier and O’Toole (2006) and Keiser et al (2002) it is, 
they submit, also necessary to concentrate on areas that are important to the issue at 
hand, be this gender, religion, culture or language. These two criteria were drawn upon 
in selecting interviewees at this senior manager level. 
In Brussels, contact was first made with the political level, through which access 
was gained to each of the four urban public administrations: the Brussels Capital Region 
(BCR), The Flemish Community Commission (VGC), The French Community Commission 
(COCOF) and the Common/Joint Community Commission (CCC). While there are indeed 
further public administrations operating within the city, they were not incorporated into 
the research as their competencies extended beyond the city boundaries and they were 
not exclusively responsive to Brussels political structures. In Brussels, 30 interviews took 
place, twenty-one with elite level bureaucrats. A sample of over 80% was attained from 
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the CCC, VGC and COCOF administrations13. All of those targeted for interview within 
these administrations agreed to participate in the research. These interviews were with 
those at director level only. As a number of directors within one of the four 
administrations, the ‘Brussels Capital Region’ (BCR) administration, declined to 
participate a number of senior managers, or ‘attachés’14, were also interviewed15 based 
on the criteria identified above.  
In Belfast all directors, all heads of department and some managers in what were 
identified as areas ‘key’ to conflict management were targeted for interview: areas 
incorporating a potentially contentious aspect and also areas where the Council had the 
primary responsibility for service provision (the above criteria – eg. The Legal Services 
directorate of the Council was not targeted for interview). Of the entire bureaucratic 
elite (Directors, Heads of Service and Managers), 43% were interviewed. However, only 
twenty-five of these forty-seven positions were targeted for interview. Of these twenty-
five, twenty agreed to be interviewed (80% response rate). 
Core interview lists were developed prior to the research phase in each city. 
These were constructed on the basis of information available from Council minutes, 
personal contacts, research and professional literatures and interviews with key 
academic and political specialists in the area. To reiterate, interviews were targeted on 
the basis of position within the public administration – not perceived nationality, 
                                                 
13 A number of positions within the CCC and COCOF were vacant at the time of fieldwork. 
14 Attachés are policy experts, one position under the director.  
15 Q methodology is more concerned with who the interviewees are as opposed to their quantity. The 
Brussels Capital Region (BCR) figure is disappointing as six of those targeted for interview declined to 
participate. Nonetheless within the BCR, three directors agreed to partake in the research. This figure was 
supplemented with four senior managers (attachés).  
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gender, race or creed. Nonetheless, given that we are looking at a contested city, it is 
most important that the sample reflects, to some degree, the population. A description 
of the sample is included as table 1.1 in the annex. 
Interviews concentrated on two key questions. Firstly I wanted to determine the 
politico-administrative dichotomy from the point of view of the senior bureaucrat. This 
would give some insight into how the political level controlled the bureaucracy within 
power-sharing structures. Did the bureaucratic level simply follow the direction of the 
political elite or were they involved in the promotion, advocation and implementation of 
particular policies. This led to the second key question. If the bureaucrat in question saw 
his or her role to provide advice to the committee or to promote key policies, I wanted 
to decipher what guided the bureaucrat in these situations (a primary or a secondary 
attachment). Thus, in addition to documenting the nature of the politico-administrative 
axis, I was also interested in what motivated the day to day activities of bureaucrats.  
Focusing on the distortions, interpretations, ideological positions and the 
degrees of importance attributed to certain issues, I wanted to establish the norms and 
values that guided the decisions of the senior bureaucrats within power-sharing 
environments. The ‘in-person’ interview was chosen over other possible techniques as it 
allowed for a more in-depth analysis of what motivated the bureaucrat. This provides 
the interviewee with an opportunity to gain maximum input into the research, where 
the norms and values of the bureaucrat could be observed at first hand. However, given 
the nature of interviews, they can be criticised for ‘leading the interviewee’ in a 
particular direction or that subjective interpretations may be inappropriately 
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determined by the interviewer. Even though such pitfalls can be avoided with prudent 
planning and due care, it was decided to introduce two further safeguards. For this 
reason, each interview began with a method known as Q-methodology. Although 
relatively new to political science, this methodology has long since been employed 
within psychology research to gauge norms, values and core beliefs of individuals. In Q, 
interviewees are given a series of statements and asked to rank them in order of 
preference, ranging from ‘I agree’ to ‘I disagree’. This mixed-methods approach not only 
allows for the quantitative analysis of individual perceptions but allows the interviewee 
to look at each statement with reference to all the other statements and not simply as 
an entity in itself. For example in a traditional ‘degrees of attachment’ questionnaire an 
interviewee may indicate equal agreement with two independent statements, however 
in Q the interviewee sees both statements side by side and if s/he wishes can indicate 
more of a preference for one statement over another. This allows for a greater 
understanding of the individuals personal core beliefs and preferences rather than a 
simple Likert scale and tick box exercise. The Q methodology process is further 
explained and expanded upon in chapter six. Together with Q methodology, the 
remainder of the interview was guided by a semi-structured questionnaire. The first part 
of the questionnaire determined the personal profile of the candidate. The remainder of 
the questionnaire was divided into three sections examining identity, perceptions of 
governance and representation16. Using Nvivo software, these three concepts were 
examined from three view points: firstly, examining the politico-administrative axis, 
                                                 
16 A sample of the questions asked are included as annex 1.3 
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secondly, the interaction within the department and finally, resource allocation. These 
categorisations identified where the bureaucrat sought recognition – from society, from 
a section of society, from his/her political masters or from his/her profession.  
This general methodology section has identified how the data for this research 
was ascertained. Personal, one to one interviews have played a central role in garnering 
an understanding of individual perceptions among the bureaucratic elite. These 
traditional interviews and questionnaires were combined with more innovative research 
methods such as Q-methodology. This combination of methods provides a more 
comprehensive basis for ascertaining what guides bureaucrats in their daily work. Each 
of the chapters also includes a methodology section where the relevant methods 
employed are expanded upon. In the next section I introduce the two cases: Belfast and 
Brussels. The latter paragraphs identify the research aims. 
 
1.5 Case selection and research questions – overview of Brussels and Belfast 
Two hard cases, each possessing alternate mechanisms of consociational power-sharing, 
have been identified: Belfast and Brussels. Although suffering from the same condition, 
the symptoms and treatments at the political and bureaucratic level in each case differ 
remarkably. This ‘most different’ method seeks to ‘compare countries that do not share 
any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two 
of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome’ (Landman 2003: 70). 
While both Belfast and Brussels manage conflict through consociationalism, this process 
differs remarkably in each case. Understanding the role of the bureaucrat in each case 
will allow for some general conclusions on the role of the bureaucrat more generally in 
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sustaining consociational power-sharing arrangements. There are many examples within 
public administration and conflict management research where this mechanism of 
research is used to generalise case study research findings. See Radaelli and O’Connor 
(2009) where two most different European policy areas were analysed in order to draw 
conclusions about the policy-making process within the European Council and 
Commission committees more generally. As mentioned at the outset, this dissertation is 
part of a large ESRC funded project designed to further understand mechanisms of 
conflict management: Conflict in Cities. The project concentrates on cities in and around 
Europe’s borders. This in turn has influenced the case selection of this dissertation. Of 
the European examples of contested cities within a contested state, Belfast and Brussels 
were deemed to be the most appropriate in extrapolating the lessons of ethnic peace. In 
section 1.6 I outline how this research contributes to the aims and objectives of the 
project. In this section however I situate my cases within the context of other contested 
cities and provide some background information for the reader unfamiliar with Belfast 
and Brussels.  
Bollens’ (2007) continuum below (Fig. 1.4) sets the two cases of this research 
within a selection of global contested cities. The continuum serves to contextualise the 
research findings within the wider contested city literature and indeed the other cities 
within the Conflict in Cities project. Belfast and Brussels have been chosen as subjects 
for this research as, of the cities outlined below, they provide an opportunity to learn 
from instances of ‘ethnic peace’. The differing nature of the conflict management 
mechanisms assists in the generation of hypotheses, while at the same time a number 
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of similarities can be held constant. Selecting cities that are ‘moving towards peace’ or 
are ‘stable’ provides an opportunity for those cities further down the continuum to 
learn from these cases of ethnic-peace by consociationalism. The research can identify 
the obstacles facing existing power-sharing regimes, where societies considering power-
sharing as a form of conflict management may be alerted to some of the potential 
difficulties in sustaining conflict management.  
I have already established the most significant difference between the two cases 
– in Belfast conflict is regulated through the traditional consociation approach, while in 
Brussels power is shared at the lowest common denominator. There are however 
further significant differences between our cases which also need to be considered. The 
following paragraphs identify the different approaches to conflict management in each 
of our cases, looking firstly at how power-sharing is politically organised before 
Fig.1.4: CONFLICT—STABILITY CONTINUUM (Bollens, 2007) *** 
 
[1]       [2]    [3]        [4] 
ACTIVE CONFLICT >> SUSPENSION OF >>  MOVEMENT TOWARD    >>STABILITY/NORMALCY 
VIOLENCE  PEACE 
 
 
JERUSALEM  NICOSIA        BELFAST   JOHANNESBURG 
 
MOSTAR   SARAJEVO   BARCELONA 
 
KIRKUK*      BASQUE COUNTRY 
 
  BRUSSELS* 
 
*** Defined by the degree that active inter-group conflict over root political issues has been 
effectively addressed 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
*I have added Brussels and Kirkuk to the continuum, based on Bollens’2008 paper describing 
Brussels as sustainable, in the same category as Johannesburg; and Kirkuk he describes as 
combustible, in the same category as Jerusalem. 
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concentrating on the public administration. The final paragraphs look at some 
sociological factors in each city. This section proves useful if we are to consider the cities 
and their institutional designs as explanatory variables for bureaucrat behaviour. In 
other words, to what extent do the cities themselves (external urban environment) or 
their choice of conflict management mechanism (LCD or comprehensive) determine the 
norms and values of the bureaucrat? Recall that the interest of the dissertation is in the 
politician-bureaucrat dichotomy: the decision-making process.  
Taking firstly the political level, power-sharing within the Belfast City Council 
(BCC) has occurred as if by chance. Once the number of Irish-nationalists increased to 
more or less parity with their UK-unionist counterparts, the balance shifted in the 
traditionally unionist dominated Council chamber. Since 1997 the balance of power has 
been in the hands of the Alliance party, a party comprising of members of both 
communities. A mayoral rotation scheme has also been adopted. Since 1997, Belfast has 
had six nationalist mayors, including two members of Sinn Fein (a party linked with the 
IRA), five unionist mayors and three Alliance mayors. This ‘power-sharing’ in Belfast has 
happened informally over a number of years. BCC provides a good example of informal 
power-sharing, where cooperation is not grounded in law or statutes, but as a necessity 
for the city to function. Cooperative norms and values have developed over time and 
are now taken as given. There is no political opposition. Governance is by consensus. 
Brussels, on the other hand, provides an example where power-sharing 
institutions have been formalised and cooperation is governed by strict top-down rules 
and procedures, rules which have been established by national level consensus. Since 
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1989 Brussels has held five successful parliamentary elections. Political representatives 
are elected from two lists, with each candidate standing for either the Dutch or French 
quota. The quotas are fixed, guaranteeing Dutch-speaking parties seventeen seats while 
their French counterparts fill the remaining seventy-two. This has the effect of creating 
a higher value for a vote for a Dutch speaking party than a vote for a French-speaking 
party. This however must be contextualised within the national power-sharing 
agreement where a French vote is worth more than a Dutch vote. Subsequent to the 
elections, a consociational government emerges representing a coalition of French-
speaking parties and a coalition of Dutch-speaking parties. A Dutch-speaking and a 
French-speaking opposition also emerge. The Brussels political and administrative 
system is complex, yet effective in conflict management. I explain the institutional 
background of the Brussels solution in greater detail in chapter four.  
Turning now to the administration we see that recruitment to the public sector 
in Belfast is governed solely by the merit principle – the most qualified person for the 
job should get it. There is a grievance redressal procedure in place where those who feel 
they have unfairly missed out on a job or promotion due to their community 
background may appeal. The effects of this policy are identified and expanded upon in 
chapter five. Meanwhile in Brussels, recruitment to the urban government is formalised 
along strict linguistic lines. Dutch-speaking candidates are guaranteed 30% of the 
positions while the remaining 70% are reserved for French-speaking candidates. At 
senior levels, there is a 50:50 split – if a department has a French-speaking director, the 
deputy director must automatically be Dutch-speaking. Thus, the merit principle is 
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compromised in favour of formally guaranteeing Dutch-speaking representation within 
the public administration. Even if passive representation were achievable under the 
merit system, this would not satisfy Dutch-speakers demands in Brussels. While they 
comprise 10%-15% of the population, for reasons that will become apparent later in the 
dissertation (Cfr. Chapter Four), Dutch-speaking politicians have successfully negotiated 
a quota of 50% of the elite level bureaucrat positions (and 30% of remaining ‘street 
level’ positions). Thus we can say that not only are two divergent mechanisms of power 
sharing employed (LCD and comprehensive) but that further differences in terms of 
political structure and administrative design are also present. A further distinguishing 
characteristic of the Brussels public administration is the highly politicised nature of the 
bureaucratic elite. As will be further developed in chapter four, members of the 
bureaucratic elite may possess concurrent membership of political parties. This is not 
the case in Belfast: as in the rest of the UK and Ireland, bureaucrats are expected to 
have no political party affiliations. The following paragraphs contextualise the 
environment in which these political and administrative institutions operate.17 
Given the relative non-violent past of Brussels and the corresponding perceived 
less tension between communities, bureaucrats in Brussels would be presumed to 
possess a more harmonised professional identity than their Belfast counterparts, hence 
the haste by some to investigate exporting the model. In Belfast, where divisions have 
been exasperated by thirty years of ‘Troubles’, it could be expected that divisions 
between the communities would remain particularly strong. While parts of Belfast are 
                                                 
17 More details on the political and public administration structure of Brussels are presented in chapter four. 
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now considered ‘mixed areas’, many, predominantly working class, but also some 
middle and upper class areas still remain highly segregated. Today, two thirds of 
Belfast’s population continue to live in areas where over 81% of residents are of the 
same religion (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). Today, no district within the Brussels Capital 
Region could be described as being predominantly Dutch-speaking. Logie’s (1981) study 
had to use a threshold as low as 20% to identify clusters of Dutch-speakers within the 
Brussels municipality. Thus Brussels has a more ‘integrated’ feel. Society in Belfast lends 
itself to division, while that of Brussels lends itself to less division – harmonisation may 
be a little ambitious. This division within Belfast is also evidenced socially; for example, if 
one is a member of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), the probability would be that 
they would belong to the Roman Catholic and hence nationalist community. Similarly, 
supporters of Linfield Football Club would be assumed to be members of the Protestant, 
and hence unionist, community. Again, these are of course generalisations and 
exceptions do exist. On the other hand, research by Janssens (2008:6) in Brussels finds 
that ‘people with a different linguistic background are not only attending the same 
schools; club life is also increasingly reflecting this diversity’. He continues: ‘Associations 
in Brussels are no longer linguistically homogenous’ (Janssens, 2008:6). Thus we can 
conclude that societal interactions in both our cities tend to differ.  
In addition, linguistic differences are not considered to be as robust as religious 
differences. It is common for many people all over the globe to possess a multitude of 
languages. It is possible to be both a Dutch and French speaker (bilingual) however it is 
more difficult to be both Catholic and Protestant (bi-religious) or to a lesser extent both 
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British and Irish (bi-national)18. Some French parents in Brussels send their children to 
Dutch speaking schools, so they may attain a grasp of the Dutch language, thereby 
developing bilingualism. The fear of ‘the other’ does not get the same opportunity to 
develop as in religious conflicts. In Belfast parents largely choose to have their children 
educated through their own faith. Exceptions are indeed identifiable, especially in the 
more middle class, South Belfast suburbs. In these minority of cases where Catholic 
parents send their children to a Protestant school, this is generally because the school is 
either perceived to be a better school or more convenient, not generally to learn the 
merits of Protestantism. Further support for this assertion is provided by Lijphart (1979) 
and Reynal-Querol, (2002) where they find linguistic conflicts not to be as vociferous as 
conflicts grounded in religion or occupation19. If bureaucrats were to mirror the 
cleavages of society, we would therefore expect Belfast bureaucrats to be more inclined 
to maintain their primary identities within the public administration. If the opposite is 
found, it would not mean that a relationship between the society and the active 
representation on behalf of that society did not exist, but simply that a vociferously 
contested or divided society would not correspondingly have to have an ethno-
politically divided bureaucracy. 
 Belfast and Brussels also display a number of similarities which can be held 
constant to assist our investigation. Both are developed, North-European cities with a 
long tradition of contestation. Both possess a highly educated public service and both 
                                                 
18 Language identity and fluency in a language should not however be confused. Many French people are 
fluent in English but do not consider themselves as possessing an English or American identity. 
19 Gurr (1993:317) however finds religion to be ‘at best a contributing factor in communal conflict and 
seldom the root cause’. This however does not influence the generation of hypotheses. 
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have seen a relative absence of violence over the past number of years.20 A proposal by 
Zartman (1993) and Lake and Rothchild (1996) is that of a zero-sum game existing at the 
political elite level. What is required, they submit, is that where it is in the political 
interests of both parties to support the institutions which regulate the conflict, conflict 
will be reduced. This however rests on the assumption of only one ‘political elite’ in 
each community – this of course is not the case in our two cases. Political parties from 
the same side of the community, but different parties, vie vigorously for votes, 
campaigning on any concessions or perceived weaknesses made by their coethno-
political political rivals. 
The politicisation of ethnicity is considered by many to be a primary escalator of 
conflict. ‘A well-developed civil society…consists of strong and autonomous secondary 
organisations based upon universalistic membership criteria’ (Wake Carroll and Carroll, 
2000, 25-50; 2004: 335). Although much progress has taken place over the preceding 
decades, political group membership remains religiously/linguistically aligned in Belfast 
and Brussels. At the political level in Belfast, Protestants tend to vote for Unionist 
parties, while Catholics tend to vote for Nationalist parties. In contrast to states such as 
Mauritius where ‘each of the main political parties includes at least a few prominent 
politicians from ethnic groups other than those from which they draw their main 
support’, political leadership in Belfast and Brussels is highly segregated (Wake Carroll 
and Carroll, 2000: 127). Again, some exceptions do exist. In Belfast, the Alliance party 
does draw political leaders from both communities. Meanwhile, in Brussels, Dutch-
                                                 
20 As indicated in the city profiles, both cities have a different historical association with violence. 
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speakers align themselves with the Dutch socialists/Dutch conservatives/Dutch greens 
parties etc… while French speakers align themselves with French socialists/ French 
conservatives or French green parties etc. Again however these are generalisations and 
French-speakers may vote (as an example) for the Dutch-speaking Green party as they 
may stand a greater chance of getting elected. However, in the main, both Belfast and 
Brussels possess leadership that is highly segregated along ethno-linguistic lines. Despite 
this, conflict is carefully regulated in each case. 
Both cities also possess stable (regional) governing regimes which are set within 
a similar, stable geographic region with constructive external support. It is important to 
note however the different contexts in which each power-sharing system functions. The 
compromises in Belfast did not emerge from the regional Good Friday Agreement but 
superseded it. In Brussels, the compromise is a direct result of the national Belgian 
compromise. Costs and benefits among communities in Brussels must therefore always 
be contextualised within the national compromise. This agglomeration of similarities 
and differences provides a comprehensive and structurally sound basis for investigating 
the role of the bureaucracy in stabilising conflict. Although both cities are experiencing a 
somewhat stable, peaceful coexistence, the structures and environments are sufficiently 
diverse to understand the role of the bureaucratic elite and power-sharing mechanisms 
in the stabilisation and normalisation of conflict. Of course it is also acknowledged that 
each contested society is unique in and of itself and one must be cautious not to 
overstate any perceived similarities. The aim therefore is not to compare Belfast and 
Brussels, by holding a number of factors constant in order to explain variance, but to 
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draw on the differing experiences of both cities in order to understand the role 
perceptions of the bureaucrat under these two differing mechanisms of conflict 
management.  
The above paragraphs intend to provide a sufficient background to the 
similarities and differences between the two cases. For further information on the 
political and administrative contexts within which each of the urban structures are 
situated, see Knox and Carmichael 2006 and Birrell, 1978: Belfast; and Witte, Alen, 
Dumant, Vandernoot and de Groof (1999) and Deschouwer & Van Parijs 2009: Brussels. 
In summary, Belfast and Brussels provide examples of two most different mechanisms 
of consociationalism. While I do deliberately draw on the two most different cases of 
consociationalism, the purpose of the dissertation is not to compare two cities, nor for 
that matter do I seek to compare the merits of two forms of power-sharing. The 
differences between contested societies are too numerous to be able to hold constant 
variable factors in order to determine causation. The most different cases method is 
used so as to understand how the bureaucrat behaves within two different power-
sharing mechanisms. It also proves useful in probing some secondary hypotheses. These 
cannot be tested due to the sample size, but findings can form the basis for further 
research. For example, firstly, if the institution were to determine norms and values, (as 
advocated by Rehfuss, 1986 and Wilkins and Williams, 2008) we would expect 
bureaucrats within the BCR, the CCC and Belfast not to represent an ethno-national 
identity as these institutions consist of both communities and are designed to serve 
both communities. As the COCOF and VGC are designed to serve one community only, 
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bureaucrats may be expected to feel more representative of their primary identities. 
Alternatively, if societal factors were to determine norms and values, (as suggested by 
Grissom et al, 2009) we would expect bureaucrats in Belfast to represent their primary 
identities more so than their Brussels counterparts, as the conflict is more entrenched in 
Belfast – see Jansens (2008) studies and Bollens (2008), as outlined above. However 
these two hypotheses are secondary to our investigation and are simply alluded to as 
the basis for further research. The overarching hypothesis for the dissertation 
investigates if a professional attachment can supersede primary or institutional 
attachments within the consociational environment. While Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) 
recommendation that bureaucrats should be encouraged to develop a common national 
identity may indeed be theoretically laudable, its possibility in practice is questioned by 
the findings of this research. As documented in chapter six, our bureaucrats within both 
cities have not developed shared nationalities. It is submitted that an alternative 
secondary attachment to either the institution or to professional learned values could 
potentially supersede active representation on behalf of a primary identity.  
In sum, this section has outlined the rationale for choosing our two cases. It is 
again reiterated that the dissertation does not seek to appraise each of the cities, but 
instead draws on the differing experiences so that societies considering 
consociationalism as an option may be better placed to make more informed choices 
about administrative design. The purpose of the dissertation is not designed to appraise 
the efficacy of differing conflict management mechanisms (nonetheless some 
conclusions can be made), but to determine the role of the bureaucratic elite in 
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sustaining conflict management under two different mechanisms of power-sharing. The 
conceptual framework above (representative bureaucracy and bureaucrat typology) 
assists in determining this. Brussels and Belfast have embraced two alternate 
mechanisms of consociational power-sharing in order to attain the common goal of 
conflict management. Throughout the dissertation I investigate the role of the 
bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management in each city. The purpose of this 
dissertation therefore is to ascertain a greater understanding of how two differing 
mechanisms of governing power-sharing affect bureaucratic governance, and hence 
conflict management. It will establish the auspices under which ethnically differing 
peoples may co-govern within stable power-sharing administrations. A greater 
understanding of urban governance within these two cities will allow for more informed 
policy making which should not only contribute to conflict management in each of the 
identified cities but provide a platform for greater understanding of bureaucratic reform 
within other contested environments. As the role of the political elite in sustaining 
conflict management has been advanced by other researchers, this study is approached 
from the view point of the bureaucrat. I restrict the investigation to how the bureaucrat 
perceives his/her role and the effect this has on policy, and hence conflict management. 
I examine the role of individuals (bureaucrats) within one governance institution (the 
bureaucracy) in assisting to sustain conflict management in instances where differing 
ethnic groups manage to actually coexist.  
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1.6 Contributions to the Literature 
The dissertation speaks to both practitioners and researchers in two literatures: firstly to 
conflict management research within the contested state and secondly to public 
administration research. The project to which this work is attributed, Conflict in Cities 
and the Contested State, seeks to better understand the ways heavily contested cities 
may become viable for all inhabitants. A team of researchers from three UK universities, 
Cambridge, Exeter and Queen’s Belfast, investigate the common subject of conflict 
management from a variety of different perspectives. The multi-disciplinary initiative 
includes: architecture, urban studies, politics, geography and sociology. These lenses are 
used to try and understand conflict management in a number of European and Middle 
Eastern cities: Jerusalem, Belfast, Brussels, Berlin, Mostar, Nicosia, Berlin, Beirut, Tripoli 
and Kirkuk. More specifically, the project seeks to understand how urban structures and 
institutions may strengthen cities to withstand state struggles, and establish to what 
extent cities may be transformed into effective and equitable sites for human 
settlement. In other words, the project is concerned with mechanisms for the 
confrontation and absorption of conflict as opposed to conflict resolution or solution21. 
This dissertation contributes directly to these objectives, disregarding the nature of the 
policies to be implemented but focusing instead on the policy implementation and 
design mechanisms and more importantly, the policy implementers and designers. Who 
are they and what guides them in their decision-making processes? The research 
contributes to an understudied aspect of conflict management research – the politician-
                                                 
21 More detailed information about the project and the nature and scope of the various associated research 
projects can be found at www.conflictincities.org.  
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bureaucrat relationship. Much of the normative literature in conflict management 
focuses on what policies would best suit particular cases. Much of this literature also 
points to the public administration as one of the primary obstacles to effective public 
policy development. I provide an opportunity for bureaucrats themselves to contribute 
to the debate, outlining their role perceptions within the contested city. Further, I 
respond to research calls by Stanfield (1996) and Varshney (2002) that in order to 
manage ethnic conflict we must first understand instances of ethnic peace. Of the cities 
under investigation, Belfast and Brussels have adopted two different forms of 
consociationalism and provide an opportunity to learn from ethnic peace. 
 My second contribution is to public administration and European governance 
research. While this is a secondary contribution, I believe it to be of equal significance. 
As identified in the previous section I compare two systems of public administration 
within two mechanisms of consociationalism. To compare these bureaucracies I use the 
theoretical lens of representative bureaucracy. To date, representative bureaucracy has 
not been applied to European committee governance research. European governance 
research seeks to understand the decision-making mechanisms of the European Union, 
and other bodies such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. While there are many theoretical approaches to investigating 
the subject from multi-level governance, to intergovernmentalism to neo-functionalism, 
a large majority of empirical works emanating from these frameworks rely on the belief 
that norms, beliefs and values guide behaviour. Smith (2003) submits that the sociology 
of European Commissioners (political level) matters at the EU level, investigating the 
51 
 
causal relationship between previous career, national identity and portfolio and role 
perceptions. At the bureaucratic level, Egeberg (1999) analyses the role conceptions of 
national bureaucrats operating at the EU level. Checkel (2003) seeks to determine the 
mindset of bureaucrats on Council Committees, investigating the changing nature of 
their loyalties. Hooghe (2005) probes the norms, beliefs and values of permanent 
officials within the European Commission. In her literature review she submits that most 
research on socialisation examines states or governments, but that along with Checkel 
(2003) and Johnston (2001) her research focuses on the individual. There are also other 
more recent examples of such research (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008; Trondal and 
Jeppesen, 2008; Lewis 2005; Fouilleux, Maillard and Smith, 2005; O’Connor and Radaelli 
2009, among others). Thus it can be surmised that within European governance 
research, the motivations and role perceptions of the bureaucrat are viewed by a 
significant proportion of the literature as being central to the subsequent actions of the 
bureaucrat. Within this dissertation I assume a similar relationship. However, while 
much of this European governance research has adopted theoretical approaches from 
psychology, or used a psychological lens to view existing theories of European 
integration (Checkel, 2003 and Hooghe 2005 to name but two), research has rarely 
adopted methods from outside the realm of political science. While the ideas and 
concepts have travelled from psychology to political science, the research 
methodologies, in general, have not. Within this dissertation I draw on a methodology 
introduced to political science from psychology by researchers such as Selden and 
Brewer and Brundy (1999) known as Q Methodology. While European governance 
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research seeks to determine norms, beliefs and values of interviewees, its interviews are 
largely based on degrees of attachment surveys and semi-structured interviews, 
techniques designed to ascertain information. In this dissertation I suggest that Q 
methodology could be more helpful in ascertaining individual norms, beliefs and values. 
 
1.7 Outline of the dissertation 
Thus far I have framed the subject to be tackled in the dissertation in terms of attention 
to it from the perspective of both conflict management and public administration 
research. I have underlined the contribution the dissertation will make to both 
understanding the conflict management process and to the public administration 
process within the contested society. I have also situated the research questions within 
two most different types of consociationalism. The plan of the dissertation is as follows: 
 Chapter two provides a comprehensive review of the literature setting out the 
current state of research into bureaucrat activity within the contested society. It finds 
that while the role of the bureaucracy within the contested society is often referred to 
in conflict management and development studies research, it scarcely is analysed. In this 
chapter I pay close attention to bureaucratic legitimacy within the context of the 
contested society and I also underline the importance of understanding bureaucratic 
norms and values. It is not sufficient to understand governance structures or policy 
implementation processes, but to understand how these structures and processes could 
be skewed by the bureaucrat. To understand how such an understanding can be 
ascertained within the contested society, I draw on more advanced public 
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administration research within the uncontested society. However, if bureaucrat 
discretion matters, it firstly must exist. Relying on new interview data from Belfast, 
chapter three pays particular attention to extent to which bureaucratic discretion exists 
within the contested society. 
Chapters three and four investigate the environment in which the bureaucrat 
acts in each of our cities. As our two cities are very different, more can be learnt about 
the environment in which the bureaucrat acts through designing two different research 
questions. Chapter three traces the changing role of the bureaucratic elite in policy-
making since power-sharing has been established in Belfast. The bureaucratic elite are 
found not to significantly influence policy outcomes in high public interest, one-off 
decisions. However in day-to-day decisions, that often also incorporate a traditional 
sectarian element, the influence of the bureaucrat is found to trump that of the elected 
official. Hence developing administrative capacity is not only necessary for attaining the 
au courant goal of good governance but also for sustaining power-sharing agreements. 
Chapter four proceeds to investigate how the bureaucracy fits within the lowest 
common denominator mechanism of conflict management in Brussels. It is found that 
while there are many problems with the implementation of the Brussels model, Brussels 
provides evidence that this alternative form of power-sharing is not only theoretically 
plausible, but practically possible. The role of the bureaucrat in conflict management in 
Brussels differs from that of the bureaucrat in Belfast. While aspects of this difference in 
role perception are indeed found to be due to the conflict management mechanism, 
there is also evidence to support the conclusion that it is not the mechanisms 
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themselves that determine role perceptions, rather it is how the mechanisms are 
implemented. These chapters provide an understanding of the governance environment 
in which the bureaucrat role perceptions are generated. Put differently, chapters three 
and four determine the role of the (elite level) bureaucracy as an organisation under 
both conditions of conflict management, while at the same time developing our 
understanding of the environment in which the bureaucrat operates in each city.  
In chapters five and six the emphasis shifts from examining the environment in 
which bureaucrats within both cases work, to determining the role perceptions of 
individual bureaucrats in each city. I am most interested in examining the motivations 
guiding elite level bureaucrats. As norms and values guide behaviour these two chapters 
concentrate on determining what these norms and values actually are – are the 
bureaucratic elite guided by their primary identities, organisational identities, 
professional identities, or are they responsive to the political level? One of the emerging 
findings from chapter two informs us that much of the research into public 
administration within the contested society concerns the proportion of each community 
represented at various levels within the bureaucracy. The debate largely polarises into 
two schools of thought – those perceiving bureaucratic legitimacy to be guaranteed 
through equity of access to employment within the bureaucracy, and those perceiving 
bureaucratic legitimacy to be guaranteed through equity of representation within the 
bureaucracy. A review of the representative bureaucracy literature also concludes that 
passive representation, or a critical mass, of the traditional out-group is a necessary 
condition for active representation. In Brussels this ‘critical mass’ of the traditional out-
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group, Dutch-speakers, is guaranteed by quotas. No such quotas are in place in Belfast. 
Chapter five investigates whether or not the traditional out-group (Catholics) are 
represented within the Belfast bureaucracy, finding that in instances where equity of 
access to public administration is guaranteed, ceteris paribus, passive representation 
will follow. Quota systems of recruitment therefore need not be relied upon in order to 
achieve a passively representative bureaucracy. However, passive representation is not 
always sufficient in every society: as indicated above, the Brussels system is deliberately 
designed to significantly over represent the Dutch-speaking minority. Nonetheless, it is 
sufficient for our study to acknowledge that both our cities are found to possess a 
significant representation of the traditional out-group at the elite level. The necessary 
conditions for a bureaucrat to actively represent his/her own community therefore exist 
in both cities. The environment to disprove the central hypothesis exists. (ie. the 
conditions for a bureaucrat representing his/her primary identity are met in each city) 
Chapter six then investigates the role perceptions of bureaucrats. Drawing on public 
administration and governance scholarship, a number of theoretically possible role 
perceptions are identified. Once contextualised within the findings of chapters three 
and four, individual bureaucrat role perceptions provide an insight into the motivations 
of bureaucrats and hence the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy. This in turn informs us 
how the conflict management mechanism works in practice.  
While references to the conceptual framework are made throughout, chapter 
seven draws together the empirical findings of the research. It revisits the aims of the 
research: to determine the role of the bureaucratic elite in sustaining conflict 
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management and determine whether or not a secondary learned attachment can 
supersede a primary attachment in guiding resource allocation and decision-making. In 
doing so, this final chapter considers the implications for further research and identifies 
some recommendations for policy-makers.  
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2 
Literature Review 
The need for public administration research in contested 
societies: Finding the bureaucracy in conflict 
management research 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Conflict management literature misses valuable evidence from public administration 
research on the role of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic values, norms and identities in 
allocating resources. This review finds that the contribution of the bureaucracy to 
decision-making is regularly referred to but rarely analysed in conflict management 
research. If, as put forward by existing conflict management literature, the bureaucracy 
is portrayed as having a negative effect on governance, surely any progress toward good 
governance must begin with a comprehensive understanding of the role of the 
bureaucrat in the governance process within power-sharing arrangements. What 
follows is a review of existing empirical research useful for understanding the role of the 
bureaucracy in conflict management. It is expected that this chapter will inform the 
reader on the nature of existing bureaucratic governance research within contested 
environments, shedding light on potential avenues of further research and current 
problems facing professional administrators in ethnically and culturally divided societies. 
Incorporating both conflict management research and public administration research, 
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the need for a greater understanding of how bureaucratic mechanisms are exploited by 
the bureaucrat becomes more apparent.  
This chapter identifies the absence of scholarly interest in determining the role 
of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. It finds that conflict 
management research has much to learn from public administration research within 
uncontested societies. It is not sufficient to understand what policies to implement, nor 
is it sufficient to understand the structures that are conducive to good governance: 
scholarship must also extend to understanding how elite level bureaucrats 
influence/skew policies and decision-making processes. There exist various mechanisms 
of conflict management, ranging from coercive domination (hegemonic) or oppression 
on the one hand to power-sharing on the other. Various actors determine the success of 
such mechanisms – the military, the political level, the bureaucratic level, non-
governmental organisations, civil society organisations, international actors, interest 
groups etc. Each of these actors will of course exploit the rules of the game to achieve 
their own personal, societal, or organisational, objectives. Each actor therefore has a 
varying influence on the management of conflict. It is this realm of interaction that has 
now widely been considered by the generic term: ‘governance’. The concept of good 
governance is not new; however of late one cannot talk of public administration, 
organisational structure or policy implementation without being confronted with the 
term ‘governance’. The literature on governance is as vast as it is diverse, examining 
how best to run health and education trusts to entire bureaucracies and organisations. 
There is however a growing interest in examining the contribution of governance actors 
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to conflict management. It is found that the literature on governance in contested 
societies covers, in some detail, the roles of democracy, poverty and social exclusion, 
(Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell, 2002) participatory budgeting (Koonings, 2004; 
Roussopoulos and Benello 1970, 2005), legitimacy (Carroll and Carroll, 1999) non-
governmental organisations and civil society organisations, (Gerometta, Haussermann, 
and Longo, 2005, Byrne, 2001), the role of militia groups and state forces, (Nilsson, 
2008; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003) political stability and 
economic growth (Jong-A-Pin, 2006) and electoral systems (Norris, 2005, 2008; 
Binningsbo, 2005; Riphenburg, 2007, Wolff, 2006). Broader research briefs take more 
encompassing approaches to conflict resolution, examining a variety of mechanisms 
leading to successful power-sharing22 (Lipjhart, 1969, 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; Lake and 
Rothchild, 1996; Kliot and Mansfield, 1999; Horowitz, 2000; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004; 
Roeder and Rothchild, 2005, Kerr, 2005; and Varshney, 2001; Norris, 2008; Wolff and 
Yakinthov, 2011). Studies by Carroll and Carroll (2000) and Stanfield (1996) look at how 
governance works in successfully managed plural societies. Persistently occasional 
however is research into the role of the bureaucracy in conflict management. This 
chapter is concerned exclusively with the role of the bureaucracy in the governance 
process of power-sharing societies. Binningsbø (2005) hypothesises a relationship 
between lasting peace and proportional representation, grand coalitions, segmental 
autonomy, number of power-sharing institutions and the size of the society. A strong 
                                                 
22 I regularly refer to ‘successful power-sharing’. I intend this to mean successful in managing conflict, not 
measuring quality of governance, quality of institutional design, administrative or political capacity or 
electoral processes etc...(Cfr. Bollens continuum Fig. 1.4) 
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stable bureaucracy however does not directly feature as an independent variable. 
Similarly Schneckener (2002) too investigates how power-sharing works. Despite 
acknowledging the dangers of poor decision-making, precedence is given to the ‘role of 
political elites in sustaining shared rule’, again avoiding any analysis of the bureaucracy 
(Schneckener, 2002: 203). Supporting this assertion, Bissessar (2009:4) finds that ‘there 
has been little attempt to date to investigate the challenges that will face senior public 
officers in developed countries and even less so in developing countries, more 
particularly plural societies’. Thier and Chopra (2002) set out the institutional challenges 
facing Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the war, however little is known about 
how bureaucrats would behave within such emerging institutional frameworks. A 
review of the most prominent journals in public administration/conflict management 
from the past ten years emphasises the lack of scholarly interest in developing our 
understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict management. Stanisevski and 
Miller (2009) suggest that government institutions can have a role in the normalisation 
and stabilisation process within the Macedonian context. While concurring with their 
thesis, a greater knowledge of the individual role perceptions of the bureaucrat in these 
environments will inform us how the bureaucracy is likely to behave in these 
circumstances. 
 One of the foremost reasons for attaining a greater understanding of the 
bureaucracy in a divided society originates from its failures, as highlighted by current 
empirical research on other aspects of divided governance. Bollens (2000: 318) finds 
policymaking in both Belfast and Jerusalem to be ‘associated with bias’. Beall et al 
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(2002: 200) question the capacity of municipal officials and politicians ‘to keep up with 
the extended responsibilities of government’. The executive director of UNCHS (Habitat) 
has called for ‘a sea change in the management approach of many city governments’ 
(Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 2001). Whether perceived or actual, the bureaucracy is seen 
at best as disregarding conflict or at worst enhancing societal conflict through resource 
allocation. As ‘the public service has a major role to play in reconciling, reconstructing 
and developing society’ (Ncholo, 2000: 87); a more comprehensive understanding of the 
service is a necessity for conflict management.  
Mistaking symptoms for cause, much of the governance research in divided 
societies has failed to acknowledge the importance of bureaucratic reform. Apart from a 
number of notable exceptions mentioned throughout the review, efforts are 
concentrated on the effects of poor public administration rather than investigating 
mechanisms of ameliorating administrative design within the contested society. 
Wimmer and Schetter (2003: 534) in their vision for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, 
propose that ‘establishing institutions that are able to perform the basic functions of 
modern states should represent the main strategic goal of the reconstruction 
programme’. Yet research has not identified how these institutions should be designed 
and managed. Studies by Jo Beall (2002) comprehensively examine the effect of 
inadequate governance on poverty and social exclusion. In Uniting a Divided City Beall et 
al (2002) empirically use the case of Johannesburg to outline in depth the affects of poor 
governance structures on social exclusion (See also Kearns and Forrest, 2000). This 
wealth of empirical data does not however extend to the bureaucracy itself. 
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Schneckener’s previously referred to study compares a variety of successful and failed 
mechanisms of conflict management in Europe, citing the pivotal role of political elites 
in managing conflict. Their behaviour however is ‘shaped by the institutional 
arrangements’ (Schneckener, 2002:203). It is these institutional arrangements that 
require further understanding. How can they be designed in a way that supports 
successful conflict management and how will the bureaucrat behave within these 
structures? 
Political level decisions are indeed a prerequisite for the success of any power-
sharing agreement, be these based on either consociationalism or centripetalism.  
Solutions however are also required at the executive, or policy, level. As the primary 
support tool of the executive arm of government, the bureaucracy directly affects 
symptoms of poor decision making. Any solution to the above symptoms of poverty, 
social exclusion and social cohesion needs to concentrate on the spheres of decision-
making which affect these areas – the politico-administrative axis. While conflict 
management research has advanced on the political side of the axis, less is understood 
about the contribution of the public administration. The need for a greater 
understanding of the administrative design is further emphasised by El Zein and Sims 
(2004). They investigate the efforts of the Office of Minister of State for Administrative 
Reform (OMSAR) in Lebanon, following the civil war, with a view to the exportation of 
the model. Although they find OMSAR to have misinterpreted the political environment 
in which the administration is set, a significant proportion of responsibility is placed on 
the failure of OMSAR to work with the existing, indigenous public administration, as 
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opposed to working against it. The bureaucrat can be part of the solution, instead of 
perpetually being perceived as the problem, and needs to be understood completely if 
institutional structural change is to have any positive impact on conflict management. 
This dissertation proposes that the development of administrative capacity is as 
important in attaining the goal of conflict management as it is in attaining the goal of 
good governance. 
Although public administration research in divided societies is sporadic to say 
the least, we are not starting from scratch. The following sections review the existing 
literature which analyses the bureaucracy in contested societies, also drawing on 
theoretical advances made in more cohesive environments. This next section will 
explore how these existing studies inform our understanding of how the bureaucracy 
affects conflict management. The remainder of the review is organised around four key 
points, specifically (i) existing research questions evidenced in the literature and 
theoretical approaches; (ii) representative bureaucracy in conflict management 
research, (iii) the wider representative bureaucracy debate and (iv) main findings and 
limitations. 
 
2.2 Existing approaches 
Before analysing the impact of the bureaucracy on conflict management, a clear 
understanding of the status quo is required. What are the existing research questions, 
how are these questions theoretically substantiated and how is the subsequent research 
designed? This section intends to shed some light on these broad discursive questions. 
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Reviewing the literature, three broad areas of investigation are identified: (i) the first 
category of research consists of empirically based studies of governance within the 
contested society that are theoretically grounded in public administration. This research 
is found to draw primarily on the theory of representative bureaucracy; (ii) Case study 
research. These studies of governance vary from investigations of various civil service 
reform agendas and normative arguments, to more theoretically substantial research 
approaches such as that of Bollens (2000). (iii) Finally, some larger-N quantitative 
studies incorporating a comparative element examining structural design across various 
territories, investigate the structural environments that are most conducive to good 
governance within contested societies. Beginning with studies grounded in 
representative bureaucracy, each of these three areas of scholarly research are 
considered in turn.  
Firstly, studies with a theoretical foundation in public administration generally 
adopt the theory of representative bureaucracy23. Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy 
(1944), further developed by Van Riper (1958: 552), supposes that decisions made by 
the bureaucracy should mirror the preferences, ‘ethos and attitudes’ of the society 
which they govern. Mosher (1968: 12) further develops the theory, differentiating 
between ‘that which the bureaucracy is’ and ’that which the bureaucracy does’. 
According to Mosher, passive representativeness concerns the origin of individuals and 
the degree to which, collectively, they mirror society, while in active representation an 
                                                 
23 While I have previously defined active and passive representation (cfr. Chapter One), I  have revisited 
the definitions here in order to situate the definitions within the wider representative bureaucracy/conflict 
management debate.  
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individual is expected to press for the interests of those he or she represents (Hindera, 
1993: 417). Put differently, passive representation would simply concern itself with the 
number of Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs within the Kirkuk bureaucracy relative to the 
population of the city. Active representation on the other hand concerns itself with the 
actions of each group within the bureaucracy, attempting to determine if or when 
representation within the administration equates with the flow of benefits to that 
particular group. Active representation, it can therefore be said, delves deeper looking 
at who the individual bureaucrat actually represents within the bureaucracy. Today, 
research questions within a contested society tend to focus on determining how to 
achieve a bureaucracy that, in its composition, mirrors that of the society it supposedly 
represents – passive representation. Meanwhile studies in more cohesive societies have 
applied the advanced concept of active representation, thereby differentiating between 
the actions of the bureaucrat and the outward (primary) identity of the bureaucrat. In 
order to understand the role of the bureaucrat within the politico-administrative axis, 
power-sharing research must consider the concept of active representation, 
determining if and when bureaucrats actively represent. Further, it is important to 
understand what people, groups or ideas they would represent when they do actively 
represent.  
In summary, the numerous literature reviews of representative bureaucracy 
highlight two aspects of empirical research: (i) passive representation, (Brown, 1999, 
Esman, 1999) and (ii) causes of, and restrictions to, active representation (Hindera, 
1993; Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Wilkins and Williams, 2008; 
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Grissom et al, 2009; Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Kennedy, 2008) Apart from a few notable 
exceptions, most conflict management research concentrates on this first field of 
enquiry – passive representation, investigating how best to achieve a representative 
bureaucracy, the necessity of achieving a representative bureaucracy, or the cost and 
benefits of achieving a representative bureaucracy. Rarely is there any investigation into 
active representation (See Mengistu and Vogel, 2006 or Dresang24, 1974 as exceptions).  
We now turn to the second and more substantial element of research into the 
bureaucracy within the contested society. These appraisals and analyses tackle a 
number of research questions, largely assessing the success of various civil service 
reform packages. Ncholo (2000) tracks the development of the South African civil 
service since apartheid indicating the challenges faced in attaining a representative 
bureaucracy. Derick Brinkerhoff (2010) edited an edition of Public Administration and 
Development dedicated entirely to administrative capacity development.  Lee (2009) 
examined how emerging democracies could build competent, politically neutral 
bureaucracies, while others have considered the success of various development 
agendas such as the incorporation of ex-combatants into the bureaucracy (Tessema and 
Soeters, 2006), the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) (Bissessar, 2009), and 
more general professionalisation objectives (Mengesha and Common, 2007; Jacobs, 
2009). Scott Bollens (2000) too uses a process tracing approach, but through a more 
urban planning theoretical lens. Empirically situated in Belfast and Jerusalem, he 
                                                 
24 Although not grounded in representative bureaucracy theory, Dresang’s findings within the 1970s 
Zambian bureaucracy point to the greater role of institutional norms in curtailing active representation on 
behalf of one’s own community. He stresses that a passively representative bureaucracy is indeed 
necessary, not in terms of resource allocation, but in terms of public legitimacy. 
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investigates the hypothesis that urban policy is partisan in Jerusalem and neutral in 
Belfast. His analysis of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) in providing social 
housing provides a most worthwhile foundation to understanding the role of the 
bureaucracy in conflict management. Models of urban policy strategy are theoretically 
identified and using this urban policy lens he explores their effect on territoriality, 
economic distribution, policy-making access and group identity. The changing nature of 
public administration in Northern Ireland is also analysed from devolution to direct rule 
by Birrell (1978) and direct rule back to devolution by Carmichael and Osborne  (2003) 
while Knox and Carmichael, (2005, 2006) investigate reform efforts within the Northern 
Ireland civil service25.  
Finally, some larger-N studies look at the bureaucracy and governance indicators 
across a broad range of societies and can inform how we understand bureaucratic 
structures within contested environments. While these studies by organisations such as 
the World Bank are not set exclusively within conflict environments, they assist in 
understanding the various approaches to governance. Their alternative approach 
focuses on structural design, rather than how the structures themselves are exploited. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) developed 31 different indicators of 
governance grouped into three clusters: rule of law, government effectiveness, and 
graft. Hyden, Court and Mease (2003) examine perceptions of the bureaucracy in 
sixteen developing countries, again establishing general conclusions on governance. 
Mehta (1998) adapts previously identified indicators pinpointing four categories of 
                                                 
25 Usamah Shahwan (2003) provides a comprehensive description of the development of public 
administration structures in Palestine.   
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capacity: institutional, technical, administrative and political. Administrative good 
governance indicators include a grievance redressal system, personnel policy, flexible 
and decentralised decision-making and performance evaluation. 
These quantifications of general trends of governance within the developing 
environment are indeed important and informative, and identify trends across divided 
and developing environments. They assist in the identification of structures that 
contribute to stabilisation and normalisation and the structures that prove as obstacles. 
Such large scale quantification studies and the development of performance indicators 
also assist in establishing the importance of the bureaucracy to the development 
process and the structures required for the establishment of a stable and professional 
bureaucracy. How these structures can be incorporated into the contested environment 
does indeed need to be understood. However these large studies, by their very nature, 
cannot take into account the intricate workings of individual bureaucracies. The rules 
and procedures of a bureaucracy can indeed create the environment necessary for good 
governance to take place, however it is how these rules and procedures are exploited by 
the professional administrator that will determine how good governance actually is. 
Indicators of best practice and good governance can determine the optimal 
environment for good decision-making, however, as put forward by Gusfield (1958) it is 
the norms and values of the civil servant that determine how these rules are 
employed/exploited and therefore how decisions are actually made. For this reason 
norms and values are central to our understanding of bureaucratic resource allocation 
and hence conflict management.  
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Put differently, it is suggested that both quantitative cross-national studies, and 
process tracing or existing policy appraisal approaches, can inform us about the use of 
governance structures, and can tell us what actors are involved at different stages of 
policy development – they cannot however tell us how administrators ‘skew’ policy to 
reflect their personal goals. To understand how these structures are ‘skewed’, we must 
indeed firstly determine where the bureaucrat has the capacity to influence policy, but 
secondly we must also consider the measurement of norms, values and behaviours in 
order to determine how bureaucrats direct policy. Chris Leeds (1997: 1) surmises: 
‘Culture, values, beliefs [and] norms...influence perceptions, assumptions attitudes and 
eventually behaviour and traditional practices’. The theory of representative 
bureaucracy provides the most valuable, and most complete, lens for examining this 
experience. I therefore introduce representative bureaucracy theory to conflict 
management research. 
 
2.3 Representative bureaucracy – a closer look 
In the previous section, various existing mechanisms of researching the bureaucracy 
within conflict management research were identified: studies grounded in 
representative bureaucracy, appraisal of civil service reform programmes and some 
large-N comparative projects. While each of these categories could be further explored, 
the emphasis in this research is on representative bureaucracy. This section further 
develops the representative bureaucracy theoretical approach to understanding 
bureaucratic behaviour. The debate within the contested society is largely grounded in 
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the sphere of passive representation. As identified in the previous section, two schools 
of thought debate the costs and benefits of representative bureaucracy, both grounded 
in legitimacy. Those agreeing with Brown (1999) tend to prioritise the merit principle 
and present equity in opportunity as the means of creating legitimacy. The alternative 
position held by Esman (1999) is that, where necessary, in the short term the merit 
principle should be sacrificed so as to achieve a passively representative bureaucracy – 
thereby guaranteeing its legitimacy. In this section I explore in greater detail the 
arguments behind both these positions, finding that the debate within passive 
representation can only be solved through shifting the debate to the realm of active 
representation. 
Brown (1999) emphasises the importance of employment in the public service as 
differing ethnicities ‘battle for resources’. Evidence from Trinidad and Guyana leads 
Brown to argue that recruitment by ethnic quota can actually contribute negatively to 
the conflict. He draws on the International Commission of Jurists (1965: 117) to support 
his position: ‘It is thought that preferential treatment…violates the merit principle and 
introduces an element of arbitrariness into the recruitment procedure’, generating 
worse friction than that which it sets out to eliminate. Further, he argues that this 
environment breeds suspicion and can cripple national development. It is Browns belief 
that it is not disproportionate representation or participation that is the problem; rather 
the problem is the ‘institutionalisation of procedures and practices that virtually 
guarantee disproportionate representation’ (Brown, 1999: 70). Roberts (1965) argues 
that if an ethnic group does not have a history of public service, it should not be 
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expected that they would be proportionately represented; or similarly if a social group 
resides predominantly in rural areas, it cannot be expected to occupy, to the same 
extent, urban positions such as the civil service. As evidence of this, Nachmias’ (1991) 
empirical study finds that sections of Israeli society without a tradition of education are 
not proportionately represented in the upper echelons of the Israeli bureaucracy. Brown 
(1999: 374) refers to the removal from office of public servants following the election of 
the former opposition to government in Guyana, ‘depleting the already small pool of 
skilled, qualified human resources available to government’. This has resulted in 
numerous vacancies which cannot be filled and the rendering ‘ineffective’ of the finance 
and public service ministries.  
The central theme running through arguments against quota systems are 
concerned with the dilution of professionalism within the bureaucracy. The absence of 
professionalism sees a corresponding reduction in the quality of governance and hence 
perceived legitimacy. However as Mengistu and Vogel (2006: 207) remind us, ‘…the 
good governance principle of responsiveness requires the promotion of a professional 
civil service that is not only capable, but characteristically representative of the 
population’. Esman (1997) refers to examples in South Africa, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, 
Israel and Malaysia whereby civil servants within ethnically divided societies, often 
mirror the ethnicity of the political elite rather than society as a whole. He finds that 
ethnic groups ‘that dominate government, award positions in public administration 
exclusively or preferentially, formally or informally, to their own constituents’ (ibid: 
72 
 
528). In other words, quotas are necessary in some circumstances to prevent such 
occurrences.  
Drawing on the Zambian experience of the 1970s, Dresang (1974: 1617) 
concludes that ‘an ethnic group cannot rely on representation in the bureaucracy as a 
resource for effectively pursuing group interests’. Thus his results evidence no tangible 
benefit to an ethnic group as a result of their representation within the bureaucracy. He 
argues that the ‘representative character of government, is more important as an issue 
of ethnic politics, than as a determinant of how administrators pursue economic 
development’ (Dresang, 1974: 1605). As bureaucrats are constrained by the 
organisation, their authority, policy conditions and criteria used to determine career 
advancement, they do not actively favour one ethnic group over another. Therefore, 
Dresang believes that as personal career advancement outweighs ethnic parochialism, 
resources are guided by technical rational criteria and underrepresented groups are not 
unfairly treated when it comes to resource allocation. However, from a stabilisation 
perspective he disagrees with Brown, viewing a representative bureaucracy as a 
requirement to engender the perception among all ethnic groups that the bureaucracy 
is a fair and equitable organisation. Like Esman, he therefore correlates actual 
representation with legitimacy. Thus disagreement exists on the origins of bureaucratic 
legitimacy: via equality of opportunity (Brown) or via equality of representation 
(Esman). While a public survey of perceptions would be of questionable value and pose 
practical difficulties to conduct, the extent to which ethno-national/ethno-political 
quotas are a necessity in attaining a passively representative bureaucracy would be of 
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value to our research and can be tested. This question is returned to in chapter five 
where I investigate whether or not a passively representative bureaucracy is a possibility 
without the requirement of ethno-national quotas. 
Dresang’s findings however rely on the supposition that the norms and values 
guiding the bureaucrat are grounded in concepts of traditional importance within 
uncontested societies – such as personal career advancement etc… Within a contested 
society however, we must also ask: do allegiances to one’s own primary group trump 
these traditional loyalties? Secondary, organisational norms may not be as powerful as 
primary personal norms within the contested society. The conditions under which a 
bureaucrat will represent interests other than those of his personal community must 
therefore be understood. 
To comprehensively understand the nature of the passive representation 
discussion, we need to delve deeper into the concept. Passive representation, at its 
heart, is concerned not with how resources are allocated but who the allocators are. To 
understand the effects of passive representation a clearer understanding of what guides 
bureaucratic behaviour is required. This key facet of representative bureaucracy, most 
important to conflict management research, is that of active representation and 
‘bureaucratic values’ and has recently been acknowledged (within the conflict 
management literature) by Mengistu and Vogel (2006). Findings within uncontested 
societies prove inconclusive as to the extent to which a group’s representatives within 
the bureaucracy actively represent the interests of that particular group. Various studies 
of active representation have shown that minority bureaucrats (usually ethnic minorities 
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and women) actively represent their counterparts in society (Keiser et al, 2002). 
Conversely, Mladenka (1980) finds resource allocation to be a function of past decisions, 
population shifts and other technical rational criteria. John Rehfuss (1986: 459) too finds 
that women and minorities share a ‘management ideology’ with their white male 
counterparts, suggesting that the organisational environment restricts active 
representation on behalf of one’s primary identity.  
Within contested societies, this hypothesis has not been sufficiently explored. In 
a passively representative bureaucracy we do not know if Hindus represent Hindus or if 
Shi’a Muslims within the bureaucracy would represent Shi’a Muslims in society – it has 
merely been assumed that this would be the case. In other words, the debate still 
focuses on the descriptive nature of the bureaucracy rather than on who the bureaucrat 
actively represents. Esman (1997: 529) suggests, that ‘under conditions of competitive 
ethnic mobilisation, the community that dominates the state bureaucracies will find 
ways to favour fellow ethnics even when rules of market allocation are formally adopted 
to satisfy international aid agencies’. Therefore for Esman, in the initial stages of conflict 
management descriptive representation, based on what the bureaucrat ‘is or is like’ 
directly correlates with what the bureaucrat does (For more on descriptive 
representation see Pitkin, 1967:61). Is this the case within the contested society? Do 
bureaucrats actively represent their descriptive identities? Similarly, for Brown, if a 
particular section of society feels discriminated against, this group will not contribute to 
the goal of national development. Contrary to Esman (1999: 369) however, he regards 
equality of opportunity as being more important tha
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deduce from Browns writings that he perceives the bureaucracy to represent secondary 
learned professional or technocratic identities. These are the questions that guide this 
research. 
To provide answers to the debate within passive representation, we must 
explore active representation. Who do ethnic minorities (and majorities) represent 
within the bureaucracy? Only when we understand the beliefs and norms that guide the 
decision-making of individual bureaucrats will we be able to determine whether or not 
bureaucrats skew decision-making in favour of their own ethnic groups. We will then 
garner a greater understanding of the conditions under which the benefits of 
compromising the merit principle may actually contribute to better decision-making. 
Apart from Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) normative study, active representation within 
divided societies has not yet been explored. In sum, if bureaucrats were to actively 
represent their own communities within the administration then passive representation 
at all levels for all groups is indeed necessary. However if shared values emerge, the 
necessity for passive representation in every decision is reduced. Brown’s proposition of 
guaranteeing legitimacy through equality of opportunity/access therefore becomes a 
possibility. Clearly if shared values were to exist a certain number of the out-group 
would have to exist within the administration in order for values to be shared, or as put 
by Reissman (1949) the interpersonal workplace relationships can also contribute to the 
social role the bureaucrat fills. 
In this section we have seen that bureaucratic legitimacy is central to conflict 
management. A somewhat passively representative bureaucracy is indeed 
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acknowledged as a prerequisite for bureaucratic legitimacy – be this for Dresang’s 
reasons of public perception or Esman’s reasons that the dominant group will always 
exploit the rules to their own advantage. A passively representative bureaucracy is less 
of a requirement however if one subscribes to Brown’s thesis. Brown’s thesis relies on a 
professional organisational identity emerging within the bureaucracy. However, 
research in uncontested societies submits that if one group dominates the bureaucracy, 
only the norms and values of that group can influence the norms and values of the 
organisation. A ‘critical mass’ of each group is therefore said to be required if the values 
of the traditional out-group are to influence the professional values of the organisation. 
This section has found that two competing theses have emerged on passive 
representation within the contested society – Brown’s staunch defence of the merit 
principle is rejected by Esman who views equality of actual representation to be most 
important. Dresang finds no correlation between ethnicity and resource allocation, but 
submits that some level of passive representation is required for public legitimacy. 
Chapter five develops this debate further, investigating whether or not community 
quotas are a necessity in attaining a critical mass of the out-group within the public 
administration. 
Studies of passive representation however do not inform us how bureaucrats 
actually behave within the contested environment. To answer this question we need to 
shift the debate from passive representation to active representation and determine 
who bureaucrats within divided societies actually represent – their personal 
communities, their political masters, their professional community or do they simply 
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perceive themselves as cogs in the machine, guided by laws, constitutions and treaties? 
Existing research indicates that values guide behaviour. If the bureaucrat is found to 
have considerable discretion in the allocation of resources and provision of services, the 
values that guide bureaucratic decision-making therefore affect the success of power-
sharing arrangements. To decide the best means of developing administrative capacity 
we need to look at how citizens can be represented in the bureaucracy – representative 
bureaucracy theory can guide us in this. Once we understand who and what bureaucrats 
represent within the bureaucracy, we will understand how governance reform 
structures will be either employed or exploited by the bureaucratic elite. The next 
section develops this question further.  
 
2.4 Completing the picture: other aspects of representative bureaucracy research 
The review of the literature thus far has identified a gap in our understanding of how 
the bureaucracy affects conflict. Debates in conflict management literature have to date 
concentrated on the extent to which passive representation within the bureaucracy 
legitimises the actions of the bureaucracy. The wider representative bureaucracy debate 
in more cohesive societies has identified the concept of active representation. In this 
section I look at the various mechanisms through which these studies of active 
representation can shed some light on how the bureaucrat operates within the 
governance structures of divided societies. 
 The divided society is a very unique entity, yet it can learn a great deal from 
studies in more cohesive states. Keiser et al (2002) investigate when passive 
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representation translates into active representation for women. Based on Pitkin’s (1967) 
research they ask when is a woman ‘standing for women’ and when would we expect 
women to ‘act for women’ (Keiser et al, 2002: 553). This distinction is important for the 
contested society as we need to know when certain groups simply physically resemble 
their counterparts in society and when they actively represent their interests. Lim 
(2006) looks at the factors that lead to active representation – why do minority 
bureaucrats produce benefits for their social group? Minority bureaucrats can benefit 
their own communities directly, but also indirectly through changing the behaviours of 
others. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) find that an increase in female police officers 
corresponds with an increase in reported instances of rape. Is this due to the passive 
representation of women, now acting for women, or as Lim (2006) advocates, through 
changes women induce in their male counterparts? Lim (2006: 203) calls for much more 
research into the ‘direct and indirect sources of passive representation’s substantive 
effects’. Hindera (1993: 436) found that ‘the human condition tends to govern the 
allocation patterns of the agency to an even greater extent than does the environment’. 
Thus, if we are to understand the root causes of active representation, we need to 
understand this human condition – the attitudes, norms and values of civil servants – 
and look at how these are manifested and constrained.  
 Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) advance our understanding of when 
representative bureaucracy is likely to occur subconsciously, however, as they concede, 
their quantitative research design cannot inform us whether it is Lim’s indirect 
‘socialised’ representation by men, or direct active representation by women, that has 
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caused an increase in active representation. Such a distinction would have to take into 
account Hindera’s (1993) appeal for an investigation into attitudinal research. If (as 
according to Lim, 2006) it is possible for men to represent women and Blacks to 
represent the interests of Hispanics, can it be expected therefore that a Walloon or a 
Hutu may represent something other than Walloon or Hutu interests? And if so, under 
what circumstances do they set aside these primary associations?    
As bureaucracies reform, or are encouraged to reform, changes are ideally 
guided by bureaucratic values. If these values are not accounted for, tension arises 
between reform efforts and the bureaucrats (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006). As it is 
bureaucrats who make decisions, not institutions or structures, the norms and values 
that guide decision-making within these organisations are of particular interest. 
Fitzpatrick (2007) finds that an alignment of values promotes cooperation among 
different groups within an organisation. It is therefore necessary to understand these 
bureaucratic values before reform efforts take place. Mengistu and Vogel (2006) employ 
Kaufman’s three bureaucratic values that guide bureaucratic reform – authoritarian 
(executive) leadership, representativeness and bureaucratic neutrality. It is, Kaufman 
submits, the interaction of these three values that determine bureaucratic values. For 
Mengistu and Vogel (2006), national values are a prerequisite for stability and 
professional continuity. This however may not be the most successful of strategies. In an 
ethnically contested society, where state legitimacy is often contested and various 
‘nations’ exist, common primary associations cannot be expected to develop easily. It is 
unrealistic, or at least improbable, for example to expect loyalists and republicans, in 
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the case of Belfast, or Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, in the case of Jerusalem, to unite 
around a common support for the state or nation. To further exemplify this with respect 
to our case study – a Northern Irish identity may indeed emerge in Northern Ireland (see 
chapter one: description of the data, table 1.1), however the opportunity for a Northern 
Irish identity to come into direct confrontation with either an Irish or British identity 
remains probable. Thus although an alignment of values is necessary to ensure 
bureaucratic structures are not routinely corruptly exploited, common values on 
support for the ‘nation’ or the ‘state’ should not be relied upon. Rather, if secondary 
associations, such as professional or technocratic values were to dominate the 
administration, weaker learned alignments along national or state criteria would not be 
a prerequisite for shared values. In chapter six I investigate the possibility of bureaucrats 
taking on a secondary learned identity.  
Thus far in this section we have seen that the debate within the contested 
society must shift from passive to active representation, but must be broader in scope 
than our existing understanding of active representation from more cohesive societies. 
While most active representation research looks at the extent to which bureaucrats 
represent their primary beliefs (colour, religion, ethnicity, language, sex etc), in the 
divided society we must ask if it is possible for a secondary, socially constructed, 
association to trump these primary associations? Further research is required to 
establish the precise values that guide the behaviour of bureaucrats within plural 
societies. What guides bureaucrats of different ethnic origins in allocating resources: 
primary associations such as attachments along ethnic, gender or racial appearances; or 
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secondary, learned/socialised associations such as a professional or technocratic 
identity. These are the questions that will lead to a greater understanding of how the 
bureaucracy affects conflict.  
However, for active representation to take place numerical sufficiency, or a 
‘critical mass’, of each group is required (Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). 
For a Sephardi Jew to actively represent the interests of Sephardi Jews in Israeli society, 
a critical mass of Sephardi Jews is required within the bureaucracy – this does not 
necessarily have to mean direct proportionate representation. Nachmias and 
Rosenbloom (1973: 596) submit that: 
‘whether civil servants conceive of themselves as being representative  
of the social groups in which they have their origins, or think that  
representation of such groups should be a part of their role, is likely to 
 be partially dependent on the extent to which members of their groups 
and members of other, and perhaps competing groups, are found  
within an organisation’.  
Keiser et al (2002) and Meier and O’Toole (2006) concur arguing that a ‘critical mass’ of 
passive representation is required for active representation to take place; or that a 
degree of passive representation is necessary for active representation. Therefore, in a 
contested society, where sufficient numbers of the secondary identity (eg. A 
professional attachment) exist within the bureaucracy, we must ask do bureaucrats 
actively represent their own personal (primary) identities, or are bureaucrats guided by 
secondary learned, socialised, norms? If so what are these secondary norms – 
attachment to ‘the national interest’ as advocated by Mengistu and Vogel (2006), or 
attachment to a professional idea or programme as suggested by this dissertation? 
These questions are the focus of chapter six. 
82 
 
Even though the human condition may be more important than the environment 
in determining resource allocation, we cannot simply ignore the evidence that 
structures affect the formulation of this human condition or behaviour. Just as 
bureaucratic behaviour affects the norms of the institution; it would be unreasonable to 
suggest that the bureaucrat remains unaffected by the institutional surroundings. It is 
therefore also necessary to understand what hinders the development of active 
representation on the part of a primary identity. Wilkins and Williams (2008) find that 
organisational socialisation can hinder the link between passive and active 
representation. Within the divided society, Dresang’s (1974) earlier study finds similarly, 
submitting that bureaucrats personal community interests are constrained by their 
personal professional ambitions to advance within the organisation. Keiser et al (2002), 
while finding a link between passive representation and active representation on the 
part of a primary identity, also acknowledge that the institutional context affects 
whether passive representation leads to active representation. In a contested city 
what/who do bureaucrats represent? Are the institutions strong enough to affect 
identity? As found by Rehfuss (1986), active representation on behalf of one’s primary 
identity can be restricted through socialisation in an uncontested society – can similar 
instances be found in the ethno-nationally contested society? Further, Grissom et al 
(2009) reinforce the belief that not only does the organisation matter but also that the 
environment in which the organisation is situated matters. They find that blacks in 
southern American states tend to actively represent their personal communities more 
so than black bureaucrats in northern America states. Thus institutional, political and 
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social environments all influence the existence of active representation. An 
understanding of aspects hindering the development of secondary identities in 
contested environments will contribute to our understanding of how these obstacles to 
a professional, efficient, equitable bureaucracy may be overcome. If we are to enhance 
administrative capacity in contested societies, we must understand the factors 
influencing bureaucratic behaviour – institutional, political and social. Are certain 
political arrangements more conducive to a professional bureaucracy? How does the 
contested nature of the society influence bureaucratic behaviour?  
 Meier and O’Toole (2006), highlight the role and power of bureaucratic values 
within US public education. Similarly Balla (1998) questions the ability of rules and 
procedures to enhance political control, thus leaving the professional administrator 
more scope within the decision-making process. Although organisations may have 
similar structures, it is how these structures are exploited that is of interest to this 
study. Sowa and Selden (2003: 707) reiterate the importance of norms and values in 
determining discretion submitting that in ‘empirical tests of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, scholars must pay attention to the discretion assumed by administrators… 
as administrators’ perceptions of their discretion to act has now been shown to have a 
direct influence on the policy outcomes these individuals produce’. Therefore not only is 
the bureaucracy worthy of study but also the study must go beyond the rules and 
procedures of the bureaucracy and concentrate on the norms and values of individual 
bureaucrats. If the bureaucracy is found to have discretion within the contested society, 
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whether personal norms supersede institutional or professional norms in guiding 
bureaucratic resource allocation must be determined. 
 This section has drawn upon more advanced research within more cohesive 
societies in order to understand how similar problems of bureaucrat role perceptions 
and resource allocation have been studied. Within the contested society we need to 
understand who and what bureaucrats actively represent, when allocating resources 
and making decisions under various institutional and societal conditions. We will then 
know the importance of group representation at each decision-making level. We also 
need to understand what conditions affect the development of these behaviours – Are 
organisational structures, the social environment or political condition such that 
personal allegiances are replaced or superseded by bureaucratic or professional 
allegiances? Do merit based systems support the development of this secondary, more 
technocratic, mindset; thereby encouraging an institutional environment where 
representation of one’s personal identity is actively discouraged? Research within 
conflict management needs to draw on such questions to create a more complete 
picture of the conflict management process.  
 
2.5 Inferences from existing research 
General findings concur that a crucial component of a stable democracy is the creation 
of a professional civil service (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010; Lee, 2009; Menghesha and 
Common, 2007; Ncholo, 2000; Carroll and Carroll, 2000 among others). Underlining the 
importance of the ‘recruitment factor’, Esman (1997: 532) submits, ‘there is much to be 
85 
 
learned about the interface between public administration, ethnic conflict and 
economic development in related areas of participation in state bureaucracies…’. 
However much of the governance research to date has centred on the economy, social 
and political representation, NGOs and public participation. Although references to the 
bureaucracy are numerous, bureaucrats themselves are rarely the focus of analysis. In 
many cases, the contribution of the bureaucracy has been ‘assumed’ by its perceived 
effects rather than ‘measured’ by its structures, norms and values. Even in mechanisms 
of conflict management that rely on the oppression of the ‘out-group’, it is unrealistic to 
put forward that bureaucrats are simply cogs in the machine with only minimal 
discretion. As William Niskanen (1971:5) reminds us: ‘any theory of the behaviour of 
bureaus that does not incorporate the personal preferences of bureaucrats...will be 
relevant only in the most rigidly authoritarian environments’. What is required is a 
comprehensive analysis of the bureaucracy, examining the extent to which bureaucrats 
in the contested society actually possess discretion, and if they do what are the norms 
and values that influence their decisions. These questions will lead to answers beyond 
the appraisal of governance mechanisms and instruments and explain how they are 
actually employed or exploited. The governance literature is pretty comprehensive in its 
analysis of where NGO’s, civil society organisations and politicians see the obstacles to 
good governance, but where do bureaucrats themselves see the obstacles? Kaufmann 
and his colleagues at the World Bank (1999), along with Hyden et al (2003), have 
conducted large-N studies incorporating numerous cities and countries, yet a deeper 
understanding of the impact of individual bureaucrat decisions on urban conflict is 
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necessary. Scott Bollens’ (2000) research, through an ‘urban planning’ lens in Belfast 
and Jerusalem, displays the value of case study analysis of the bureaucracy. The ‘public 
administration’ lens can contribute equally to this understanding. Public administration 
research has significantly developed over the past century; however these concepts, 
already employed within more cohesive societies and developing societies, need to be 
employed in ethno-nationally contested societies in order to understand how the 
bureaucracy contributes to conflict management. 
The findings, in general, demonstrate an absence of scholarly interest in applying 
theories of public administration to contested environments. While studies in more 
cohesive societies have explored the nature of the bureaucrat’s actions, those studies 
drawing on public administration theory tend to investigate the attaining of an 
ethnically representative bureaucracy. If the debate is to be fully informed, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the concept of active representation is required. 
Alternative approaches tend to assess the success of various administrative reform 
processes and together with large scale studies aim at determining the structures 
necessary for developing administrative capacity. These indeed provide necessary 
analysis of public administration within the contested and developing society. 
Nonetheless, for a comprehensive understanding of how the bureaucracy affects 
conflict management, existing research will have to give greater prominence to well 
established public administration theory. One avenue of possible research would be to 
investigate the norms and values held by both minority and majority bureaucrats within 
contested environments.  
87 
 
Existing literature tends to view active representation as a minority activity; 
however in a society where primary associations are so strong, active representation is 
equally as likely among the majority group and must also be measured. Crighton and 
Mac Iver (1991) determine that identity driven fears are not simply reserved for ethnic 
minorities but can also motivate the majority of the population. Where personal 
allegiances traditionally outweigh allegiances to the state, it is also crucial to understand 
the factors that promote or inhibit the creation of a professional technocratic mentality. 
Jacobs (2009: 218) talks of generating ‘reform minded civil servants’. In her study 
Bissessar (2009) emphasises that a ‘change in attitudes and behaviour will be required’ 
among the bureaucratic elite, if New Public Management is to be implemented in 
countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. If these attitudes and behaviours 
are to change they first must be understood. If attitudes and behaviours are simply 
ignored, even the most robust of structures will be manipulated and exploited in favour 
of either personal or group advantage. In sum, as both Esman (1997: 528) and Brown 
(1999: 369) establish, the literature on ethnopolitics ignores the importance of public 
administration to the conflict management and development process. Research is 
required to determine who bureaucrats represent and determine their core beliefs and 
values that in turn guide decision-making. Only then will we understand how the 
bureaucracy affects conflict management.  
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
We have seen throughout the review that studies of governance in conflict 
management literature tend to refer to the bureaucracies structural weaknesses and 
negative effects on society without understanding how these structures are 
exploited/employed by bureaucrats. Although the bureaucracy alone will not bring 
peace to contested societies, its role does need to be acknowledged and understood. 
Solutions are indeed required at the political, social and judicial levels, but also at the 
public administration level. Solutions must be robust, durable and efficient. Evidence 
from existing conflict management literature tends to confirm a universal dissatisfaction 
with the contribution of the bureaucracy to conflict management. Academic research 
needs therefore to identify the role of the bureaucracy (and the bureaucrat) in 
sustaining power-sharing systems of governance. Two research questions emerge from 
this review of the literature. Firstly, do bureaucrats in the consociational environment 
have similar levels of discretion as their counterparts in more cohesive societies? 
Secondly, if they do so, what norms and values guide the bureaucrat in these instances 
of autonomy/discretion? An understanding of bureaucrat role perceptions and 
bureaucrat norms and values is therefore central to understanding the effects 
governance structures will have on conflict management and on development. While it 
is important to understand what governance structures to adopt, it is also important to 
understand how bureaucrats will interact with these structures, thereby influencing 
policy outcomes. If a secondary identity is found to guide bureaucrats’ interaction with 
governance structures, it is also important to determine the basis of this secondary 
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identity. Although this understanding is important to all developed and developing 
societies and cities, the role of resource allocators in a conflict environment can have 
more far reaching consequences.  
In the next chapter I return to the first research question, looking at the role of 
the bureaucrat in decision-making within Belfast City Council. Professional 
administrators are found to possess significant influence in the rules and processes 
which affect the allocation of resources. It is not sufficient however to determine that 
senior bureaucrats influence resource allocation but we must also determine the 
instances in which they have influence. Drawing on three different decision typologies I 
explore the decision-making environment within Belfast City Council subsequent to 
power-sharing taking hold. I investigate the types of decision where the bureaucrat is 
most likely to be able to influence policy and the types of decision where the bureaucrat 
is seen to have little influence. 
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3 
Belfast revisited: Colourful policy making in a contested 
environment 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A year before the much celebrated 1998 Good Friday Agreement; the Belfast electorate 
returned a hung Council to govern their city. The following years facilitated a transition 
from hegemonic or domination mechanisms of conflict management towards the 
traditionally more acceptable approach of power-sharing. Such a change provides us 
with an opportunity to understand the nature of public policy within an emerging 
power-sharing environment. Drawing on evidence from interviews with Belfast’s 
bureaucratic elite, this chapter investigates how power-sharing changes the nature of 
elite level bureaucrat responsibilities within a contested society.  
For researchers and practitioners alike, power-sharing is often advocated as the 
conflict management mechanism of choice. Numerous literature reviews point to the 
pioneering works of Lijphart (1969), Nordlinger (1972), and McGarry and O’Leary (1993) 
in developing the most sympathetic environment for successful power-sharing. Along 
with more recent contributions (Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008; Wimmer and 
Schetter, 2003), these studies tend to prioritise consociation at the political level. 
Schneckener (2002) correlates bad rules and procedures, even in the presence of 
otherwise beneficial factors, with the failure of power-sharing. Although numerous, 
these references to decision-making refer primarily to political level decisions. The 
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bureaucracy does not feature as an independent variable (where the management of 
conflict is the dependent variable). While indeed the politico-administrative dichotomy 
has been the subject of much research within the uncontested society, this relationship 
within the contested society is less understood. Bollens’ (2000) research explores this 
dichotomy in the divided society through an urban planning lens. This study adds to 
Bollens (2000) research, outlining how the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy changes as a 
society progresses from a majoritarian, hegemonic-controlled divided society (as 
studied by Bollens) to a power-sharing society. Drawing on new evidence from Belfast, 
the study highlights the need to also incorporate a public administration approach into 
conflict management research. While examining the political influence on street level 
bureaucrat activity is indeed a necessity (Lipsky, 1980), attention is also required at the 
elite level (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978). As previously outlined, my concern within 
this research is restricted to elite level bureaucrats. Taking three broadly defined 
‘decision typologies’ in turn, this chapter finds the bureaucratic elite to play a pivotal 
role in decisions that affect conflict management. Administrative reform is generally 
acknowledged as a key tenet of achieving better governance (Zhang and Thomas, 2009, 
among others. Cfr. Literature Review). The empirical results propose that administrative 
reform is also a key tenet of conflict management as the role of the bureaucrat 
increases under power-sharing conditions. Given the opportunity of the bureaucracy to 
affect conflict management, a major goal of ethnopolitics must be to create an effective, 
efficient, yet fair and equitable public administration.  
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Fieldwork conducted by Scott Bollens during the winter of 1994/1995 provides 
what is probably one of the most formidable contributions to our understanding of how 
the bureaucracy operates within the contested society under the domination 
mechanism of conflict management26. His study of Belfast identifies the negative and 
unintended effects of ‘colour-blind’ procedures. The disregard for the sectarian context 
by the bureaucratic elite, he believes, has the potential to prolong rather than manage 
conflict (Bollens, 2000: 258). This neutral strategy relies on technical rational data in 
resource allocation, distancing itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities 
and political exclusion. As citizens are treated as individuals and not as being from a 
particular community, this gives rise to the term colour-blind. Bollens (2000: 230) wrote 
extensively on the need to contextualise technical decision-making concluding that 
Belfast evidences ‘greyness where colour matters’. Returning to Belfast ten/fifteen 
years later as a power-sharing society, this chapter investigates if there has been a 
change in policy making within this contested city. Do bureaucrats contextualise their 
evidence within the framework of a contested city or do they continue to follow neutral, 
colour-blind policies? As put forward in the introductory chapter, Stanfield (1996) 
proposes that we know very little about how different ethnicities coexist. Varshney 
(2002:6) reinforces the sentiment, maintaining that ‘until we study ethnic peace, we will 
not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict’; this study goes someway to 
understanding how differing ethnopolitical groups are collectively governed. Brinkerhoff 
                                                 
26 The fieldwork for Bollens’ research was conducted shortly after the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 which 
ultimately paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Power-sharing has been the mode of 
governance within Belfast City Council since 1997. In 2007 the Council adopted a ‘committee’ governance 
structure. 
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(2010), Morgan, Baser and Morin (2010) and Lee (2009) too speak of the necessity to 
increase administrative ‘capacity’ within developing environments. The results of this 
investigation do not simply find bureaucrat role perceptions to change with power-
sharing, but also demonstrate that developing administrative capacity is crucial, not 
simply for attaining the objective of good governance, but in the stabilisation and 
normalisation process. 
Returning to Belfast in 2008, Bollens (2008: 2) categorised the Belfast peace 
process as ‘fragile’. I am most concerned with the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining 
the power-sharing agreement. Put differently, in 1997 Belfast ceased to be a Council 
where one community ‘dominated’ the other, adopting the traditionally more 
acceptable form of conflict management: power-sharing. It is necessary to investigate 
how this transition to power-sharing has affected the role of the bureaucratic elite in 
Belfast.27 While Bollens’ (2000) approach uses an urban planning lens to theoretically 
inform his process tracing approach, this research is grounded more firmly in public 
administration. The approach also differs from Bollens’ (2000) in that the entire 
bureaucratic elite of the City Council are taken as the target universe. Instead of 
examining two policy areas, as in Bollens (2000), and extrapolating the findings to 
describe policy-making more generally within the city, a cross-section of departments 
within the urban environment are examined. As outlined in the introduction, interviews 
are restricted to members of the bureaucratic elite – directors of departments, heads of 
                                                 
27I am most concerned with the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy. Of course it is acknowledged that factors 
external to urban governance influence this relationship (such as the Good Friday and St. Andrews 
Agreements, and also interactions with regional, national and supranational bodies etc). I am most 
interested however in determining the nature of the bureaucrat-politician relationship, not why it is so. 
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service, and in cases of particular interest to the contested city, senior departmental 
managers were also included.  Bollens’ (2000) selection criteria are based on 
functionality, whereas the selection criteria employed here are grounded in 
institutionalism. This is so for one primary reason. Under direct rule much authority was 
removed from local politicians to diminish their discriminatory activities. Local councils 
were highly politicised. Now that the (urban) conflict management process is well 
established, the local council is gradually expanding its authority once again. Relying on 
institutionalism rather than functionalism, allows us to ascertain the type of 
organisation that would inherit any new responsibilities under any review of public 
administration. Twenty, in-person, semi-structured interviews were conducted between 
August and November of 2009, each interview averaging about an hour and a half in 
length. The questionnaire was designed so as to allow for maximum input from the 
interviewee, within the constraints of the research question. In conjunction with the 
qualitative data, results from the closed questions are also presented to enumerate the 
degree of sentiment surrounding certain themes. The sample size of twenty represents 
43% of the forty-seven elite level staff. Twenty-five of this forty-seven were targeted for 
interview28. Interviewees were selected solely by the occupational position they held, 
not by perceived religious affiliation, class, nationality or gender and were given on 
condition of anonymity. It transpired that eight Roman Catholics were interviewed 
together with seven Protestants, while five perceived themselves to belong to neither 
                                                 
28 Five of those targeted either did not respond or were too busy to be interviewed. 
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community. Ten men and ten women completed the sample. Extracts from the 
interviews are included throughout the chapter and are numbered one to twenty. 
Making use of Nvivo software, the qualitative aspects of these interviews were 
documented, coded and analysed. In order to categorise and subsequently analyse the 
data, I draw on a conceptual framework designed by Radaelli (1999). Radaelli (1999) 
submits that the decision-making process is determined by the complexity and salience 
of the policy. Based on his research, I coded any reference to how policy was formulated 
or to how decisions were made into three clusters of interest: Significance was firstly 
attributed to any mention of policy making in areas where existing public administration 
research would lead us to expect maximum bureaucratic influence over policy 
formulation, or in other words, the traditionally more mundane areas of service 
provision – areas of low technical complexity and low public interest (Category A 
decisions). Secondly, references to policy making in areas of low technical complexity 
and high political interest were coded. I subsequently further subdivided codes in this 
section. The first subcategory recorded decision making relating to large scale one-off 
projects. Sometimes these would be issues left over from the conflict – for example the 
redevelopment of a highly symbolic army barracks or police station, but would also 
include less contentious issues such as the building of a waste incinerator or a sports 
stadium (Category B decisions). The second sub category highlighted day-to-day 
decisions that attracted high levels of public interest. It is this latter section that I am 
most interested in – the day to day management of the city. The project through which 
this research has been funded, Conflict in Cities, seeks to establish the role of urban 
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institutions in regulating the everyday lives of people in urban conflict societies. This 
latter category provides an opportunity to understand the day-to-day management of a 
successfully managed contested city. Policies that would often be described as mundane 
in more cohesive societies often develop or maintain a controversial nature within a 
contested society. It is for this reason that significantly more attention is attributed to 
determining the politico-administrative dichotomy in such policy areas (Category C 
decisions). Dividing the research into these different policy types will provide a clearer 
picture of the policy-making process which in turn will generate a more nuanced 
understanding of how conflict is managed within the city. The following paragraphs 
provide an overview of both Belfast, and the governance structures of its City Council, 
while section three introduces some expectations and hypotheses. The next sections 
introduce the findings, taking each of the three broadly defined categorisations in turn, 
determining how the advent of power-sharing has changed the nature of the 
bureaucracy within this traditionally contested city. As just outlined, given the aims of 
the chapter, considerably more attention is given to the latter field of enquiry. 
 
 
3.2 Background to the city 
Until 1997, Belfast was a Unionist Council, representing only one community and even 
at that, Bollens (2000: 230) finds the interests of this community to have been poorly 
served with local politicians being more interested in the Anglo-Irish agreement than in 
the everyday lives of their constituents. In 1997, the people of Belfast returned 25 
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unionist Councillors, 20 nationalist or republican Councillors, leaving non-aligned 
Alliance holding the balance of power with six seats. The political level were forced to 
cooperate if the Council was to continue to function. Since 1997, power-sharing, relying 
on informal norms and practices, has governed the functioning of the City Council. 
Recall, it is the purpose of this chapter to understand how the bureaucracy has adapted 
to this change. Understanding if and how power-sharing has changed the nature of 
public policy formulation, will inform us of the need to take into account the role of the 
bureaucracy in any transition from domination mechanisms of conflict management to 
power-sharing mechanisms of conflict management.29   
Bollens’ (2000) research suggests that policy making in Belfast before power-
sharing (in 1994) was neutral or colourless. Bureaucrats, he finds, employed technical 
rational criteria in the allocation of resources, distancing themselves from the issues of 
ethnic identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. During the mid nineties, 
bureaucrats sought to depoliticise territorial issues, solving problems through 
professional and technical criteria. Neutral policy making has been widely criticised by 
Bollens (2000) and others (see Torgovnik, 1991; Forester, 1989; Nordlinger, 1972) for its 
social conservatism, over technical emphasis and its inability to address issues 
containing ethnic characteristics. Krishnarayan and Thomas (1993) also criticised it for 
being insensitive or dismissive of the different needs of minority citizens. Bollens’ (2000) 
                                                 
29 While the environment within the City Council has indeed changed with power-sharing, changes in role 
perceptions must be contextualised within the larger Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement which was 
signed a year later and the subsequent increase in Council activities that this permitted. However, this 
chapter is concerned with the politician-bureaucrat relationship and space does not permit including 
national and supranational level variables. I am not so much interested in why the relationship has 
changed, but ‘if’ the relationship has changed, and if so ‘how’ has it changed.  
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analysis of the bureaucracy of the mid 1990s was overtly technocratic, existing solely to 
provide a service within the status quo. Conflict management was not a function of the 
bureaucracy. However, despite being ignored in government plans and blueprints, 
sectarianism was nonetheless acknowledged in policy formulation – ‘it was as if we 
were carrying out a plan for two cities that happened to overlap each other’; what 
Bollens terms ‘plural planning’ (Bollens, 2000: 233). While addressing the two colours of 
the city, blue and green, no effort was made to ‘disturb the volatile territoriality of the 
city’ (ibid: 233). Before power-sharing, sectarianism was ‘accepted as a characteristic of 
the urban setting’ (ibid: 233). The bureaucratic elite did not perceive it to be their role to 
challenge this status quo.  
Bollens’ (2000) interview data also suggest a somewhat excessively cautious and 
meticulous atmosphere within the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic elite appeared to be 
more concerned with appearing neutral rather than suggesting solutions and reforming 
policies: ‘Policy makers and administrators amidst ethnic polarisation do not wish to be 
perceived as ‘social engineers’, viewing such a role as producing more harm than good’ 
(Bollens, 2000: 231). They did however acknowledge the environment in which they 
worked:  
‘Traditionally we said “we’re blind”, this is an honourable position. However to 
carry out our responsibilities further, we must have an understanding of the two 
sides and their different needs’ (Bollens, 2000: 233/234). 
  
Throughout Bollens’ Belfast interviews, this theme of neutrality takes precedence. 
Based on Bollens’ research I deduce the bureaucratic elite in 1994 to be responsive to 
society and politicians. The bureaucratic elite were not leaders nor were they actively 
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involved in conflict management. They did not set the agenda nor did they define the 
scope of research. Further, this period evidenced much contracting out of ‘research’, 
where ‘consultants would simply return with the result favoured by those 
commissioning the report’ (Interview 4).  
 Finally, if the decision-making environment had not changed since power-
sharing, bureaucrat views of their political masters would also have remained constant. 
As previously alluded to, the politico-administrative axis has been found by Bollens to be 
overtly unproductive during the eighties and early nineties. Politicians, he describes as 
being: ‘among the greatest obstacles to effective urban planning...whose relative lack of 
power frees them to be extreme in their interactions with government’ (Bollens, 2000: 
229). Interview evidence supports his claim that they ‘rant and rave at consultation 
meetings to show their communities that they care’, describing them as ‘leading from 
the back’ (ibid: 229). Local politicians are further described as ‘obstacles to the 
establishment of cross-community bridges’ (ibid: 229). One of Bollens’ interviewees 
goes so far as to describe monthly Council sessions as resembling ‘juveniles on a 
playground more than locally elected officials in a forum’ (ibid: 230). The sum of these 
factors created an environment within the bureaucracy that appears to have been very 
pressured, ‘under the gun and unable to promote the organisation proactively’ (ibid: 
232). Hadfield (1992) found that direct rule in Belfast resulted in ‘“an almost complete 
absence of representative participation and accountability” with the locally elected 51-
member unionist majority Belfast City Council having severely constrained policymaking 
power’ (Bollens, 2001: 85). To summarise, policy before power-sharing, did indeed take 
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into account the two colours of the city, however only in so far as to preserve the status 
quo. Public servants did not rock the boat. They were in essence preservers of the status 
quo, while trying to make progress in their own particular policy areas. Morale was low 
and bureaucrats were lead as opposed to leading. Conflict management was most 
certainly not a function of the bureaucracy. Finally, the bureaucratic elite perceived the 
political level (Councillors) to be an obstacle to effective policy-making. Following the 
Good Friday Agreement, Councils across Northern Ireland slowly (re)expanded their 
competencies. The politician-bureaucrat dichotomy therefore necessitates closer 
examination in order to understand how policy today is actually formulated and to 
understand how conflict management is actually sustained. 
 
3.3 Expectations 
Let us start the exploration into how power-sharing has changed bureaucratic activity 
through an examination of how bureaucrats today perceive policy making. Recall the 
aim of this research is to determine if the politician-bureaucrat relationship has 
sufficiently changed since power-sharing became the status quo to warrant further 
research. The following paragraphs draw on three categories of decision-making where 
we can see how decision-making has changed as power-sharing has emerged. Firstly we 
turn to policy making in non-controversial policy areas (Decision type A). Typically, as 
demonstrated by the bureaucracy at the supranational level, where cultural differences 
also emerge, the bureaucracy can be expected to have maximum influence in areas of 
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low public and political interest (Radaelli, 1999). These areas of activity tend to be highly 
regulated. Similar findings are expected within the contested society.  
Conversely it is also expected that in areas of high public interest and low 
complexity, political influence will be maximised (ibid: 767). By extension, in the 
contested city, we would expect the bureaucracy to have least influence in the decision-
making process in areas of controversy. High public and political interest, combined with 
low levels of uncertainty and technical complexity are theoretically the traditional areas 
of maximum political influence on policy (Radaelli, 1999). In his pan-European study of 
power-sharing successes and failures, Ulrich Schneckener (2002) too points to the 
crucial role of political elites in sustaining shared rule. Therefore, in such cases it would 
be expected that the political level would have greater influence over policy outcomes 
and the decision-making processes than the bureaucrat. Adapting the framework to the 
contested urban environment, I have subdivided this category into one-off decisions 
that are of high public interest (Category B) and secondly decisions that could be 
described as ‘day-to-day decisions’ of high public interest (Category C). This third 
category of interest identified decision-making in areas that were of high public interest 
at the urban level, which were not technically complex. Given the physically divided 
nature of the city, these decisions often incorporated a potentially sectarian element. 
This category of decision making incorporated the majority of bureaucrat’s interaction 
with the political level. As these decisions involved low technical complexity and were of 
direct interest to the political level and their electorate, political level influence was also 
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assumed to trump bureaucrat influence on outcomes. To summarise it was expected 
that in: 
Decision type A, low public interest: maximum bureaucrat influence 
Decision type B, low technical complexity, high public interest one-off decisions: 
maximum politician influence 
Decision type C, low technical complexity, high (urban) public interest day-to-day 
decisions: maximum politician influence 
 
3.4 Low public interest (Type A) 
Returning now to what are perceived as the more mundane, non controversial 
decisions, where we expect public interest to be low and hence political interest to also 
be correspondingly low. Bureaucratic officials are expected to have maximum input into 
policy design and implementation. The Belfast results however indicate that thirteen 
members of the bureaucratic elite (65%) perceive the political level to have an interest 
in low public interest areas.30 Respondents were also similarly divided on the assertion 
that the political level only interests itself in issues directly affecting their own 
communities. More comprehensively however, only two respondents (10%) described 
the political level as being ‘fairly involved’ with their department, with the remainder 
responding ‘seldom involved’ or not ‘at all involved’. Interest therefore should not be 
confused with influence. Decisions at this level appear to be simply rubber stamped by 
the political level. In these areas, senior bureaucrats largely report to committee based 
on evidence and research conducted by the department or by external consultants, with 
one single option to proceed with. Amendments can be made to this option, but 
decisions falling into this category are generally accepted in their recommended form. 
                                                 
30 Results from a questionnaire which formed the basis of the semi-structured interview 
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Feeling on the option is gauged before hand to anticipate political reaction: ‘An options 
paper will only be presented if the cuts are to be political...but even then a 
recommendation is always made’ (Interview 4). This recommendation is almost always 
carried, with or without alterations. Together with this, not all decisions made at these 
levels make it to Council. This is demonstrated by a number of interviewees: ‘once I 
have the money I don’t need to go to Council’ (Interview 19); ‘we filter a lot of 
information...there is incapacity at the political level to understand a lot of the technical 
stuff’ (Interview 2). Decisions in this category also appear to be heavily regulated, which 
in turn leaves less scope for the political skewing of resources or services. Bureaucrats 
on the other hand do have additional scope, being guided by the ‘professional 
judgement of risk’ (Interview 5). An example from one such area – food safety – 
indicates that politicians do occasionally try to influence what premises are assessed. 
However within the current power-sharing administration, the bureaucrat is strong 
enough to rely on the existing regulation to support his/her decision. Scientific reports, 
used to determine resource allocation, prevent skewing of resources by Councillors. 
While regulations generally do not leave much scope for interpretation, it is the view of 
the bureaucrat that interprets the regulation, not that of the politician. Other such 
examples in areas of waste service provision and cleansing evidence similar results. 
 In these areas, the political level is occasionally found to increase its involvement 
at the behest of either one or a collective of constituents. The bureaucratic elite 
prioritise these concerns, and where possible do allocate resources according to political 
level direction. This allocation is always grounded in technical criteria. In these non-
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controversial policy areas such as the provision of specialist waste facilities or graffiti 
removal, the bureaucracy will give precedence to the Councillor’s query, and where 
possible will allocate resources accordingly: ‘Even though I don’t give them everything 
they want, I give them something’ (Interview 16). Bureaucrats ‘always keep some 
[money] for political interests’ (Interview 4). However, this is not always possible as it 
cannot be technically justified. One of the many examples was the provision of ‘brown 
bins’ for organic waste to an area of the city. Although researched by the department, 
facilities for dealing with the ‘brown bin’ waste were operating at full capacity and 
therefore the department could not grant the Councillor’s wishes to extend service 
provision to his area (Interview 14). Petitions in this category are rarely based on 
sectarian grounds, but more firmly rooted in the elected representative trying to get the 
maximum level of service for his constituents. ‘I have rarely experienced a situation 
whereby Councillors deliberately sought to not serve one community – rarely would a 
Councillor manipulate the evidence but it happens as if by default’31 (Interview 9).  
 Thus in areas of low public interest and high regulation, political level interest 
does exist, but as expected political influence in affecting resource allocation is low. 
There is nothing to suggest that this was not the case before power-sharing. Recall 
Bollens’ (2000) finding that urban politicians were more interested in the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement than conditions within the city. In areas of low public interest civil servants 
or bureaucrats will be guided by personal or organisational norms, seeking political 
                                                 
31 As there is a high degree of segregation in Belfast, politicians tend to represent only one community. 
Two thirds of Belfast’s population live in areas where over 81% of residents are of the same religion. 
Shirlow and Murtagh (2006)  
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guidance only where additional finances or capacity are required. The political level may 
bring a subject to the attention of the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat will in turn endeavour 
to respond, but is usually constrained in his/her response by regulation or limitations of 
technical capacity.  
 
3.5 Low technical complexity, high public interest, one off decisions (Type B) 
We now turn our attention to resource allocation in arenas of greater public interest. 
When an issue is expected to be controversial, bureaucrats have a variety of 
mechanisms of broaching the decision however the following quotation sums up the 
general approach: 
‘When we know something is going to be contentious we involve the political 
level but otherwise we do it ourselves and just ask them to sign off at 
committee meeting. For divisive or potentially divisive issues we would 
meet with them very regularly and then bring something to committee that 
we hope will be signed off on’ (Interview 9) 
 
Where political interest is high, we firstly look at decision-making in large scale projects, 
often regarded as one off decisions in areas perceived to be of political salience across 
Northern Ireland. Some of these issues would also attract high national public interest 
within more homogenous societies while others could be described as hangovers from 
the conflict. Recalling that in these areas it is expected that public interest would be 
high; and therefore political interest and influence would be correspondingly high. In 
other words, bureaucratic officials are expected to be primarily involved in the 
execution of political decisions, rather than being involved in proposing and shaping 
decisions.  This indeed is found to be the case. Decisions in this category tend to have a 
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stronger political influence. Two recent examples demonstrating support for this 
conclusion are the rejection of the proposed North Belfast incinerator and the decision 
to spend Council funds drawing up plans for a proposed new Northern Ireland stadium. 
‘Up until the decision with the incinerator, members agreed with everything we 
proposed. We always presented it as a win for them (Interview 2). ‘We gave them (the 
political level) numerous briefings, field trips, community surveys, etc but Councillors 
still rejected the incinerator proposals’ (Interview 8). There were similar findings with 
the Belfast stadium project where bureaucrats ‘advised against throwing money’ at the 
stadium (Interview 16, interview 7). The political level again disregarded this advice, 
continuing to support the locating of a sports stadium in Belfast. 
  In areas of high public interest, the political level is seen to have maximum 
influence. This is confirmed by the political rejection of the bureaucratic proposal to 
develop an incinerator plant in North Belfast32. It is further supported by the 
determination of the political level not to heed the advice of Councillors and financially 
support feasibility studies for the development of a sports stadium within the city. Again 
following Radaelli (1999), this finding is not surprising. We should expect higher political 
involvement in non complex, high public interest areas such as this. Further, Flynn 
(2011: 383) in his case study research of decision-making at the Maze prison/Long Kesh 
finds that ‘many see plans for...the site [maze prison/Long Kesh] redevelopment as 
determined by party politics, as well as parochial interests’. While his research is not 
designed to specifically examine the politician-bureaucrat power dichotomy, (and not 
                                                 
32 I am not so much concerned with why they rejected the idea, but with result that they went against the 
‘expert’ advice of their bureaucrats. 
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set within the parameters of Belfast City Council) it is evident that in highly political, and 
not technically complex decisions, politician influences trump the influences of the 
bureaucratic elite. Similarly it would also be expected that it is the political level that 
would control highly symbolic traditionally divisive issues such as the redevelopment of 
the Crumlin Road Gaol (used until 1996 to house nationalist and loyalist prisoners) and 
Girdwood Barracks (a former Army site and a symbol, in the eyes of nationalists of 
British occupation; see O’Dowd and Komarova, (2010)). 
 Attention in the next section turns to the day-to-day decisions that are politically 
salient at the urban level. These day-to-day decisions account for the majority of a 
bureaucrat’s interaction with the political level. Is the public administrator’s role in the 
policy-making process diminished further in these areas? Public and political interest 
remains high, levels of technical complexity remain low and regulation tends to be less 
explicit. Further, urban politicians (Councillors) are not bound to the same extent by 
national political party stances as these policies tend not to have substantial national 
implications. For example, while the national party may have a position on waste 
incineration or the redevelopment of sites of particular importance to the conflict, the 
location of a playground would not be a political priority for the national party. The 
politician would therefore be expected to possess more discretion to reward supporters 
and punish adversaries (Mladenka, 1980). As party membership largely correlates with 
religious affiliation (with exception of the Alliance party), and day-to-day issues are 
often distributive, we would expect political influence to be maximised in these areas. 
Bollens’ study would also lead us to expect this finding: ‘Local politicians increase their 
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“leadership” role most easily by tapping into separate constituencies, not by seeking to 
span them’ (M. Fitzduff in interview with Bollens, 2000: 229). 
 
3.6 Low technical complexity, high public interest, day-to-day decisions (Type C) 
Resource allocation and service provision decisions within this category are not policy 
specific but emerge in numerous situations and departments. Since the Good Friday 
Agreement, Belfast City Council has seen its competence grow. As the Council becomes 
more involved in different policy fora, it is important to understand its day-to-day 
decision-making processes. Throughout this section a number of examples are drawn 
upon to demonstrate bureaucratic involvement in resource allocation and service 
provision. Recreational funding, which comprises much of the Council budget, has 
traditionally been a contentious issue. These resources are usually quite visible and 
therefore it is not difficult for one community to ‘evidence’ their supposed neglect. 
Similarly, issues involving personal security are very contentious as these involve the 
police – an organisation historically associated with the Unionist cultural identity. 
Policies that may appear non controversial or benign, such as employing community 
wardens or alley gating, tend to maintain their contentious nature, and hence high 
urban public interest, within the contested environment. Most decisions surrounding 
physical resource allocation can therefore be interpreted as ‘high public interest’ at the 
urban level, most especially in contested societies that are physically highly segregated. 
The opening paragraphs of this section consider the policy-making process in these 
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areas. The following paragraphs then turn to the withdrawal of public services which 
again, in a highly segregated society, is often controversial.  
 Contrary to what is expected, in these decisions of high public interest among 
the urban population, be these in terms of resource allocation, finance or service 
provision, we see much more bureaucratic leadership. While under Unionist hegemony 
bureaucrats were led, now they see themselves as leaders. They now considerably 
influence the framework of the debate in which decisions are made. There is a renewed 
awareness of the role of the bureaucrat. The elite level bureaucrat does not simply 
provide advice or a service, but now must frame this advice in a particular manner. Their 
purpose is not simply as a consultant, but to create an environment where the best 
decisions that are politically possible can be taken. This is demonstrated by numerous 
interviewees: ‘It is most important to frame the debate....at an informal evening I will 
ask Councillors what they want to see changed for the next year... you must do it right’ 
(Interview 19). ‘You must be thoughtful on how you write reports...you must be 
politically savvy...If something is contentious you do your work before committee’ 
(Interview 14). ‘My staff are very technocratic in the main... however you can have a 
great project plan based on technocratic criteria, but now you must show me the plan 
for implementing it...This is where you need to be politically astute’ (Interview 11). In 
controversial areas, bureaucrats ‘push forward the evidence’ (Interview 17, Interview 3); 
or ‘put decisions in a framework in which they [Councillors] can agree, (finding) an 
approach that is likely to find favour’ (Interview 9). Thus bureaucrats are found not to 
fulfil the role of simply advising the best ‘technical’ decision, but seek to find a decision 
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that is politically acceptable to all parties: ‘How proposals are couched is very 
important...One must take into account the political realities’ (Interview 7).  
 In traditionally contentious policy areas salient at the urban level, the 
bureaucratic elite see their roles as to ‘steer politicians in the right way’ (Interview 12). 
‘Even though my policy hat says resources should be based only on need, the political 
need and environmental context must also be accounted for’ (Interview 15). These 
quotes make evident the changing role perceptions of the bureaucratic elite. Particularly 
recurrent are phrases such as ‘framing the debate’ and ‘couching proposals’. In each of 
the twenty interviews, senior bureaucrats perpetually referred to their involvement in 
framing the debate, particularly in these traditionally controversial areas33. 
Recommendations are not based solely on technical criteria for politicians to negotiate 
and navigate a way forward. Resource allocation recommendations in traditionally 
divisive issues are ‘based on firstly cost, and secondly what is political saleable...what 
will I get through’ (Interview 7). ‘It depends on how you frame it – this is the art of a 
successful official’ (Interview 15). In traditionally controversial areas ‘the debate is 
framed – everybody gets something or everybody looses...It is all about ‘managing the 
process’ (Interview 17). While the views of the political level are indeed considered 
significant, these views are collated and restructured by the bureaucratic elite to find a 
way forward. In other councils in Northern Ireland Councillors are perceived to be very 
involved in setting targets. This is not the case in Belfast (Interview 3). Bureaucrats are 
                                                 
33 These characteristics also present themselves in Type B decisions; however such findings are more 
consequential in Type C decisions. In Type B decisions, the ‘couching’ and ‘framing’ of the bureaucratic 
elite is often trumped by the wishes of the political level.  
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involved in developing departmental and organisational goals. It may be the case that a 
Lord Mayor may have a particular attachment to a particular theme and that does 
become a target for the Council. Apart from this, Councillors would rarely be involved in 
setting targets (Interview 12). Fourteen respondents (70%) perceived the political level 
to be ‘not at all’ involved in the development of departmental targets, while only three 
respondents (15%) perceived the political level to be ‘fairly involved’. There is 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that in the traditionally controversial policy areas, it 
is the policy expert who frames the debate, shapes proposals and designs 
implementation strategies. Thus recommendations are found not to be solely technical 
but a compromise between the best technical decision and the decision that is expected 
to be most politically acceptable.  
 Bureaucrats also frame the structure of interaction with the political level. 
Whereas in Bollens’ 1994 research elected officials determined the nature of the 
relationship, today this coordination is managed by the bureaucrat (See section: 
background to the city). Not only therefore does the bureaucracy frame the debate, but 
they also frame the structure in which this debate takes place. Among the most 
common mechanisms is to invite the ‘key players’ from each political party to attend a 
meeting, either individually or as a collective (Interview 19). Alternatively, a bureaucrat 
may invite representatives of the affected area, again either individually or as a 
collective: ‘Each member represents his own area, not his own party…I bring in all 
Councillors from West Belfast if I am talking about their area, all from South Belfast 
when talking about South Belfast etc...not by party groups…I discuss issues in these new 
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groups’ (Interview 9). This approach is accepted by politicians as they then ‘do not have 
to talk about Catholic wards and Protestant wards...’ (Interview 7). On my committee 
‘the budget is not allocated to the ward, it is city wide...nothing is done by area...it is 
always a citywide approach’ (Interview 15). Consistently, bureaucrats refer to ‘the city 
wide’ approach, and much of their interaction with Councillors is spent encouraging the 
development of a city wide mindset. A similar approach is taken to research. 
 Not only do bureaucrats recommendations and consultations take into account 
the contested nature of the city, but so too does their (bureaucrat) research. It is 
evident that the parameters of their research are not grounded solely in technocratic 
criteria, but again incorporate the political realities of the contested city. Taking for 
example issues like playgrounds: ‘if it ends up that you technically should provide three 
playgrounds in Nationalist areas, well you don’t look at playgrounds, you look at services 
for young people... We must understand why we are here. Everyone knows decisions 
must be fair...we frame the debate to make sure decisions are fair’ (Interview 15). ‘We 
keep our operational areas large – not at the super output area34 level...we steer the 
debate away from this...Members [Councillors] don’t want to go down to this level 
either’ (Interview 14). The bureaucratic elite therefore also now control the nature of 
the research to ensure Council reports do not aggravate sectarian differences. The 
bureaucratic elite feel that the political level do not want discussions to degenerate into 
a sectarian battleground so therefore they frame the research accordingly.  
                                                 
34 Super output area – a geographical area used to improve the reporting of small area statistics across 
the UK. 
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 Thus far we have seen that the bureaucratic elite influence the framing of the 
debate in terms of targets, structure of interaction and research. They are not simply 
consultants, but create an environment where the best decisions that are politically 
possible can be taken. We now turn our attention to the effects of this increased 
influence: in instances where the political level would request a service in their area, 
how then do policy officials allocate resources? To highlight the needs of one’s 
constituents is indeed a legitimate and necessary function of the urban politician.  
‘It would often happen that a member [Councillor] would come to me and 
say: “I want this resource in my community”…I say fine, I will do a report and 
bring it to committee where other Councillors will want the same resource in 
their communities – is that okay?...Often the politician no longer wishes the 
review to be conducted’ (Interview 3)  
 
In a more controversial case, an interviewee was asked to fund Ulster Scots35 in a part of 
the city. The bureaucrat indicated to the politician that a review would be conducted, 
but if the proposal were to make it through committee, the Irish language would also 
have to be included in the review. Once this was explained to the Councillor, the 
Councillor no longer wished for the review to be conducted (Interview 20). Within 
Belfast’s power-sharing political structures, the bureaucratic elite frame the debate and 
control the flow of information in traditionally contentious areas. The governance 
structure allows for this increased responsibility. Bureaucratic influence is further 
confirmed by the following two interviewees: If a Councillor comes to me and asks for 
resources in a particular area – I retreat to the evidence (Interview 19). If a member of 
the political level tries to say ‘you gave them this service, give it to us...I steer the debate 
                                                 
35 Predominantly a Unionist cultural identity 
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away from this’ (Interview 14). As we can see bureaucratic involvement is crucial to 
sustaining power-sharing within the city. To say however that the bureaucratic elite act 
with disregard for the political level would be disingenuous and erroneous. On the 
contrary, the bureaucratic elite actively encourage constructive political involvement in 
decision-making. What we see in Belfast however is that the bureaucratic elite have 
developed sufficient administrative capacity so that potential solutions are 
contextualised within the divided city environment.  
 The bureaucracy is now seen to stand up to sectarianism rather than, at best 
circumventing it, or at worst, facilitating it. ‘Now bureaucrats are freer to reject 
sectarianism...due to political dominance in previous eras this may not have been the 
case.’ (Interview 3) Bureaucrats can rely on legislation to retreat to the evidence: ‘there 
is now a legislative requirement that all our decisions carry equality impact assessments, 
so as to ensure that no community is discriminated against’ (Interview 2). However most 
often they rely on informal modes of governance. Bureaucrats frequently refer to the 
use of the committee36 in order to prevent politicians rewarding their electorate and 
punishing adversaries: ‘not even members of their own party would support resource 
allocation if it was only to one particular ward’ (Interview 9). This way, if a politician 
seeks reward for his electoral area, the bureaucrat simply agrees to take the proposal to 
committee where it will always be unsuccessful.  
                                                 
36 As previously described, governance in Belfast (since 2007) is by committee. Elected politicians are 
nominated to a committee which has responsibility for a particular subject area. Unless specifically 
provided for, decisions of committee are ratified by Council. 
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 The role of the bureaucrat in divisive issues has increased dramatically. If the 
political level try to represent their electoral ward with sectarian bias the bureaucratic 
elite revert to the technical evidence to shape the debate.  If a Councillor wanted 
increased service provision in his/her area, the bureaucracy responds that there is a 
‘technical basis for frequency of service: “we conducted a study and this was acted 
upon”’ (Interview 14). Time and time again interview evidence shows that the 
administrative elite steer the debate along the central channel, occasionally being blown 
off course by the political level trying to over represent their electoral area. This 
however is rarely sectarian on the politician’s behalf – they are simply representing their 
area. In exceptional cases where the debate does degenerate into a sectarian contest, 
this usually involves the grant-making process. 
 Reiterating Bollens’ (2000) assertion, it is not sufficient for the bureaucratic elite 
to deal with Councillors simply in a non-sectarian manner, but they must also 
contextualise their professional advice within the framework of the divided society. 
Tensions do still emerge between certain politicians and the bureaucratic elite. This first 
quote comes from a policy maker with a Catholic background: ‘some politicians would 
know my personal background and would not look at me in the eye and would always 
check my homework...These are in the minority but it still does happen’ (Interview 7). 
This second quote comes from a bureaucrat from a Protestant background: ‘Sinn Fein 
may have the impression that as I am of the other community that I have an agenda’ 
(Interview 19). However, for the majority of cases, the bureaucratic elite are keen to 
stress the good working relationships they now have with Councillors: ‘The political level 
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have never questioned my decisions yet – I try to keep both sides happy’ (Interview 12). 
‘Councillors really do represent the people and have played a huge part in getting us to 
where we are today’ (Interview 13). ‘The Council has been instrumental and influential 
in conflict management’ (Interview 10). ‘If it is the right thing it should get 
through...Councillors respect the city’ (Interview 15). Today the bureaucracy 
understands its responsibilities and is no longer afraid or inhibited to carry out its 
perceived duty. A much stronger bureaucracy now exists: ‘Sometimes the political level 
do try and deal with the department inappropriately...they need to be told “no”...two of 
the last three chief executives were sacked – suffering abuse by members’ (Interview 9). 
A number of officials pointed to the unfortunate position of many of their colleagues in 
other non-power sharing councils: ‘Some councils have bureaucrats that have been 
beaten to a pulp; they have no more interest in public service any more, it’s just the 
political level guiding resource allocation’ (Interview 3). This is further supported by a 
survey conducted by the NIPSA public service union which found morale to be ‘low’ 
across the Councils of Northern Ireland (NIPSA, 2010) While a minority of interviewees 
did express frustration with the ineffectiveness of a number of social mobility 
programmes (Interview 6), these interviewees still remained passionate and committed 
to their work within the administration. 
 Bureaucrats now perceive their roles as actively managing conflict. While ‘in the 
past the primary value of the bureaucracy has been neutrality...Now with an increase in 
diversity, we should not now be neutral – we must promote diversity’ (Interview 8). 
Recommendations made by policy experts now take into account the divided nature of 
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the city. While before bureaucrats provided advice on the basis of two cities side by 
side, now they are actively managing conflict. Recommendations are not simply based 
on expertise, but incorporate political realities in which the city is set. It is seen that 
bureaucrats no longer shy away from involving themselves in the more colourful areas 
of policy making– while before they perceived this as ‘social engineering…producing 
more harm than good’ (Bollens, 2000:231), today, even managers in more technical 
policy areas evidence active involvement in conflict management: ‘It is my responsibility 
to encourage people to work together. This is a service delivery issue – North Belfast 
does not need two depots – if people could work together we could have a single depot 
and provide alternative services’ (Interview 14). Managers no longer see their roles as 
solely to provide a service within a contested city. The bureaucratic elite are now 
directly involved in the management of conflict. The bureaucratic elite have become 
quasi leaders or ‘co-producers’ (Interview 9). ‘You are either politically aware or not – if 
you are not politically aware you should not be head of service’ (Interview 18). The 
bureaucratic leadership perceive themselves to be ‘changing the status quo’ (Interview 
7). In the areas of service delivery, resource allocation and budget cuts, the 
administrative elite lead the Council in developing, shaping and implementing policy. 
While previously the bureaucratic elite would have shied away from divisive issues, 
leaving these to the preserve of elected officials, today the bureaucratic elite see 
themselves as key actors in potentially contentious issues: ‘I often have to step in in a 
divided issue’ (Interview 12). The role of the bureaucracy in conflict management 
increases with the advent of power-sharing, while there is also a parallel increase in 
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challenges and responsibilities. Increasing bureaucratic capacity within fragile 
consociational environments is therefore a prerequisite, not simply for good governance 
but for conflict management. 
 Interviews returned numerous examples of the expansion of Council activity into 
new arenas: ‘We used to make equality returns to the Equality Commission but do 
nothing with them ourselves: now we use them to target areas in our outreach 
programme’ (Interview 18). ‘Community safety was deemed to be a priority for people 
in a survey conducted by Council...Council therefore took the lead in providing 
community safety’ (Interview 19). Now there is an environmental health officer – before 
this would have been an area that the Council would have shied away from. ‘If it was 
not a service that we had to expressly provide we did not provide it’ (Interview 12). This 
confidence in power-sharing is further evidenced by the expansion of Council 
responsibilities into what are traditionally controversial policy areas. In 2009, a number 
of Roma immigrants were racially abused in Belfast. Belfast City Council played a 
significant role in diffusing the tension: ‘Take the Roma example – not only was the 
Council involved but played a leadership role’ (Interview 19) 
 Alley gating is another recent policy, which through the closing off of back alleys 
in urban areas, has proven to reduce anti social behaviour37. This policy area however 
has a budget cap. If resources were to be allocated on the basis of greatest need, the 
service would be provided almost entirely in one section of the city. The resource 
                                                 
37 For a recent  account of some of the problems associated within this policy area see: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12923647  ‘House is “gutted in east Belfast arson attack”' 31 
March 2011. In this instance a house was burned down and the perpetrators gained access through a 
‘back alley’.  
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therefore cannot be allocated simply by need. Based on political bargaining coordinated 
by the bureaucratic elite, financial resources were committed equally to each of the four 
parts of the city – North, South, East and West. Alley gating however was not a 
traditional function of the Council, but provides evidence of the Council taking the 
initiative to provide a service for its citizens. While under direct rule data was also 
fudged to manage the conflict (Bollens, 2000), the difference today is in the goal – while 
in the past bureaucrats and planners planned for two cities side by side, today they are 
planning for one city. In attaining this objective the role of the bureaucracy has altered 
considerably. 
 A further example is that of community wardens. Community wardens are 
allocated on the basis of crime analysis statistics. The resources are allocated to the 
areas of maximum need; however, this interpretation of need is again fudged to ensure 
that each area has some physical presence. This is probably the most remarkable 
evidence of bureaucratic activism into traditionally controversial areas (law and order), 
justified on the basis of a comprehensive survey of citizens where the people of Belfast 
identified community safety as a primary environmental health fear (Interview 19). 
While before the Council would have shied away from such sensitive areas, it now 
embraces the opportunity to involve itself in new challenges.  
‘In 1999 there was no policy officer in this department. Now there is a policy 
unit. We are now building a strong policy evidence base...Before 1999 if we 
needed a decision, the department would employ consultants who would simply 
recommend the option favoured by their political masters’.  (Interview 4) 
  
 The advent of power-sharing has correlated with an increased the influence of 
the bureaucratic elite on conflict management. Correspondingly, this had had three 
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notable affects on bureaucratic activity. Firstly, senior bureaucrats feel they can now 
stand up to sectarianism. Secondly, their working relationships with the political level 
have changed, as have their role perceptions. Thirdly, the Council and the bureaucracy 
have expanded their role into arenas traditionally avoided by the organisation. We see 
the bureaucracy interpreting their role in an all encompassing manner. If no one else is 
providing a service, the bureaucracy will find a way of responding. Before power-
sharing, this was not the case. This expansion of Council competency is not simply in 
areas of resource allocation but also involves framing the debate on where resources 
are to be withdrawn. As the losses of Belfast City Council had always been underwritten, 
budget cuts never featured prominently in the day to day life of the bureaucrat. As the 
Council now must balance its own books, budget cuts are expected to take up more of 
the officials work load. To date, much of the cost has been underwritten through 
efficiency savings. Officials are unanimous in their agreement that this is becoming less 
and less possible and that cuts to direct services will have to be made. How direct 
services are cut is a potentially sensitive issue, yet once again, the nature and 
geographical area of the cuts is proposed at the bureaucrat level. This is further 
confirmed by the disinterest of the political level in these more macro issues: ‘We now 
have a downturn committee and we have trouble getting Councillors to attend’ 
(Interview 11). 
 As happened in the nineties, when resources are being cut, they are done so in 
light of the sectarian realities of the city: ‘If I had to cut leisure centres I would have to 
cut one in North, one in the South, one in the East and one in the West. There is no 
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other way’ (Interview 7) When services are being cut, ‘you have to do your homework 
before the meeting...I know who the Councillors are who will have issue with particular 
things’ (Interview 19). However the building of new replacement Council facilities marks 
a departure from ‘planning for two cities’ (Bollens, 2000). When buildings in 
communities come to the end of their financial life, a new combined one is built. 
Massive consultation is required. These projects are always initiated by the bureaucracy 
but ultimate authority is with the political level (Interview 12). 
 While sectarianism is often not addressed by official Council documents, it has 
been incorporated informally into the modus operandi of Council decision-making. 
Departing from the years of hegemonic rule, Belfast no longer plans for two cities, but 
actively plans for a contested society.  There is no doubt that the bureaucratic elite 
perceive themselves to considerably frame the debate in contentious issues. This is how 
policy making works: ‘we take into account the perspectives of the political level at 
department level and work with how we think/expect to progress’ (Interview 9). 
Particularly recurrent throughout the interviews was the reference to the high 
percentage of unanimity achieved at Council decisions. The process which allows for this 
unanimity is most important – the bureaucracy firmly control the nature of the debate 
in which decisions are made. It is they that bring recommendations to Council, and it is 
they who control the nature of the research and flow of information.  
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3.7 Concluding remarks 
In decision type C the role of the bureaucrat in both policy-making and conflict 
management is found to be substantial. However the role of the bureaucrat in 
sustaining the status quo has not changed. In 1994 when Bollens conducted his research 
bureaucrats were found to be preservers of the status quo. Today, bureaucrats role 
perceptions have changed. They perceive themselves to represent the needs of the city 
and to be partners in the policy process. Nonetheless, they still behave as preservers of 
the status quo. In order to sustain the status quo of a power-sharing governance 
structure however, the bureaucrat is required to become actively involved, not only in 
the policy-making process, but also in the wider urban governance process. Put 
differently, when Bollens conducted his research in 1994/5 bureaucrats were indeed 
extensively involved in the policy making process of the city, however they deliberately 
were not involved in the conflict management process. This was perceived as an 
exclusively political level competence. Since power-sharing, the bureaucracy has 
developed a substantial role in managing the political process. The bureaucrat is not 
simply an adviser or a policy expert, but is actively engaged in the stabilisation and 
normalisation process.  While under hegemonic conditions sectarian realities were, 
‘known to but avoided by, town planning and housing allocation administrators’ 
(Bollens, 2000: 240); this research finds that the bureaucratic elite within the Council no 
longer shy away from these issues. We now see the bureaucracy incorporating physical 
sectarian realities into policy making. Bollens’ evidence indicates that this was not the 
case before power-sharing. Bureaucrats today confront sectarian differences and have 
123 
 
expanded the competencies of the City Council, justifying this both through attaining 
efficiency savings and through citizen demand. The overtly technocratic attitude of the 
1980s which guided planning for two cities side by side, has been replaced with a highly 
motivated, committed workforce that contextualises expert advice within the changed 
political reality. Today, within the day-to-day decision-making category, the 
administration frames the debate, sets the agenda, pushes forward policies, and 
questions policies that run counter to what they perceive to be the interests of the 
entire city. As the environment in which the bureaucrat acts has changed, so too has the 
role of the bureaucrat. In this article I have not established definitive causes for the 
change in bureaucrat behaviour, nor do I identify the dynamic nature of bureaucrat role 
perceptions. The findings serve however to demonstrate that the bureaucratic elite 
have a significant role to play in sustaining power-sharing arrangements. Societies 
adopting a comprehensive consociationalism model akin to that of Belfast need to be 
aware of the significance of the bureaucrat (and hence developing administrative 
capacity) in sustaining the political structures. While much has been written on potential 
political solutions in Jerusalem, Nicosia or Mostar, how would the public administration 
be designed and tailored to each circumstance? 
Developing administrative capacity is found to be a necessary condition not 
solely for good governance but also for successful power-sharing and conflict 
management. The important role of the bureaucrat in decision-making has been 
extensively analysed in public administration literature; bureaucrat role perceptions 
within the contested society are however less understood. Table 3.1 conveys that in 
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Belfast, where the political level have decided to share authority, the bureaucracy have 
a substantial role to play within the governance of the city. While public administration 
research in less contested societies would lead us to expect the results for decisions in 
categories A and B, existing research tells us little about the role of the bureaucratic 
elite in the day-to-day management of the contested society. In this chapter I find, 
converse to hypothesised expectations, that the bureaucrat significantly influences the 
day-to-day decision making process within the city. At the same time, the bureaucratic 
elite are not found to act completely independent of the political level, but instead are 
found to work in conjunction with the political level, seeing themselves as co-producers. 
Meier and O’Toole (2006) define political control as a bureaucrat acting in ways s/he 
otherwise would not. Drawing on this definition of political control, it is evident that 
political control exists in type B decisions. The bureaucrat may try to influence policy 
outcomes but is not usually successful. The bureaucrat-politician relationship differs in 
type C decisions: while the process of achieving an intended bureaucratic outcome takes 
into account the contested nature of the city and the political power-sharing structure, 
outcomes in these type C policy areas are rarely converse to the original policy 
proposals of the bureaucrat. Nonetheless, these bureaucratic objectives are 
contextualised and constrained by the contested environment of the city. Thus, the 
term discretion is used with caution. The bureaucrat does not behave in isolation to 
his/her political surroundings. Following power-sharing, the argument can be made that 
contestation decreases and that the legitimacy of the political institutions 
correspondingly increases; this does not necessarily cause bureaucrats to possess 
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increased discretion. However, evidence from Belfast suggests that the role of the 
bureaucrat expands from a policy-specific role to a broader governance role. How 
individual bureaucrats perceive their roles within this form of governance will be 
returned to in chapter six. 
Table 3.1: Summary of research findings 
 Decision Type A: 
Low public interest 
Decision Type B: 
High public interest one 
off decisions 
Decision Type C: 
High (urban) public 
interest, day-to-day 
decisions 
Actor with most 
influence on the 
decision-making 
process 
Bureaucratic elite. 
Bureaucrat relies on 
regulation and the law to 
inform decision making.  
Political level. Bureaucratic 
elite can influence process 
but this is trumped by that 
of the political level 
Bureaucratic elite with 
indirect influence from 
political level. 
Bureaucratic elite 
balance technical 
criteria with what is 
politically saleable 
Actor with most 
influence on 
agenda setting 
Bureaucratic elite with 
occasional influence from 
individual Councillors 
Both political and 
bureaucratic elite involved 
in setting the agenda. If 
bureaucratic elite set 
agenda this is usually due 
to a statutory requirement 
Both political and 
bureaucratic elite. 
Political level advance 
the concerns of their 
constituents while 
administrators advance 
the needs of the entire 
urban population 
Actor with most 
influence on 
outcomes 
Bureaucratic elite. Where 
possible bureaucrats will 
keep some money for 
Councillor’s wishes but 
this money is allocated at 
bureaucrat’s discretion  
While the bureaucratic 
elite try and influence 
outcomes, the political 
level make the bureaucrat 
elite act in ways they 
otherwise would not 
While the bureaucratic 
elite have maximum 
influence on policy 
outcomes, policy is 
developed within the 
context of the political 
structures of the 
Council 
Primary guidance in 
decision-making 
Technical criteria and 
regulation 
Political criteria. 
Bureaucrat tries to 
influence but often 
unsuccessful 
Both technical criteria 
and political saleability 
are balanced 
 
 The bureaucratic elite have learned how to manage the political environment in 
which they work. The nature of the bureaucrat-politician relationship has changed since 
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1994. It is the bureaucratic elite that facilitate the political-level solution of power-
sharing. It is the bureaucratic elite who frame the debate, the bureaucratic elite who set 
the agenda and the bureaucratic elite who push certain policies forward and question 
policies that run counter to the general public interest. The research has shown that in 
some decision typologies the bureaucrat is more successful in this process than others. 
The research serves as evidence of a widely held, but little evidenced, assertion that the 
public administration affects not only the successes of good governance (which is well 
discussed in the literature) but also influences the success of power-sharing itself. As 
Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) have demonstrated, developing administrative capacity 
is indeed necessary for good governance; it is also noteworthy that lessons from Belfast 
indicate that developing administrative capacity is also a necessary condition for 
successful power-sharing. 
 This chapter has been concerned with the politico-administrative relationship. 
Within Belfast City Council, elite level bureaucrats possess significant discretion. This 
chapter has not sought to determine what guides this discretion, however the findings 
suggest that such a study is indeed required. While there is an extensive body of 
literature examining bureaucrat preferences and role perceptions within the United 
States bureaucracy, apart from studies by Mengistu and Vogel (2006) and Dresang 
(1974), little is known about the preferences of bureaucrats within post-conflict 
environments. Further research is required to determine who the bureaucracy are 
(passive representation) and what interests they represent (active representation). To 
develop a comprehensive understanding of what makes the administration of power-
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sharing systems work, a closer look at the norms and values that guide bureaucratic 
behaviour is essential. I return to such questions in chapter six. An understanding of 
both bureaucratic role perception and the structural mechanisms influencing these 
norms needs to be clarified if we are to truly understand what makes power-sharing 
systems of government work. If power-sharing forms of governance in cities such as 
Kirkuk, Nicosia, Beirut or Jerusalem are to be successful, attention to developing 
administrative capacity is necessary, not simply for good governance, but for conflict 
management itself.  
 To summarise; as the mechanism of conflict management changed from 
majoritarian or hegemonic control to power-sharing, the environment in which the 
bureaucrat operates has also fundamentally changed. The bureaucrat has become a co-
producer in the policy and conflict management process. Directors and Heads of Service 
are no longer afraid to target funding where they perceive the need is. Funding is not 
based solely on political direction. Nor are the needs of the city simply defined in purely 
technocratic terms but also incorporate the contested nature of the city. Conflict 
management is a function of the bureaucracy. The mechanisms through which the 
bureaucracy within the power-sharing society works need to be greater understood. 
Further research is necessary to establish bureaucratic role perceptions, to determine 
the bureaucratic structures conducive to good decision making and investigate 
recruitment policies within contested societies. What guides bureaucrat behaviour? 
How important are the values of efficiency, impartiality and fairness? How can a non-
sectarian professional administration be achieved? The research presented in this 
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chapter has shown that the bureaucracy in power-sharing environments affects conflict 
management, playing an integral role in policy formulation and decision-making in areas 
crucial to the conflict. Power-sharing research needs to discover the importance of the 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic structures in managing conflict. Although political 
institutions and compromises are necessary for initially developing successful power-
sharing, this research documents the pivotal role of the bureaucracy in sustaining 
power-sharing agreements. Developing bureaucratic capacity is essential if power-
sharing is to succeed. 
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4 
Power-sharing ‘light’: bureaucrat perceptions of power-
sharing at the lowest common denominator 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For managing plural societies, power-sharing arrangements are often put forward as 
providing the most appropriate solutions. Unlike more comprehensive mechanisms of 
power-sharing, the Brussels experience differentiates itself in that, where as much as is 
possible, decisions relating to the conflict are administered separately by each language 
group. This therefore leaves only a minority of traditionally controversial issues to joint 
decision-making. Authority is shared in the arenas of economics, employment, 
infrastructure and transport, largely removing policy areas such as culture, education 
and health from power-sharing. The endurance of the Brussels institutions amidst 
numerous national crises can inform us how conflict can be managed through power-
sharing at the lowest common denominator. While impressively serving their purpose as 
mechanisms of conflict management, this chapter finds that it is these same structures 
that have prevented the governing institutions from adapting to the changing urban 
realities of a power-sharing society. Today Brussels is widely considered as an example 
of ‘ethnic peace’. Consequentially, conflict management is no longer a primary concern 
of the urban government – attention has shifted to priorities that also present 
themselves in more cohesive societies – those of delivering quality, coherent 
governance.  
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The central tenet of power-sharing is that former adversaries have agreed to 
joint authority and to take decisions based on consensus (Schneckener, 2002). The 
degree to which ethno-political communities share this power can vary from 
comprehensive power-sharing, as is the case in Belfast, to the lowest common 
denominator method (LCD) of power-sharing, as employed in Brussels. Once power-
sharing has been sustained for a number of years, conflict management is generally no 
longer the primary concern of a majority of the urban population. Conflict management 
concerns are superseded by concerns for the amelioration of governance conditions. 
Put differently, in the initial phase of power-sharing, conflict management is indeed the 
primary concern of the emerging government. As the process succeeds however, the 
quality of governance outputs, outcomes and decisions supersede conflict management 
as the major urban concern. In the case of Brussels, Dutch-speakers no longer feel 
threatened by the traditional French-speaking majority (Janssens, 2008). Since 1989, the 
power-sharing structures within Brussels have contributed to the stabilisation and 
reversing of tensions between both linguistic communities38. Drawing on existing data 
and over thirty interviews with bureaucratic and political actors, I find that while the 
Brussels conflict management mechanism has indeed proven itself successful in conflict 
management, it has found difficulty adapting to the new urban demands of good 
                                                 
38A greater problem, which on occasion causes national (Belgian) paralysis, is the plight of the French 
speakers residing in the neighbouring Flemish Region. This problem is outside the scope of this particular 
study as I am confining my research to examining the implementation of the conceptual solution of 
power-sharing at the lowest common denominator within the Bilingual Region of the Brussels-
Capital/Brussels Region. The 1989 agreement fits into a national compromise. The emergent structures 
will be presented later in the chapter. 
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governance39. This in turn frustrates the conflict management to conflict resolution 
process. While chapter three contextualised the working environment of the Belfast 
bureaucratic elite, this chapter focuses on the environment in which the Brussels 
bureaucratic elite operate. I ask: where do the bureaucratic elite see the obstacles to 
both good governance and conflict resolution within the version of power-sharing 
employed in Brussels. 
I find however that while the mechanism of conflict management employed in 
Brussels, has indeed contributed to normalisation and stabilisation within the city40, a 
number of implementation deficits in the conflict management mechanism prevent the 
transition from what is considered good governance within a contested society, to that 
which is acceptable within an established power-sharing society. In other words, the 
governance problems in Brussels are not associated with the principle of conflict 
management at the lowest common denominator, but how the mechanism has been 
executed. This study finds that failures in the electoral design and structure of public 
administration have prevented further rapprochement between the two ‘traditional’ 
Brussels communities. Coherency in policy-making is not only necessary for good 
governance but in order to move from the short term goal of conflict management to 
the longer term goal of conflict resolution. While the chapter does not intend to address 
the conceptual merits of power-sharing at the lowest common denominator, it does 
                                                 
39 While ‘good governance’ in Belgium may be perceived as a right-wing nationalist policy, no such 
meaning is intended in this dissertation. (Cfr. Introductory Chapter) 
40 ‘City’ throughout this chapter refers to the territory of the Brussels Capital Region and the Bilingual 
Region of Brussels Capital, not to the municipality of Brussels which is one of the nineteen communes and 
also the capital of Belgium 
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address the extent to which power-sharing at the lowest common denominator is a 
realistic alternative to traditional comprehensive mechanisms of power-sharing41.  
The study also has broader implications, providing an insight into how deeply 
divided societies may consider limited power-sharing as an alternative to total 
separation. Michael Dumper (2010: 26) outlines a two-state plus model for Jerusalem 
where, given the existent urban demographic realities, ‘a range of highly coordinated 
joint frameworks’ would be necessary to govern the city. Virginia Tilley (2005:1) goes 
further claiming that the Two State Solution between Israelis and Palestinians ‘has been 
eliminated as a practical solution’. Regardless of the political resolution in Jerusalem, or 
other similarly contested cities, the governing framework of the contested city will have 
to account for the existing ethno-national/ethno-linguistic demographic realities. Cities 
can often be the focal point of ethnonational conflicts and generally contain a 
concentration of each ethnopolitical group. Ethnopolitical autonomy along territorial 
lines within an urban environment is not always possible – in cities such as Kirkuk, Kurds, 
Arabs and Turkmen do not congregate in their own areas of the city but are dispersed 
throughout the city. Similarly, no district within the Brussels Capital Region could be 
described as being predominantly Dutch-speaking42. Drawing on governance practices 
and structures within the Brussels example of ‘ethnic peace’, I examine if this alternate 
form of governance is worth considering in contested societies such as Kirkuk. 
                                                 
41The conceptual level debate surrounding types of conflict management mechanism – consociationalism 
(Lijphart, 1969), power-dividing (Roeder and Rothchild (2005), etc... is outside the scope of this study. I am 
concerned with the effect of these theoretical solutions on the politician-bureaucratic relationship. 
42 Logie (1981) used a threshold as low as 20% to identify clusters of Dutch-speakers within the Brussels 
municipality. 
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4.2 Power-sharing in Brussels 
Traditional approaches to power-sharing generally require power-sharing across all 
aspects of governance. A study of Brussels’ power-sharing structures provides an 
example of an alternate mechanism of consociationalism. Over the past number of 
years, a number of researchers have explored the idea of exporting this Brussels model 
to other contested societies (Van Damme, 2003; Demant, 1997, Stroschein 2003). Van 
Damme describes the ‘complex politico-institutional arrangements [as] keeping the 
communities in the capital together’ (2003:49). Bollens too categorises Brussels as being 
‘most politically stable because power-sharing structures and forms of transitional 
democratisation have effectively stabilised the local state’ (2008:5, emphases added). 
The Brussels model has indeed proven itself to be stable, remaining steadfast amidst 
numerous national political crises. While Bollens (2008) quite correctly describes the 
Brussels solution as ‘sustainable’, I argue that the institutional design, while successful in 
conflict management, impedes the normalisation process within the city. Before further 
consideration is given to the exportation of the Brussels model, a greater understanding 
of the mechanisms and workings of the Brussels model must be attained.  
I therefore focus on just one aspect (most relevant to the research question) of 
the Brussels model: how the public administration works within the LCD mechanism of 
conflict management. Before exportation of the model is considered, further studies 
through different lenses will of course also be necessary. Using the public administration 
lens I find that while the various political actors within Brussels may ‘talk’ to each other, 
the various public administrations do not. As demonstrated in chapter three the public 
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administration supports, and operates within, the status quo. The status quo in Brussels 
means that four separate administrations have responsibility for public policy 
exclusively within the city. If these Brussels public administrations are to cooperate, this 
will have to be led by the political level. Such an initiative is found to be unlikely given 
the Brussels electoral system. Institutional design has been highlighted as an integral 
component of consociation success (Reynolds, 2002). Various aspects of institutional 
design have been considered and analysed – the extent of federalism (De Villiers, 1994), 
the merits of presidential rule (Shugart and Carey, 1992), public administration, (Bollens, 
2008; Esman, 1997, 1999; Brown, 1999) and electoral systems (Pilet, 2005; de Silva, 
1998; Deschouwer and Van Parijs, 2009; Norris, 2005, 2008). While other contributors 
have looked at improving the Brussels solution through overhauling the institutional and 
jurisdictional structures to better serve the Brussels/Belgian population (Maskens, 
Lagasse and Nieuwenhove, 2008), this research takes an alternative approach 
identifying the primary bureaucracy-level problems that have arisen in implementing 
this type of power-sharing. Societies considering consociationalism as a mechanism of 
conflict management will consequentially be more aware of the potential (public 
administration level) pitfalls in implementing consociationalism at the lowest common 
denominator. While the Brussels system is in need of reform, it is important to correctly 
distinguish between the causes of poor governance and the symptoms of poor 
governance. I explore not only the institutional design within the Brussels solution, but 
also the effects of this design on coherent governance and conflict management. The 
research question for this chapter asks: where do the bureaucratic elite see the 
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obstacles to both good governance and to conflict resolution within the LCD mechanism 
of conflict management as employed in Brussels? This question will generate an 
understanding of the environment in which the Brussels bureaucrat operates.  
To summarise, I am most concerned with how the institutional model works and 
where the implementation deficits are. Bollens (2008) describes the Brussels solution as 
‘sustainable’. I therefore examine what precisely the Brussels solution is in terms of the 
public administration, and determine the problems in its implementation from the 
perspective of the elite level bureaucrat. This should shed some light on how power can 
be shared in some policy areas, without requiring ‘comprehensive’ power-sharing in all 
aspects of governance. The research within this chapter contributes to both conflict 
management and public administration literature documenting the administrative 
structures of Brussels, and outlining an alternative solution to how a public service can 
be designed within a system where two communities share one geographical space. I 
acknowledge that the Brussels institutional solution is a product of its environment and 
that state and municipal level institutions also influence the conflict management 
process. It is however the concept of limited power-sharing that I am interested in. 
Brussels is indeed stable, but what does the Brussels solution teach us from a public 
administration perspective? I do not go into advanced detail describing the political and 
administrative structures at the municipal and national level. While these levels of 
course influence the city to a great extent, this research concentrates on the sub-state 
institutions that operate exclusively at the community/regional level (linguistic and 
territorial) in Brussels. Recall I am not interested in the city-state relationship but in 
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determining if and how the elite level bureaucrat influences the conflict management 
process. 
 
4.3 Outline of the chapter 
The Brussels compromise is a complex mesh of devolved responsibility which first must 
be understood before prospects for its adoption elsewhere are considered. Federalism 
is highly advanced in Belgium, with significant functional autonomy at both the regional 
and municipal levels. The most noteworthy aspect of the next section (4.4) is to 
emphasise that at both national and regional levels, areas of cultural sensitivity are not 
under joint responsibility. Apart from a number of sites of predetermined cooperation, 
issues of health, education and culture are administered by two separate linguistic 
bodies. Power-sharing is, in the main, restricted to the economic sphere43. After this 
brief contextualisation section I proceed to investigate the problems of inter-
institutional cooperation. It is found that the various institutions are not responsive to 
citizen demands while they also lack the structural ability to develop coherent 
governance. These problems are further compounded by a failure in the electoral design 
to present an environment where such inefficiencies may be overcome. These problems 
with the electoral design are presented in the final section. It is found that while trying 
to overcome the problems of conflict management, further problems have been 
inadvertently institutionalised. While in the initial stages of power-sharing these 
                                                 
43 In section 4.4 I describe the politico-administrative solution as it exists today. Space does not permit a 
description of HOW these institutions emerged, but a comprehensive description (in French) can be found 
in Witte et al (eds.) 1999 – Bruxelles et son Statut. 
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inefficiencies may be accepted as the ‘price for peace’, the institutionalisation of these 
inefficiencies allows for the stagnation of the ‘grander’ conflict resolution process. 
The findings propose that while the Brussels institutions are well equipped to 
deal with the problems of conflict management; as the collective goals of the urban 
population change with the onset of stability and normalisation, the institutions are less 
able to realise the demand for quality urban governance. The first finding proposes that 
although the concept may suggest an amicable and transferable solution for other 
contested societies, its implementation in Brussels urges caution. The formalised 
institutional design of Brussels fails to incorporate new and emerging urban realities 
into the governance process. The objective of conflict management must also include a 
commitment to both good governance and conflict resolution. The second finding 
indicates that bureaucrats in Brussels do not have the same level of interaction with the 
policy-making process as their Belfast counterparts. It is put forward however that this 
distance from the policy making process is not due to the conflict management 
mechanism but grounded in how the mechanism has been implemented. 
  
4.4 The Brussels Solution: Power-sharing at the LCD. 
The conflict in Belgium is often put forward as a linguistic conflict. While language has 
emerged as the most visual manifestation of the conflict, further differences have also 
been present throughout the country’s recent history. Traditionally, the largely Catholic 
north opposed the largely socialist/liberal south. During the 1960s, traditionally a 
Walloon identity was centred around social-economic emancipation and an open 
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attitude to other cultures and anti-racism (Van Dam, 1996; Billet, Maddens and Beerten, 
2003). On the other hand the Flemish identity was centred around a cultural heritage 
(Billet et al, 2003). These differing cleavages have shaped federalism in Belgium. French-
speaking Walloons have traditionally advocated for the federalisation of economic and 
social policy. Conversely, Dutch-speakers in Flanders traditionally advocated greater 
federalisation of cultural and heritage competencies. In addition, unlike the Belfast 
compromise, the Brussels compromise is inherently linked with the national 
compromise. This was not an indigenous solution at the urban level but a product of 
state level agreements. By default of the national compromise, power in Brussels is 
shared in the economic sphere but not in the personal sphere. What has emerged is a 
solution resembling power-sharing at the lowest common denominator, however this is 
not to suggest that the politicians of Brussels agreed to share power in certain areas 
while deciding to manage their own affairs where they could not find agreement. The 
Brussels solution provides the opportunity to learn about how power sharing can work 
in instances where not all aspects of public policy are subject to the power-sharing 
arrangement. This in turn provides an opportunity for other contested societies to 
consider the Brussels mechanism of conflict management as an alternative to traditional 
comprehensive mechanisms of consociationalism.  
While traditionally a Dutch-speaking city, over the past century, Brussels has 
transformed into a predominantly French-speaking city, completely encircled by the 
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largely Dutch speaking Flemish Region44. Today it consists of nineteen communes, or 
electoral wards, each with a high degree of autonomy. Together the territory of these 
wards form the Brussels Region; a sub-state tier of government with responsibility for 
economics, employment, emergency services etc45. These wards are also within the 
Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital which has competence for services related the 
person such as education, health and culture. Brussels therefore has two spectrums of 
authority – a personal community authority (education health and culture) and what is 
referred to as a territory authority (economics, employment, transport etc). Power is 
shared in the ‘territory’ policies while, where as much as is possible, each linguistic 
community manages its own affairs in the former category.  
The focus in this section is on the institutional design. As put forward in the 
literature review, institutional structures themselves do not lead to conflict 
management. Rather, it is more important to establish how bureaucrats engage with 
these structures. While I acknowledge that it is how structures are exploited that 
matters, not the structures themselves, an understanding of the institutional solution is 
still required. Further, the focus of this chapter is narrowed to concentrate on the 
institutional structures that govern Brussels at the sub-state level. As is to be expected 
such a governance mechanism involves a complex set of institutional structures. While 
                                                 
44 The Flemish language is a variation of Dutch. In general the term ‘Flemish’ is associated more with 
territory, while the term ‘Dutch’ is associated more with language. For example, while one may identify 
themselves as a Dutch-speaker, it does not necessarily follow that they are Flemish – they may identify 
with Brussels to a greater degree than with the Flemish Region (Flanders).  
45In 1963 it was agreed that French ‘language facilities’ be provided in 6 neighbouring communes in 
Flanders – language facilities allow French-speakers to deal with government institutions through French. 
In return, the boundaries of Brussels were to be permanently fixed at 19 communes so as to prevent the 
further expansion of Brussels into the Flanders region. 
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indeed confusing, this in itself should not preclude the adoption of the structures 
elsewhere. Federalism is highly advanced in Belgium, so much so that sub-state 
authorities hold comparable authority to the national level. In other words, authority in 
Belgium cannot be depicted on a pyramid, with the national level at the top and the 
municipal or local level at the bottom: national level authority does not always 
supersede the authority of sub-state actors. Belgium is divided into three territorial 
regions: The Flemish Region, commonly referred to as Flanders, where the majority 
speak Dutch; The Walloon Region, also known as Wallonia, where the majority speak 
French; and the Brussels Region which is bilingual. This is depicted in Fig. 4.1. 
Fig. 4.1 The Regions of Belgium 
 
 
 
 
These regions each have a regional parliament and government and have authority 
exclusively within each of their respective territories for all activities connected with 
territory – economics, water, employment, environment, foreign trade etc. During the 
federalisation negotiations, federalisation of these activities was advocated 
predominantly by French-speakers. The bilingual region of Brussels is the focus of this 
research. The only sub-state actor with competence for territory activities within this 
bilingual region is the Brussels Capital Region. (Neither the Flemish Region nor the 
Walloon Region have competence within the Brussels Region.) It consists of a power-
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sharing parliament where Dutch-speakers are guaranteed 17 seats and French-speaking 
candidates are guaranteed 72 seats. For elections to the BCR, candidates appear on 
monolingual lists: voters must first choose which language group they would like to vote 
in and subsequently must vote for the party list of their choice. Of these 89 
parliamentarians, one is chosen to lead the Brussels Capital Region government. In 
theory, the Minister-President is language-neutral, while in practice the Minister 
President is a Francophone who is also competent in Dutch. The Minister-President is 
supported by two Dutch-speaking and two French-speaking Ministers. The government 
also includes three junior ministers, at least one of whom must be Dutch speaking. Each 
minister is supported by a cabinet, appointed by his/her political party. These cabinets 
do not formally exist in the legislature but usually consist of about 40 people and are 
usually members of the Ministers political party appointed for the term of the 
government. The political level is supported by a permanent administration. The service 
provided by the Brussels Capital Region is bilingual, its bureaucrats are not. 70% of 
positions are reserved for French-speakers while 30% of positions are reserved for 
Dutch-speakers. At the elite level positions are allocated 50:50. Thus the bureaucracy is 
bilingual, not the bureaucrat46.  
While Francophones advocated the federalisation of economic activities, Dutch-
speakers aspired to greater cultural autonomy. Hence, further sub-state institutions 
were designed to govern areas such as health, education and culture. Belgium has four 
                                                 
46 At the Commune level, the bureaucrat is in theory expected to be bilingual. Thus in each case a bilingual 
service is to be provided. In the BCR, this is via two sets of theoretically monolingual bureaucrats, while at 
the commune level this is via bilingual bureaucrats.  
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language communities, each with a sub-state actor with responsibility for the provision 
of services related to the person: The French-speaking community (CF), the Dutch-
speaking community (VG) the German speaking community and the Bilingual Region of 
the Brussels-Capital. The CF has competence for the provision of services to French-
speakers in Wallonia and the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. The VG has 
competence for the provision of services in Flanders and the Bilingual Region of 
Brussels-Capital47. The German-speaking Community has responsibility for service 
provision in the German-speaking region. The French Community Commission (COCOF) 
and the Flemish Community Commission (VGC) have competence only within the 
Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. A Common Community Commission (CCC) also has 
competence only within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. Thus, as depicted in Fig. 
4.2 (below), in Belgium, there are three regions and four linguistic community 
governments in Belgium. Note: The bilingual region government consists of two (French 
and Dutch) communities existing alongside each other, not a bilingual community. 
 
Fig. 4.2 The Regional Governments and Linguistic Communities of Belgium 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
47 The Flanders region and the Dutch-speaking community (VG) governments have merged.  
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In figures 4.3 and 4.4 the relationship between the regions and their governments as 
relevant to Brussels is identified. As shown in the diagram, reference to the Brussels 
Capital Region refers to the sub-state actors with responsibility for territory services. On 
the other hand, reference to the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital refers to linguistic 
governments: those with responsibility for personal services. The CF and the VG operate 
in their respective regions but also in the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. The CCC, 
COCOF and VGC operate only within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital48.  
Fig. 4.3 The relationship between the regions/communities and their governments  
 
                                                 
48 Both The Brussels Capital Region and the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital cover the same geographic 
territory – the nineteen communes of Brussels. 
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Given the aims of the chapter, I limit the scope of this research to those institutions that 
operate exclusively in Brussels: The government of the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) 
which has responsibility for territory activities and three of the linguistic governments: 
The Common Community Commission (CCC), the French Community Commission 
(COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission (VGC). While the CF and the VG also 
have competence within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital, they also have 
competence in other language territories. Their inclusion would add to the study, 
however time and resources have limited the ability to extend to six the number of 
governments examined. A further dynamic would also be introduced – the relationship 
between the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital and the two dominant linguistic 
communities: The Dutch-speaking region (VG) and the French-speaking region (CF). Such 
an investigation is outside the scope of this research (which is concerned with the 
politician-bureaucrat relationship) but an understanding of these tensions would 
explore the relationship between within the city and the state/region. Researching this 
question would advance both urban studies and conflict management literature 
documenting the differing identities that emerge post power-sharing, in turn 
highlighting how these emerging identities influence both the traditional conflict and 
the city’s relationship with the state. While these research questions are important, 
they remain outside the scope of this research. The following paragraphs provide some 
more background information to the Linguistic Community institutions selected for 
further study, beginning firstly with the VGC.  
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 The Flemish Community Commission provides services through the medium of 
Dutch49 in Brussels. The government of the VGC derives from the Dutch-speaking 
ministers within the BCR government. In turn they are supported by their political 
cabinets and the permanent administration: the Flemish Community Commission 
administration (VGC). An overarching secretary general is assisted by six directors, 
predominantly in the areas of Culture, Education and Health. The French Community 
Commission which politically governs the French-speaking community consists of the 
French-speaking ministers from the Brussels Capital Region elections and is supported 
by politically appointed cabinets. In turn, the political levels are supported by the 
permanent administration: The French Community Commission administration (COCOF). 
It consists of eight directors, again with responsibilities in areas directly related to the 
person. Each of these administrations is staffed by members of each individual 
community. Both the Communauté Française (CF) and the Vlaamse Gemeenschap (VG) 
also operate within the capital but usually via or in cooperation with the VGC or COCOF. 
The COCOF and VGC differ slightly in that the COCOF has legislative power while the 
VGC does not. Authority was transferred from the CF (which has competence within 
Brussels) to the Walloon Regional Government in certain policy areas; however the 
Walloon Regional Government does not have competence within Brussels. Authority 
could not be given to the Brussels Capital Region government as it is bilingual – it could 
however be given to the COCOF. Hence, COCOF has a degree of legislative 
                                                 
49 Note – services are not provided solely to one community – they are provided through one language 
only, but each individual has the right to choose his or her language group. Further, this choice does not 
have to be consistent across public services – a resident can choose a French-speaking school for one child 
and a Dutch-speaking school for another. Further, a child may have been born in a French-speaking 
hospital but may attend a Dutch-speaking school. 
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independence while the VGC does not. The Common Community Commission (Culture, 
Education and other ‘personal’ services) and the Brussels Capital Region (Economics and 
Employment etc) administrations provide administrative support to their political 
cabinets and ministers50. 
Fig. 4.4 The political organisation of Brussels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As previously indicated I have excluded analysis of the municipal level from the scope of 
this research. It is important to note that each of the 19 communes maintains a high 
degree of autonomy51. Further discussion on the evolution of the institutional design 
can be found in Rihoux (2003), while a broader examination, which contextualises 
Brussels within the Belgian system, can be found in Deschouwer & Van Parijs (2009), 
while Witte et al (2003) contextualise the development of the nineteen communes of 
Brussels since 1989.  
                                                 
50 A further tier of government also exists where a number of communes have cooperated to jointly 
provide local police forces etc...These are outside the focus of my research. 
51 Further, it is also noteworthy that the governments of these communes are in theory bilingual. While 
within the BCR and the CCC, a bureaucrat must be competent in either Dutch or French, a bureaucrat at 
the municipal level is in theory expected to be competent in both languages. 
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 To summarise, it is sufficient to acknowledge that four institutions have 
exclusive competence in Brussels: two are linguistically homogenous and govern areas 
related to the person (VGC and COCOF); and the remaining two administrations are 
linguistically heterogeneous governing areas largely in economics and employment but 
also include some health competencies such as bilingual retirement homes and bilingual 
hospitals etc (BCR and CCC). Two further sub-state actors have influence in Brussels: the 
CF and the VG. These two actors are outside the scope of this research as the dynamics 
of these organisations differs from the organisations identified. As previously indicated, 
further research is required to identify the internal tensions within these two sub-state 
actors – the divide between the Brussels politicians and bureaucrats and those from the 
Dutch-speaking and Francophone Linguistic Communities. This would generate a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of the city’s relationship with both its hinterland and the 
state. Such an investigation is outside the scope of this chapter. 
With the institutional design established, I now proceed to delve a little deeper, 
developing our understanding of how this institutional design works in practice from the 
perspective of the elite level bureaucrat. At the political cabinet level, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with six directors from four ministerial cabinets. At the 
administrative level, interviews were conducted with six directors within the VGC, four 
directors within the COCOF, four directors within the Joint Community Commission and 
three directors within the Brussels Capital Region. As indicated in the dissertation 
introduction, a number of directors within the BCR declined to participate in the 
research. Four BCR attachés were therefore also interviewed. While responses from the 
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Capital Region administration were disappointing, the sample is highly representative of 
the other three administrations, in each case representing over 80% of the positions 
filled52. Interviews were also conducted with three of the primary stakeholders involved 
in the development of the Brussels Cultural Plan (2007)53. Interviews were conducted on 
condition of anonymity and have been numbered here one to thirty54. Fieldwork took 
place between March and May 2010. The ideas or structures presented in the following 
sections are not new in and of themselves; the problems faced in the implementation of 
such a solution however are less understood. Drawing on thirty interviews with 
members of the political and bureaucratic elite, together with representatives of the 
cultural sector in Brussels, the findings provide an insight into the difficulties of 
implementing power-sharing at the lowest common denominator. While there are 
numerous references to the cooperative nature and ethos in Brussels, this should not be 
mistaken for the success of the political institutions. As Pilet (2005) reminds us, societies 
with a tradition of compromise are most likely to be conducive to stability. Drawing on 
evidence from the interviews investigating how the institutional arrangements in 
Brussels actually function, I find that normalisation and stabilisation in Brussels would 
be further advanced had the concept been more thoughtfully implemented.  
  
                                                 
52 Recall from the introduction that a number of Director positions are vacant within the administrations in 
Brussels 
53 Plan Culturel pour Bruxelles/Cultuur Plan voor Brussel 
54 Political interviewees are identified as ‘Interview X POL’. Culture interviewees are indentified as 
‘Interviewee X CUL’, where X refers to the randomly generated number attributed to each interviewee. 
Interviewees in each of the administrations are similarly referenced using their standard acronyms. 
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4.5 The Findings 
Beginning firstly with the problems associated with multiple administrations the results, 
presented below in the first subsection, demonstrate that although sharing power at 
the lowest common denominator is a viable alternative for contested societies, its 
application should not prohibit the coherent governance of the city. It is found that the 
administrative structures are unable to respond to the changing urban realities of the 
city (a post conflict society). The following sections further exemplify the unintended 
consequences associated with the Brussels electoral system. The electoral system, it is 
found, does not encourage politicians to represent those outside their language groups, 
nor is it found to be representative of all groups within the urban environment. Also, 
despite the longevity of the capital government, the entire process can be held hostage 
by small radical parties. While indeed these electoral problems are not necessarily 
particular to Brussels, the Brussels institutional design relies to a greater extent on 
political support for coherent public policy. Under the traditional ‘comprehensive’ 
mechanism of power-sharing bureaucrats can, to an extent, formulate inter-
departmental policy. In Brussels the various administrations do not speak to each other. 
Ideas cannot therefore be shared, which in turn hampers the development of coherent 
policy-making within the city. Given that bureaucracies by their very nature support the 
status quo (see Chapter three), without political support for such meetings, cooperation 
on policies will not happen. Given the existing electoral design, such support is not 
expected to be forthcoming.  The problems of dysfunctional policy-making look set to 
remain.  
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4.5.1 Public procurement and policy coherence 
Similar to most global capitals, the Brussels urban area has expanded in recent years 
and as a consequence, much of its workforce now resides outside its municipal 
boundaries. Kesteloot and Saey (2002) cite firstly, the delimitation of the region’s 
boundaries, and secondly the fragmented administrative structures of Brussels as the 
primary reasons for Brussels’ failure to develop a strategy for dealing with the problems 
of a divided city. I now look at each of these factors in turn through a conflict 
management lens. Urban sprawl is not a unique problem but experienced in most 
developed and developing cities. In response, cities such as Berlin have increased 
cooperation with the encircling Brandenburg Lander, while the actual geographical 
competence of the Lille urban administration has grown across international borders. 
Such progressions have not been possible in Brussels as in 1962/3 Dutch-speakers 
secured a deal to ensure the authority of Brussels would be geographically limited to the 
territory of the nineteen communes, preventing the further erosion of Flemish territory 
by the majority French-speaking Brussels. As taxes are levied at place of residence, not 
at place of employment, the urban administration in Brussels suffers financially from its 
incapacity to expand. Finances are however transferred from national government to 
the four Brussels governments in an attempt to negate this deficit. The following 
examples demonstrate the negative effect that this current financing arrangement has 
on governance and conflict management.  
The cause for concern arises in the funding of cultural and educational initiatives. 
In these areas, funding largely derives from transfers from the Linguistic sub-state 
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actors: the French and Dutch-speaking Community governments (CF and VG). Financing 
from these organisations to Brussels based organisations and administrations, always 
has a linguistic flavour, actively discouraging cooperation across the linguistic 
boundaries. As one interviewee put it: ‘money speaks a language’ (Interview 23 CUL). 
Again recall that these sub-state actors are tasked with providing services exclusively 
though the medium of Dutch or French. Put differently, finances within the city are 
stretched and attaining financial support for cultural or educational projects requires 
financial support from the Linguistic sub-state governments. As these governments 
largely operate in unilingual (community) regions, and contain a majority of elected 
representatives from unilingual districts, the funding of cross-community projects is 
actively discouraged in Brussels. The provision of services through both Dutch and 
French is not contested, nor is the promotion of Walloon and French speaking cultures 
or Flemish and Dutch-speaking cultures – this being a core principle of the conflict 
management mechanism. However, such a mechanism must also serve the growing 
population identifying, not with the Flemish Community (or The Flemish Region) or the 
French Community (or The Walloon Region), but with bilingual Brussels.  
Circumventing these legalities, the regional power-sharing institution (BCR) does 
try to fund cross-cultural activities, involving itself in a number of cross-cultural 
projects55. As the region has no competency in the promotion of culture, these projects 
are often financed from an ‘image building’ budget of the External Affairs Ministry 
designed to promote Brussels: Rayonnement International. These usually take the form 
                                                 
55 According to the Flemish Minister for Brussels, Bert Anciaux, (2007) this amounts to some 250 million 
euro per year. (Vaesen, 2008) 
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of street festivals or other large scale projects that can be designed to promote Brussels 
culture with the aim of enhancing trade and financing opportunities. Regional funding 
can also be directed towards cultural infrastructure, but not cultural activities. These 
funding opportunities nevertheless occur outside the legal competences of the Capital 
Region Government. A similar situation exists in education. Based on census data, there 
is expected to be a shortage of school places in Brussels. As many of the would-be 
attendees are considered neither French nor Dutch-speaking, neither of these 
community governments has been forthcoming in providing extra school places. The 
Capital Region is stepping in and providing the infrastructure for these new schools, 
again acting ‘technically illegally’ and expanding its competencies.  
Yet in spite of these difficulties, a common cultural plan for Brussels has been 
developed, reaching across the linguistic divide. Supported by the King Baudouin 
Foundation (www.kbs-frb.be), the cultural plan was an exogenous process developing 
from the grassroots of the cultural sector. Frustrated with the lack of leadership at the 
political-administrative level, two umbrella cultural organisations – the BKO (Dutch-
speaking) and RAB (French-speaking), developed a 34 point plan for the promotion of a 
coherent approach to the cultural development of the capital. A common cultural plan 
within a contested society is not an easy accomplishment, however very few 
disagreements emerged in its design. The plan focuses its attention on organisational 
coherence, good management and respecting diversity. Its purpose is not to 
homogenise culture in Brussels, but to facilitate the coherent cultural development of 
the city. While receiving commendation from the political level on the concept of 
153 
 
working across the language divide, politicians were more cautious in their support for 
the content (Interview 23 CUL). Following a number of critical reviews in the French-
speaking daily ‘Le Soir’, the plan was depicted as a ‘Flemish plan’, comparable to the 
wooden horse of Troy. In one Brussels municipality, a French mayor has recently 
signalled his intention to develop a cultural plan for his commune – advocating a real 
cultural plan for the people – not a Dutch-speaking plan (Interview 24 CUL).  
The failure of the cultural plan to attract political support is a symptom of a 
greater problem experienced within the capital. Communicating to the political level is 
the biggest hurdle for those involved in cross-cultural projects. As the linguistically 
divided political level control the allocation of funding, the difficulty in committing 
Ministers to prioritise cross-cultural funding is the primary limitation in implementing 
any cross-cultural policy (Interview 23 CUL). Although not opposing cross-cultural 
programmes or initiatives, Ministers do not prioritise such programmes. Until taken on 
board by both political communities, more coherencies in policy development seem 
unlikely. While the development of the cultural plan did not include representatives of 
the political or administrative level, four working-groups were established after the 
presentation of the plan. Members of the bureaucratic elite do comprise a number of 
positions on these groups but do so in a personal capacity, highlighting the gulf between 
personal support for such a plan and institutional scepticism or at best, indifference. 
One of the primary ambitions of the plan has been to set an example to the political and 
administrative levels – the fear of constructively working together should be reduced as 
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the text provides evidence of citizen-level support for such cooperation (Interview 24 
CUL). It is to this aspect of coherency that the latter part of this subsection will address. 
Thus far, it is seen in Brussels that as institutions are financed largely from 
linguistically homogenous bodies, existing solely to promote one culture; bilingual and 
new cultures experience difficulty in serving their communities. The development of a 
common cultural plan demonstrates the necessity to not only consider the two 
traditional communities but to also facilitate cross-cultural and emerging culture 
initiatives. As financing of projects from the CF and VG is outside the control of the 
population of Brussels, the people of the city (the Brussels electorate) have little control 
over how money in cultural or education matters is spent. While there are instances 
where the Capital Region administration (BCR) has responded to citizen demands, 
expanding its competency to circumvent these restrictions (building of schools and 
supporting cultural initiatives through a trade budget and developing cultural 
infrastructure), the majority of funding encourages the development of two separate 
cultural identities within the city. Despite this, a collective of cultural organisations 
developed a common cultural plan outside the formal structures of the region, 
indicating the gulf between civil society and the institutional structures governing the 
financing of civil society.  
Returning now to Kesteloot and Saey’s (2002) other concern, I explore in greater 
detail a more apparent problem with power-sharing at the lowest common 
denominator: as competencies are highly dispersed, there is a corresponding increase in 
institutions, with each community looking out for their own affairs. Traditional 
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differences are correspondingly institutionalised and prolonged, but are also controlled. 
Coherence of governance is the obvious primary problem in such a situation. While 
politicians and their cabinets do cumulate their political party manifestos after an 
election, governance in Brussels remains disjointed and unresponsive to the demands of 
large sections of the urban population. As power-sharing evolves, if communities were 
allowed to cooperate in areas they saw as necessary, or at least not discouraged from 
cooperating, coherent governance could develop, while at the same time respecting 
each community's right to govern their own community. The following paragraphs draw 
on evidence from education policy where cooperation between linguistic communities 
is actively discouraged by institutional design. The dangers of this lack of coordination 
are then demonstrated with reference to other policy areas. Again, it is reiterated: the 
segregation of service provision is not questioned by this study, segregated service 
provision does not however have to equate with haphazard, inefficient and ineffective 
service provision. While informal practices of coordination between institutions may 
exist at the political and cabinet levels (Vaesen, 2008), this study finds no such 
coordination to occur at the public administration level.  
Education plays a pivotal role in a multilingual society. Brussels is in the unusual 
position as the majority culture (French) are interested in learning the Dutch language. 
91.3% of non-Dutch speakers see mixed language classes as an enrichment of Brussels 
society (Janssens, 2008: 6). However, ‘only a minority are satisfied with language 
education’ in Brussels (ibid: 9). While not contesting the right of each community to self-
govern, the service provider must respond to citizen demands. As established by the 
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following paragraphs, the existing institutional framework does not allow for such 
responsiveness.  
De Bleyser, Housen, Mettewie and Pierrard (2001) present data evidencing a 
growing proportion of students from a homogenous French-speaking background 
attending Dutch schools (27.7%). Similarly Deprez and Wynants (1989) draw on a much 
earlier 1979 study which indicates more children from a homogenous Dutch speaking 
background attending a French-speaking school. Although these studies are now dated, 
the trends identified in each study are interesting. More recent findings by Janssens 
(2008) have highlighted the upward trend in French students attending Dutch schools, 
but also point to the increasingly successful Dutch courses for adults. As these education 
initiatives increase in popularity, so too will the bilingual population. The growing 
importance attributed to bilingualism among the Brussels population is unquestionable, 
yet the educational structures do not cater for this bilingual demand. It is not simply the 
schools that are segregated, but so too are the administrations and political bodies that 
administer these schools. While this is a necessary condition of the lowest common 
denominator mechanism of conflict management, absence of voluntary cooperation is 
not. Janssens (2008) observes with pity the situation where a substantive element of 
society (bilinguals) are disregarded by the education system, suggesting that it would be 
more beneficial for traditional Dutch speakers to teach Dutch to Francophones and 
more beneficial for traditional Francophones to teach French to the Dutch-speakers – 
this however he admits is unlikely given the current institutional frameworks. 
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 While education is governed by both community institutions, language tuition 
encounters numerous logistical problems. COCOF and the Communauté Francaise 
(French Speakers) indeed have attempted to teach their French-speaking pupils Dutch 
by allowing Dutch-speaking teachers to work in French-speaking schools. This initiative 
is frustrated however as the Dutch-speaking government prioritises teacher 
remuneration more so than the French-speaking government. Dutch-speaking teachers 
are therefore unlikely to choose a position in a French-speaking school as a first option. 
While the French linguistic government intention may have been noble, lack of 
coordination among institutions has frustrated its implementation.  
Similar problems arise in other policy areas. For example, a social worker within 
the Dutch-speaking government of the city has a higher salary than a social worker 
within the bilingual government (CCC), who in turn has a higher salary than the French-
speaking social worker. Similar problems arise in the regulation of the private provision 
of public services. If a regulatory disparity were to exist between the three community 
governments (VGC, CCC, COCOF) with responsibility for, say, nursing homes, private 
sector providers would opt to provide the service under the regulation of the 
community with the least stringent regulations. Without cooperation between each of 
the respective governments (both at the political and administration level), such an 
environment could lead to a race to the bottom in terms of regulatory quality. 
The effects of this lack of coordination are felt in numerous aspects of culture, 
health and education policy. The failure of the governments and their administrations to 
deal with immigration may not have a tangible effect on the conflict; however it has a 
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greater effect on the city, especially in the medium term. The bureaucratic elite across 
the city described immigration as the most pressing problem for the medium term. 
These concerns are supported by the 2001 census where it was found that Brussels had 
45 different nationalities that numbered over 1000 people each. Deboosere, Eggerickx, 
Van Hecke and Wayens (2009:11) submit that it is this demographic reality within the 
Capital Region that ‘presents a great challenge’ to both the city and the country. 
However, once again differing approaches to the ‘problem’ frustrate any effective 
solution. Dutch-speakers prefer an Anglo-Saxon approach (multiculturalism), while 
French-speakers prefer an approach based on the French experience (assimilation). An 
absence of inter-institutional cooperation has led to a sense of chaos where in a small 
urban area, no coherent plan for dealing with what all acknowledge to be a primary 
problem facing the city can emerge, providing further evidence that the current 
institutional framework, while serving to manage the Dutch-French linguistic conflict, 
fails to appropriately manage what have become more pressing problems facing the 
city.   
 While Vaesen (2008) found informal cooperation to exist among politicians, 
evidence from interviews supports the above conclusions that very little inter-
institutional dialogue takes place at the public administration level. A director within the 
VGC admitted to having contacts with both the ‘new Brussels people (immigrants) and 
French-speakers, but never with COCOF’ (Interview 3 VGC). A CCC director replied, ‘I 
have not got a clue who my counterparts in the VGC or COCOF are...we met twenty 
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years ago at the division of Brabant56 and that was it’ (Interview 14 CCC). ‘My 
department has no contact with CCC or COCOF’, was the response from another VGC 
director (Interview 5). Each director was asked the extent of their contact with their 
counter-parts in the other two administrations. Of the 21, only 4 indicated that they met 
with other Brussels administrations about once a year. Where instances of contact do 
emerge these tended to be at international fora: ‘we have very little contact with other 
administrations but we are involved in a European project called “Health Cities” where 
we meet’ (Interview 7, COCOF). Contact with the sub-state community bodies – the 
French-Speaking Community (CF) and Dutch-Speaking Community (VG) was slightly 
higher: ‘we have contact with the national Flemish and French-speaking communities 
but not the VGC or COCOF’ (interview 12, CCC) ‘I have no contact with VGC or CCC but 
have some contact with the federal and regional levels so we can send one person to 
represent Belgium internationally – there has been international pressure to have just 
one Belgian representative’ (Interview 9, COCOF). However, these bodies represent 
language communities throughout the country of Belgium. There was no significant 
contact with the other urban level administrations. The effects of this failure to 
communicate are evident in the haphazard governance of the city. While cooperation 
with international and national bodies demonstrates an ability to cooperate and work 
with other cultures and bodies, no interviewee referred to any significant policy 
coordination among the urban administrations. The following quotation from a director 
within the Brussels Capital Region summarises appropriately the contact between urban 
                                                 
56 Division of Brabant: The St. Michel’s Agreement, Sept. 1992 approved the division of Brabant into two 
provinces: Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant. The provinces formally split in January 1995. 
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administrations: ‘at present when we work with the VGC/COCOF/CCC it is entirely a 
bureaucratic relationship...it is not in any way proactive...if a file did come to the wrong 
department I would forward it to the right administration...it is more of a paper 
relationship’ (Interview 21 BCR). 
Despite this absence of contact, the bureaucratic elite of both communities 
would welcome greater cooperation. A VGC director spoke of instances of cooperation 
at a school premises within the Capital Region. Following the division of the province of 
Brabant in 1995, competency for administering schools in Brussels was also divided 
within the Capital – the VGC and COCOF becoming responsible for the running of ‘town 
schools’; The Linguistic sub-state actors, CF and VG administering state schools and 
Catholics administering Catholic schools. This left schools such as Ceria-Coovi in 
Anderlecht with a French and Dutch speaking school on the same site. While 
cooperation exists between both the VGC and COCOF, this is ‘only on business...in the 
restaurant we still have Dutch-speaking tomatoes and French-speaking tomatoes’ 
(Interview 6, VGC). The Dutch-speaking interviewee lamented ‘we work with Thailand 
and Italy but not children and teachers in the same building’, reflecting the ‘regrettable 
Belgian paradox’ cited by Van Wynsberghe(2007: 9): ‘it is often easier to cooperate with 
another country than with the other Belgian Community or Region. Meanwhile, a 
French-speaking director expressed his wish ‘that every child in Walloon Brabant would 
do an exchange with every child in Flemish Brabant’ so they may learn the language 
(Interview 8, COCOF). 
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 Further evidence from interviews indicates that most senior bureaucrats would 
welcome the opportunity for enhanced cooperation: ‘I have a unity view for Brussels 
between the different parties – VGC and COCOF (Interview 12, CCC)...‘the only way to 
succeed is through collaboration’ (Interview 2, VGC). ‘If we did things together it would 
be better’ (Interview 4 VGC). ‘We don’t have enough contact with the VGC and COCOF – 
it would be great if we could meet every two months’ (Interview 13, CCC). I never have 
any contact with other administrations...I would love to have joint projects. I regret 
there is not more collaboration. Our Dutch-speaking colleagues have the same 
problems...I would be very interested in cooperating with them’ (Interview 8, COCOF). 
‘We can learn a lot from COCOF/CCC – they understand the Brussels situation too – they 
know what procedures work best in our context’ (Interview 5, VGC). 
A number of solutions have been presented to surmount this type of problem – 
the most obvious of which is to increase the competencies of the joint community 
commission – CCC, or to transfer the authority of the CCC to the BCR, thereby giving the 
region both territory and person (community) competencies. A VGC director, frustrated 
with the absence of coherence within the capital, commented ‘do we really need to 
have all three institutions – VGC, COCOF and CCC?’ (Interview 5) This was further 
supported by a CCC director: ‘to improve Brussels we need less administration...we have 
three commissions in Brussels doing the same job...even building hospitals’ (Interview 
14). This however poses a number of problems as it involves two powerful linguistic-
based institutions willingly sacrificing authority. While such a solution is possible, the 
CCC is already a mutually suspect organisation which ‘often falls short of the mark when 
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it comes to wielding its powers’ (Lagasse, 2008: 8) and to give it greater competency at 
the expense of both language groups could cause further tension. It also puts undue 
pressure on one organisation to succeed. Those in opposition to a bilingual solution 
would be able to channel their energies into frustrating the operation of this one 
organisation, increasing the possibility of failure. Similar problems would arise if 
competencies were to be transferred from the CCC to the BCR. The opportunity for 
direct confrontation with the COCOF and VGC could also negatively impact the current 
workings of the BCR. It also would incorrectly define the cause of the failure. Rather 
than being a problem rooted in the LCD mechanism, as we are beginning to see the 
problem lies in the implementation of the concept. Neither the COCOF nor the VGC (nor 
for that matter the BCR or CCC) are in themselves problematic; it is simply the lack of 
coordination between the bodies that leads to haphazard governance which can lead to 
poor decision-making. 
A more productive and realistic alternative would therefore be to encourage 
greater cooperation between all four governments at the public administration level. To 
encourage more joined up governance among the various administrations must become 
a function of the political elite. As indicated above, the public administrations operating 
in Brussels do not constructively cooperate. The role of the Joint Commission is not to 
promote and develop bilingual services but to provide bilingual services in a minority of 
policy areas that were agreed in 1989. At present, the public administrations do not talk 
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to each other57. One director within the BCR administration put forward that much of 
his interaction with the political level focused on where they had the competency to act. 
An example of a Minister within the Capital Region wanting to financially support a 
cinema was given: As responsibility for cinemas rested with community administrations, 
not the regional administration, the policy was not further considered. The bureaucrat 
perceived it as his role to inform the Minister of his competency boundaries, not to 
become involved in cross-institutional policy making. Instead of taking the ideas further 
through cooperation with other administrations, ideas such as this tend not to be taken 
forward as directors and Ministers do not seek to implement policy through cooperation 
with other administrations and departments. Despite this, the results demonstrate that 
community administrations want to cooperate and formulate common solutions to 
common problems. The institutional design however prevents any significant level of 
cooperation. While increasing the role and capacity of the CCC involves the unlikely 
scenario of both communities voluntarily transferring authority and also 
misappropriates the causes of failure; a more realistic and immediate approach, not 
requiring any legislative changes, would be to facilitate inter-institutional cooperation, 
or at the very least not to discourage it. This way norms of policy-making could develop, 
relying on constructive cooperation, yet each community maintains their own politico-
administrative independence. Coordination of cultural education and health funding 
policies can only work to the benefit of the entire urban population. If cooperation 
                                                 
57 Exploratory evidence also suggests that political cabinets rarely cooperate across the language divide. A 
cabinet director within a newly elected Dutch-speaking party recalled the surprise that greeted him when 
he introduced himself to his French-speaking counterpart who worked in the same building. (Interview 
25, POL) 
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between the Brussels institutions is to materialise the controlling relationship between 
the linguistic community authorities, the VG and CF, and their Brussels based VGC and 
COCOF counterparts will need to be redressed. Further research briefs should pay 
particular attention to this city-state/region relationship. A further recommendation, 
requiring a more substantive change would be to remove the influence of the CF and 
the VG from Brussels58. While the control of Brussels policies relating to the person such 
as education, health and culture rests with the interests of those in Flanders and 
Wallonia, closer cooperation seems unlikely. Further research briefs should investigate 
the VGC-VG relationship and the COCOF-CF relationship at the political and 
administrative levels. Future research questions should pay close attention to the 
perceptions of Brussels based bureaucrats and those based within each of the 
Community governments. Els Witte (2008) provides a valuable starting point, presenting 
an overview of the development of the VGC as it seeks to find its place within the 
Brussels compromise. 
Ethnically divided societies can indeed draw from the Brussels experience – the 
Brussels mechanism has proven itself as an effective conflict management mechanism. 
However careful consideration of financing options is necessary. While respecting the 
right of each linguistic community to govern itself, governing does not have to be 
conducted in isolation to reality. In Brussels, cross community cooperation is actively 
discouraged. As demonstrated by the strong indigenous support for the cultural plan, 
together with Rudi Janssens study (2008), it is evident that policy formulation in these 
                                                 
58 Further research should look at the VGC – VG dynamic investigating how the Brussels based Dutch-
speakers ‘fit’ with VG.  
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areas represents the electorate of Wallonia and Flanders, not that of Brussels. As 
conflict management becomes less of a priority for the city, this failure becomes more 
and more pronounced. Mechanisms of conflict management, while attributing 
importance to the four existing cultural identities (French-speaking and Dutch-speaking 
or Walloon and Flemish), must also be responsive to the emerging urban identity that 
will materialise in a shared space. The urban institutional design has to be able to adapt 
to the changing urban realities.  
Closer cooperation between existing community institutions would provide an 
opportunity for more coherent and responsive governance. While this cooperation 
relies on expertise and proficiency at the bureaucratic level, political support is also a 
prerequisite. As realised with the cultural plan, citizen proposals can only go so far 
before requiring political support. There is a physical gap between the administrative 
level and the elected political level, filled by politically appointed cabinets. Cabinet 
directors are generally policy experts. While many have previously worked with a public 
administration, they are no longer involved in the day-to-day administration; or as one 
bureaucrat summed up: The administration turns like a bicycle wheel; if cabinet 
(political advisers) wish to make changes to the public service, it will have an effect 
elsewhere within the system and if it is not done correctly, the wheel will stop turning: 
‘Cabinet are not aware of the complexity of implementing policy’ (Interview 9, COCOF) 
59. Put differently, the Minister receives advice from a policy expert perspective, which 
                                                 
59 It is noteworthy that many cabinet appointees are on temporary secondment from the bureaucracy. While 
this should assist in bringing an administrative perspective to the political level, the evidence presented 
here finds that this representation is not sufficient to generate coherent policies within the urban 
governments: BCR, VGC, COCOF and CCC.  
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often fails to understand the administrative realities. While administrators may wish to 
work closer together to implement more coherent long term policies, this remains a 
distant prospect if the political levels do not understand the necessity to cooperate. The 
organisational priorities of the administration appear to become lost in the policy 
priorities of the cabinet; neither priority however can be successfully realised without 
more coherency between the ministers, the cabinets and the various administrations.  
The following section identifies how such progress is frustrated by the existing 
electoral system. To summarise, this section finds that financing at present does not 
encourage cooperation in policy areas to do with the person; conversely it is found to 
actively discourage cross-cultural cooperation. The various public administrations need 
to cooperate and coordinate, not simply for good governance but also if Brussels is to 
move from conflict management to conflict resolution. Such lack of coordination 
between the administrations frustrates coherent policy development. The findings from 
this section also indicate that the CF and VG, while representing the electorate of 
Flanders and Wallonia in terms of services to the person, do not represent the 
electorate of Brussels. The tensions between the urban VGC and COCOF and their 
parent governments the CF and VG requires further scholarly attention. It is unlikely 
that increased cooperation among the institutions will occur while the VGC and COCOF 
are restricted by the CF and VG, where Brussels politicians do not have control over 
policy within the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. Rather the majority of the CF and 
VG is comprised of politicians from outside the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. 
While the French-speaking Community (CF) has decentralised a number of 
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competencies to the COCOF, the Dutch-speaking VGC is subject to more monitoring and 
cannot act as autonomously. Sufficient consideration should be given to the 
decentralisation of such responsibilities.  
 
4.5.2 The electoral system 
While not a problem directly related with the lowest common denominator method, the 
electoral design in Brussels incorporates a number of unintended consequences. Of 
course these problems also present themselves under other mechanisms of conflict 
management. The electoral design within Brussels serves to perpetuate the 
administrative problems outlined in the previous section: without political leadership, 
coherent governance at the policy implementation stage appears unlikely. Drawing on 
two contrasting schools of conflict management, Horowitz (power dividing) and Lijphart 
(consociationalism), this section highlights the failures of the electoral design and the 
subsequent effect on policy-making. Since 2004, Dutch speakers have been guaranteed 
seventeen representatives in the Brussels Regional Parliament, while the remaining 
seventy-two representatives belong to the French-speaking community.  
Following the Horowitz school of conflict management, it is generally accepted 
that electoral procedures should aim to promote moderate results ‘by giving politicians 
in ethnically divided societies reasons to seek electoral support from groups beyond 
their own community’ (Reilly, 2001:6). This is not the case at the sub-state level in 
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Brussels60. Although the electorate within Brussels do vote tactically, the electoral 
system actively discourages voting for parties of the other community. Deschouwer and 
Van Parijs (2009:11) find that due to the Belgian electoral process, not ‘one single 
politician formally represents voters outside his or her language group’. While political 
representation outside the language group may not happen, this does not preclude 
voting across the linguistic divide. For example if a Dutch-speaking person feels a 
greater attachment to ‘green’ issues than his linguistic community, he or she may decide 
to vote for a French-speaking Green party, if it is perceived that that candidate stands a 
greater chance of electoral success. Ironically, the right wing and separatist Flemish 
nationalist party, Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) increased their support in the 1999  
election through an appeal to French-speaking voters on issues such as immigration, 
thereby pulling the right-wing rather than the linguistic vote (Coffe, 2006). In 
subsequent elections, Dutch political leaders also encouraged French speakers to vote 
for moderate Dutch speaking parties so as to minimise any Vlaams Blok/Belang support. 
While indeed the electoral system does allow political parties to seek votes from outside 
their own communities, political representatives do not actively represent the views of 
those outside their language communities. This is also a problem at the national level 
and various national level solutions have been put forward. One contribution is that of 
the Pavia Group where Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009) seek a number of electoral 
reforms to encourage politicians to reach out to the electorate as a whole rather than 
                                                 
60 It is the case at commune level where Liste du Burgomasres (electoral candidates of the mayor) are 
presented bridging the linguistic and political party divide. These lists include candidates from a broad 
spectrum of middle ground parties from both language communities. Bilinguals however are not 
represented to a greater extent by these coalitions, as individual councillors remain part of their 
traditional mono-lingual political parties – a marriage of convenience so to speak. 
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simply one community. It is evident that the electoral system in Brussels actively 
discourages political parties from constructively seeking votes and representing views 
beyond their language group – a principle that scholars such as Horowitz (2009: 27) and 
Reilly (2001: 7) find to negatively affect conflict management.  
If the political level are not to constructively seek votes and represent the views 
of those in other language groups, an alternative criterion grounded in Lijphart’s 
consociationalism, advocates that it is vital that each group be actually represented by 
its own members and not simply by the moderates of another group. At first glance the 
Brussels system appears to fit this principle. On closer inspection however a significant 
weakness emerges. While bilinguals and immigrants are members of political parties in 
Brussels, the Brussels/Belgian electoral system does not have a single party that 
prioritises the interests of indigenous bilinguals and immigrant minorities. It is to this 
weakness I now turn. 
The Brussels Capital Region is an agglomeration of minorities. In 2001, 49.8% of 
the Brussels population had been born in Brussels. 31.7% were born outside Belgium, 
while 8.4% and 10.1% originated in Flanders and Wallonia respectively. Studies by the 
socio-linguist Rudi Janssens (2008:4) have found that those with both French and Dutch 
as their home languages now comprise 9.9% of the Brussels population: ‘This tendency 
is mainly accounted for by the born and raised Bruxellois’. A position further supported 
by Louckx (1978) and Treffers-Daller (1994), both finding that indigenous Bruxellois not 
to consider themselves as either Walloon or Flemish. Given that only 50% of Brussels 
inhabitants were born in Brussels, (see Deboosere et al, 2009) this number of bilinguals 
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represents a considerable proportion (~20%) of those who had the natural opportunity 
to develop both French and Dutch as primary first languages. If linguistic identity is to 
restrict how the electorate vote, where do these traditional Bruxellois vote? A multi-
lingual list does not exist at the sub-state level, nor for that matter does a multi-lingual 
political party61.  
In modern Brussels, ‘people do not live in a monolingual environment...and in 
both personal relations and their daily public life they are constantly reminded of their 
multilingual environment’ (Janssens, 2008: 12). ‘Associations in Brussels are no longer 
linguistically homogenous...club life has evolved from a strict separation based on 
language background to a meeting place for all the people’ (ibid: 6). 97.4% of Dutch 
speakers and 75.3% of French speakers find bilingualism an essential component of 
Brussels identity (ibid: 12). Despite the large majority of Bruxellois seeing this 
multilingual environment as a major asset, multilinguals are not served by the electoral 
system. The emphasis here is not to rid Dutch and French speakers of their 
minority/majority representation, but to point out that a significant and growing 
collective of the urban population are not represented in the urban government. This 
unrepresentativeness is further substantiated by Treffers-Daller (2002:56) where she 
finds that ‘in mainstream Belgian politics it would be hard to find any defendants of the 
ideal of a bilingual Brussels in which French and Dutch would live together 
harmoniously.  
                                                 
61 Recall multilingual lists are however presented at Commune level. 
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As indicated by Murphy (2002), Brussels population patterns are extremely 
unpredictable. Not simply in terms of language identity as suggested above, but also 
add to the concoction the wealthy migrant of the EU institution employees and the less 
well off migrant workers from Europe’s periphery. The 2001 census found that over 30% 
of the Brussels population were born abroad; thus although this 30% may speak French 
(or Dutch), they could not be described as members of the French-speaking community 
in cultural terms. This 30% of the Brussels population are forced to polarise into either 
the French or Dutch-speaking electoral category. To summarise, as only unilingual lists 
can be presented, the electorate must choose between a French-speaking list and a 
Flemish-speaking list. Immigrants and indigenous bilinguals are not represented by their 
communities within the Brussels system and, contrary to Lijphart’s recommendation, 
are instead represented by the moderates of each of the culturally defined groups. I 
demonstrate in the following paragraphs the effects of the existing system which 
unintentionally facilitate the electoral preferences of a small group of right-wing 
nationalists, yet as just established, fails to represent EU and non-EU immigrants and 
indigenous bilinguals. 
Such a formalised electoral system also allows for manipulation by those in 
power for what they perceive to be the greater good. Brussels demonstrates this 
particularly clearly in the gerrymandering of the system so as to exclude Vlaams 
Blok/Belang from partaking in government. The 1999 Brussels Capital Region elections 
confirmed the vulnerability of the Brussels institutional system. Until the 2004 Brussels 
elections, the number of Dutch-speaking candidates was proportionate to the votes cast 
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for those parties. In 1999, Vlaams Blok secured 4 of the then 11 Dutch-language seats 
becoming the largest Dutch-speaking party, which was almost enough to produce an 
institutional stalemate in the Capital Region. As no French-speaking party would enter 
government with Vlaams Blok/Belang, their realisation of a further two seats would 
have deadlocked the system. The electoral system was changed to guarantee Dutch-
speaking candidates a fixed 17 seats in the parliament, making it improbable that 
Vlaams Blok would be able to block the system62. 
The boundaries between guaranteeing minority Dutch-speaking representation 
and electoral engineering so as to exclude parties whose interests are against the 
functioning of the power-sharing system, have become blurred in Brussels. Jacobs and 
Swyngedouw (2003: 138) highlight the dangers of this precedence, and demonstrate 
how the Brussels electoral approach may be manipulated by collective ‘in groups’ if 
adopted in other divided societies: ‘of course it cannot be ruled out that the new 
arrangement could also be used as a normal political instrument against other political 
parties’. 
This vulnerability triggers knee-jerk reactions from the political establishment, 
blurring the lines between guaranteeing minority representation and gerrymandering. 
This underlines a significant flaw in the Brussels model. Such vulnerability within a well 
developed, European contested society, with a history of democracy and non-violence, 
may startle and concern commentators and researchers; however such vulnerable 
                                                 
62See Jacobs and Swyngedouw (2003: 136/7) for a comprehensive description of the institutional changes 
designed to keep Vlaams Blok out of the political system: The number of Dutch speaking seats was 11 
(1989), 10 (1995) and 11 (1999). An extra ‘protective device’ was agreed upon in the Lombard Agreement 
and used for the first time in 2004: the number of seats for Dutch speakers was fixed at 17, while the total 
number of seats in the regional Parliament was raised to 89 (also giving more seats to French-speakers). 
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institutional design within an underdeveloped, violent-prone conflict environment 
would have much more dangerous consequences. The electoral design of Brussels 
therefore intensifies the problems of destructive financing and incoherent governance 
identified in the previous section. The political level are elected to represent only two 
linguistic communities, neglecting any sense of proportion to the actual composition of 
the city. While there may be merit in the lowest common denominator method of 
power-sharing, Brussels demonstrates a number of implementation deficits. The 
existing institutional framework is poorly equipped to respond to the demands for 
coherent governance within a power-sharing society. Further the existing electoral 
system fails to encourage politicians to reach across the traditional divide at the sub-
state level, nor does it represent all major groups within the city, and finally, an electoral 
system that could be deadlocked by a party receiving a little over 5% of the total vote 
could cause further problems within a more violently contested society. Janssens (2008) 
study highlights the gulf between the dynamic nature of society in Brussels and the rigid 
electoral system, serving solely to institutionalise differences and ignore completely 
those identifying with Brussels over Flanders and Wallonia. While similar occurrences 
are evident in other mechanisms of power-sharing, this research finds that where 
conflict management is highly regulated, special attention to the unintentional 
consequences of electoral design is required. Wolff (2006:4) submits that what is 
‘particularly important in societies underpinned by power-sharing is that electoral 
systems and institutional designs actually “match” in the sense that electoral systems 
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generate outcomes that enable political institutions to function’. This cannot be said of 
the Brussels Capital Region. 
The weaknesses of the electoral system are substantiated by Deschouwer and 
Van Parijs (2009) who identify the failures of the 2007 federal election as being 
grounded in ‘a major defect in the system’, not the failings of the individuals. In the 
same publication De Briey (2009) finds the Belgian electoral system to promote two 
competing public spaces, and to stimulate the radicalisation of political and public 
opinions. Throughout this section I have demonstrated that such an electoral system 
excludes migrant workers and bilinguals and over represents immigrants from Flanders 
and Wallonia. The system is open to manipulation by those in power and does not 
encourage politicians to reach beyond their own communities. Given that ‘electoral 
systems design is a key mechanism in the broader institutional design approach to the 
resolution of conflict in multi-ethnic societies’, this is a significant failure within the 
Brussels governance design (Wolff, 2006: 35). While a constructive electoral system is 
indeed a prerequisite for coherent governance, so too is an effective bureaucracy (See 
chapter 3 or Brinkerhoff, 2010). Administrative capacity is a crucial component of 
successful governance. The capacity for good governance at the lowest common 
denominator is being constrained by the failure of the various administrations to 
cooperate to achieve the needs of the entire urban public: A failure that the elected 
government of the city must recognise. Given the combined problems of the electoral 
design and the lack of bureaucratic involvement in the policy design process such 
recognition remains unlikely.  
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4.6 Inferences from the findings and concluding remarks 
This chapter has contextualised the working environment of the bureaucrat in Brussels. 
Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator can work. The problem originates in 
the implementation of the concept, not the concept itself. Societies considering 
adopting the LCD mechanism of conflict management have much to learn from the 
Brussels experience. Primarily, as the governance process succeeds, community 
governments should not be discouraged from cooperating. Two inter-related problems 
are associated with this lack of cooperation. The first problem concerns good 
governance while the second concerns conflict management. Firstly, policy 
development needs to be responsive to the wishes of the urban population. Once 
concerns about the traditional conflict are superseded by other governance concerns, 
the priorities of the urban population are seen to change. In Brussels the urban 
demographic realties have changed as Dutch-speakers no longer felt threatened by the 
French-speaking majority (Janssens, 2008). The governance process needs to be 
responsive to this change. In Brussels, policy initiatives are not responsive to bilinguals 
within the city. Secondly, the process should not prohibit the progression from conflict 
management to conflict resolution. The actions of the governance institutions are seen 
to preserve divisions between Dutch and French speakers rather than responding to a 
substantial proportion of inhabitants who see themselves as neither French nor Dutch 
speaking. This in turn can prolong the conflict. While such problems also posit 
themselves in more comprehensive power-sharing mechanisms, the fragmented 
institutional structure, inherent within the LCD mechanism, also institutionalises a 
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number of unintended consequences. In Brussels, the various public administrations do 
not coordinate policy, which negatively affects both the quality of governance and the 
progression from conflict management to conflict resolution. A new urban association 
with the city has emerged, independent of a Dutch speaking or French speaking identity. 
The administration has not been able to respond to this new urban reality. The 
consequential administrative efficiency deficit has become most apparent, as 
demonstrated throughout the chapter in cultural, social, health and immigration arenas. 
The failure of the political and bureaucratic level to prioritise organisational coherency 
in these areas has frustrated the implementation of political policies for the region. Until 
this coherency deficit is addressed, political policy initiatives cannot realise their full 
potential. Instead of the political level being told that their policies cannot be 
implemented as they are outside their competency, cooperation and coordination with 
other political and administrative levels should be encouraged.  
  Bollens (2008) correctly describes Brussels as ‘sustainable’, however this is in 
spite of how its form of power-sharing has been implemented, not because of it. While 
separate community governance is indeed a central tenet of the LCD mechanism of 
conflict management, this should not preclude cooperation between the various public 
administrations. If the quality of governance within Brussels is to be improved, closer 
coordination between the administrations is a necessity. Secondly, financing should not 
actively discourage cultural cooperation. While funding should of course be made 
available for Dutch-speaking and French-speaking community cultural projects, similar 
funding should be available for the growing population identifying with Brussels vis-à-vis 
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the traditional communities. While the BCR government circumvents legal obstacles to 
support such programmes, support for cross-community cooperation should not 
depend on the willingness of an institution to consistently act outside its legal remit. 
Financing the Community governance institutions needs to be reviewed. As funds derive 
from agencies responsible for the promotion of only one particular culture, (CF or VG), 
cross-community projects tend to find it difficult to secure financing. These governance 
problems negatively affect the conflict management to conflict resolution process.  
Any solution to the above problems is frustrated by the design of the electoral 
system. It is also suggested that the physical distance between the public administration 
and elected representatives, filled by politically appointed cabinets, prevents a more 
coordinated approach to policy making as bureaucrats cannot relay their concerns 
about policy implementations to Ministers at an early stage in the policy design process. 
Future research briefs should consider the influence of these advisory cabinets on 
policy, on conflict and on the bureaucracy. Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) present an edited 
volume of case studies examining the role of political appointees in the policy process. 
Their work could act as a valuable reference point. Cooperation is further frustrated as 
the VGC and COCOF remain controlled by their regional counterparts, the VG and CF. 
While the COCOF and VGC are tasked with the provision of services within the Bilingual 
Region of Brussels Capital, their actions, to a large extent, are subject to the directions 
of the VG and CF. If the institutions in Brussels are to be responsive to the Brussels 
population, they should not be controlled by influences from Flanders and Wallonia. As 
indicated throughout the research, further research briefs concentrating on the city-
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state relationship should examine the VGC-VG/COCOF-CF tensions. Cooperation, both 
vertical, meaning between the elected official and the bureaucrat, and horizontal, 
meaning between the various public administrations needs to be enhanced if the 
Brussels solution is to be successful. If other societies were to consider adopting the 
lowest common denominator mechanism of conflict management, sufficient 
consideration of the longer term goals of conflict resolution would be required. By 
facilitating inter-institutional dialogue and incorporating a more carefully designed 
electoral system the Brussels model could indeed provide an alternate solution to either 
the traditional comprehensive power-sharing approach or indeed to societies 
considering total separation.  
From both its successes and failures, the Brussels ‘lowest common denominator’ 
model has much to teach us about how two ethno-linguistic groups can govern a single 
territory. Power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. Above all, the 
Brussels solution has indeed demonstrated that such a proposition is not just 
theoretically plausible, but practically possible. Amidst national chaos, conflict has been 
successfully managed within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital and within the 
Brussels Capital Region; the institutional solution has played its part in creating the 
status quo. It is unfortunate however that it is this same institutional design that serves 
today to preserve linguistic divisions, despite the population of the city evidencing its 
readiness to progress. Rather than seeing this as being a problem with the concept, this 
chapter finds the problem to be rooted within the implementation of the model. If 
bureaucrats were allowed to cooperate (both vertically and horizontally) in the policy-
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making process, while still maintaining their institutional independence, such problems 
could be overcome. For this to occur, it is suggested that future research briefs consider 
the city-state/region relationship – ie. the relationship between the VG and VGC and the 
CF and COCOF. Indicative findings suggest however that the VGC and the COCOF will 
require greater financial and legislative autonomy from their parent organisations, the 
VG and the CF.  
Whether it is the Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs of Kirkuk, or the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots of Nicosia, the Brussels model of power-sharing at the lowest common 
denominator does suggest an alternative to total separation, domination, or 
comprehensive consociation mechanisms of conflict management. The evidence from 
Brussels urges caution in any attempt to export the LCD governance model. As it is 
currently implemented the Brussels model incorporates a number of dangerous 
attributes that if incorporated into a more violently contested society could serve to 
exasperate rather than reconcile tensions. Devolving authority among numerous actors 
within the same physical territory can succeed. The Brussels example has demonstrated 
that this division of responsibility should not preclude communities from working 
together. The short-term goal of conflict management should not inhibit the longer 
term goals of conflict resolution and good governance.  
This chapter has contextualised the working environment of the Brussels 
bureaucratic elite. It is clear that bureaucrats in Brussels operate in a very different 
environment from their Belfast counterparts. This background to the environment in 
which the bureaucrat works provides sufficient contextualisation to the findings in 
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chapter six which aim to ascertain the core beliefs and values of the bureaucratic elite. 
Chapter five however returns to one of the necessary conditions for active 
representation – a critical mass. Recall from the literature review that without a 
numerical sufficiency within the administration, bureaucrats cannot be expected to 
represent their correspondents in society. In order to test the hypothesis that a 
bureaucrat can actively represent a professional mindset the conditions to disprove the 
hypothesis must also be met – these include the conditions underwhich a bureaucrat 
would be expected to respond to the preferences respond to the preferences of his/her 
own community: ie. comprise a critical mass within the public administration. As quotas 
guarantee a critical mass of Dutch-speaking bureaucrats in Brussels, chapter five turns 
to Belfast where no such quotas exist – have the traditional out-group (Catholics) 
managed to ascertain a critical mass within the Belfast bureaucracy where quotas do 
not exist?  
  
181 
 
5 
 
Throwing the champagne out with the cork: the merit 
principle in representative bureaucracy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A review of the literature on public administration within the contested society in 
chapter two indicated two emergent schools of thought on the concept of passive 
representation. Both schools concur on the necessity for the bureaucracy to possess 
legitimacy – for one however this is derived from actual representation within the 
bureaucracy, for the other legitimacy is derived from equity of opportunity. Drawing on 
research in uncontested societies it was further found that a group’s representativeness 
within the bureaucracy needed to be sufficient in order for benefits to flow to that 
group – be this directly through active representation or indirectly through contribution 
to the overall norms and values of the organisation. If the argument that passive 
representation equates with active representation on behalf of a primary identity is 
accepted, should emerging power-sharing societies therefore introduce community 
recruitment quotas to guarantee a substantial representation of the tradition out-
group? This chapter applies the theory of representative bureaucracy to elite level 
bureaucrats in Belfast. The theory proposes that the demographic composition of the 
administration should mirror, to some extent, the composition of the society it 
supposedly represents. Traditionally, power-sharing societies have tended to introduce 
quotas to ensure the proportional representation of minority citizens within the state 
bureaucracy. Belfast however has instead maintained and strengthened the merit 
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principle. The results demonstrate that the traditional minority has achieved passive 
representation within the Belfast bureaucracy without the necessity for quotas. 
Arguments advocating the use of ethnopolitical quotas to attain a passively 
representative bureaucracy are therefore rejected by this research. The study offers a 
detailed breakdown of policy leaders in Belfast by creed and nationality. The findings 
show that both Protestants and Catholics are passively represented among the 
bureaucratic elite, while those possessing a Northern Irish identity are over-
represented. The results empirically reinforce the view that a representative 
bureaucracy can be achieved within a contested society without sacrificing the merit 
principle. The conditions for a bureaucrat to actively represent a primary identity are 
therefore satisfied in each of our cases: A critical mass of the traditional out-group exists 
in both Belfast and Brussels. 
Although far from being the norm in practice, power-sharing has convinced a 
significant majority of researchers of its merits as a mechanism of conflict management. 
The opening chapters of this research demonstrate that the bureaucratic elite influence 
decision-making within the contested society. In these next two chapters, attention is 
turned to developing an understanding of individual bureaucrat role perceptions, for as 
found in the literature review, it is not simply the bureaucratic structures that concern 
us, but how bureaucrats perceive their roles within these structures that determines 
policy-making. Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy such role 
perceptions are measured using Q Methodology. However, in order to comprehensively 
examine the concept of active representation we must first look at the concept of 
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passive representation. Recall that a necessary condition for active representation is 
passive representation (Chapter two). In other words if a group within the bureaucracy 
are to actively represent their counterparts in society, they need to comprise a 
significant proportion of the bureaucracy. As recruitment quotas are in place to 
guarantee out-group representation in Brussels (thereby ensuring representation of the 
traditional out-group), this chapter focuses on Belfast, investigating if a significant 
proportion of the out-group can be attained without sacrificing the merit principle.  
As already established in chapter two, a variety of studies to date have examined 
the advantages of various electoral systems, political and institutional arrangements and 
the role of civil society in the reconstruction process. Esman (1997: 528) and Brown 
(1999: 369) however draw our attention to the fact that the literature on ethnopolitics 
ignores the importance of public administration in the conflict management and 
development process. Schneckeener (2002:203) underlines the importance of getting 
decision-making mechanisms right: if ‘bad…rules and procedures prevail, then even the 
presence of comparatively beneficial factors will probably not avoid failure’. In 
Afghanistan, Wimmer and Schetter (2003: 534) too recommend that ‘establishing 
institutions that are able to perform the basic functions of modern states should 
represent the main strategic goal of the reconstruction programme’. Thier and Chopra 
(2002) investigate the shape these institutions in Afghanistan should take. In his recent 
research, Brinkerhoff (2010: 76) reasserts that ‘competent capacity developers’ are a 
key component of capacity development, while Lee (2009) investigates how a politically 
neutral bureaucracy can develop within an emerging democracy. The design of 
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bureaucratic institutions is therefore fundamental to conflict management, yet we know 
very little about how a bureaucracy within a contested society should look. Starting at 
the most rudimentary level this chapter explores one of the simplest, yet crucial 
questions in the establishment of a functioning state: who should staff the organisation 
that is tasked with both providing services to the people, and supporting the political 
level.   
Reforms in bureaucratic recruitment are found to be essential for staffing the 
public sector (Hanson, 1995). As alluded to by Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010), an 
organisation’s recruitment policy is central to successful capacity development. Each of 
the ‘capabilities’ that (they submit) are required for administrative capacity 
development rely not only on a legitimate administration, but also on a high level of 
expertise within the administration63. Drawing on the experience of Belfast, one of the 
most heavily contested cities in Europe, merit based recruitment is found to be integral 
to the design of the administration and need not be sacrificed in the name of achieving 
a passively representative bureaucracy. Developing administrative capacity (expertise) 
and the attainment of a passively representative bureaucracy (representation) need not 
therefore be contradictory ambitions.  
The following paragraphs depart from traditional power-sharing research 
focusing instead on how to get the composition of the public administration ‘right’ 
within these contested environments. The chapter investigates the research question: 
                                                 
63 Reiterating the five core capabilities required for capacity development: the capability to commit and 
engage with other actors and mechanisms, to carry out technical tasks, attract support from stakeholders 
and society, adapt and reform and finally the capability to balance diversity and coherence. From Baser and 
Morgan (2008) and Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) 
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are community quotas necessary to guarantee minority representation within the public 
administration of a contested society? The chapter begins with a (re)introduction to the 
theory of representative bureaucracy. After a brief contextualisation section to situate 
the theory within the Belfast context, I outline the research design for the investigation 
and then present the findings. The implications of the findings are then discussed in the 
closing section. 
 
5.2 The theory of representative bureaucracy 
Interest in recruitment to the public administration is not new and can be found in the 
classic writings of Hegel and Weber, but it is Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy 
(1944) that guides this research. Kingsley perceived the British bureaucracy to work for 
the interests of its composite class – in his case, the middle class. Recruitment in less 
contested societies has since aimed at increasing diversification, developing various 
mechanisms for attaining a more ‘representative bureaucracy’ – guaranteed interview 
schemes, outreach programmes, equal opportunity legislation etc.  In contested 
societies a mechanism often employed to achieve such a result is that of community 
quotas (See Belgium, Nigeria and Lebanon as examples). The merit principle is often the 
first sacrifice of power-sharing arrangements, being replaced with simple quota systems 
of recruitment. The former out-group feels this to be a necessary requirement to 
guarantee sufficient representation within the bureaucracy. In this chapter this 
assumption is challenged, investigating the hypothesis that proportional (passive) 
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representation within the administration can be attained without forgoing the merit 
principle.  
Recall that passive representation occurs when the bureaucratic representative 
resembles the represented along one or more primary dimensions (race, gender, 
religion etc), while active representation occurs when the representative acts in the 
interests of those he perceives himself to represent (Mosher, 1982; Meier and O’Toole, 
2006). Passive representation is therefore concerned simply with what the bureaucrat is 
or is like, not what the bureaucrat does (Pitkin, 1967). Therefore, in the case of 
Jerusalem, passive representation would concern itself simply with the number of Jews, 
Muslims and Christians within the administration, measuring this against the 
composition of society. Similarly in Kirkuk, passive representation is concerned with the 
number of Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds within the urban administration. Active 
representation on the other hand delves deeper examining who, or what interests, the 
bureaucrat represents, and in what circumstances they are represented. For example, 
under what circumstances would a Kurd within the Kirkuk administration represent the 
interests of Kurds in society? Or when does a Palestinian within the Jerusalem public 
administration actively represent the interests of Palestinians in society? This in itself is 
controversial as in traditional doctrines of public administration the bureaucrat is to 
serve, not represent. However this is not always the case within the contested 
environment: the bureaucratic elite can be involved in the shaping, designing and 
implementation of policy, particularly in areas relevant to conflict management (Chapter 
Three). While active representation is indeed of greater importance to the governance 
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and conflict management processes, this chapter limits its concern to the former field of 
enquiry: passive representation.  
A small number of studies within contested societies refer to passive 
representation within the bureaucracy. Nachmias’ (1991) study of the Israeli 
bureaucracy documents the absence of women, Sephardim and Israeli Arabs from the 
bureaucratic elite. Scholarship of the principle is much more advanced however in more 
homogenous societies. While the debate within more cohesive societies has progressed 
to analysing the extent to which minority bureaucrats actively represent their own 
personal communities (Meier, 1993; Keiser et al, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999) or the 
environments that encourage/restrict minorities to actively represent their own 
communities (Rehfuss, 1986; Sowa and Selden, 2003; Wilkins and Williams, 2008), 
discussions within the divided society largely remain at the passive representation 
phase. How necessary is a passively representative bureaucracy (Brown, 1999) and how 
is this best achieved (Esman, 1999) are the most predominant questions addressed 
within our conflict management literature.  
While undoubtedly active representation is more crucial in terms of policy 
formulation and development,  numerical concentration, or what is termed a ‘critical 
mass’ is required in order for the minority to potentially act on behalf of their 
counterparts in society (Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). This prerequisite 
for a ‘critical mass’ indicates that a significant concentration of the out-group is required 
within the administration before out-group administrators begin to press for the 
interests of their counterparts in society or alternatively as Lim (2006) would suggest, 
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before the out-group can affect or alter the norms of the traditional in-group. Scholars 
and practitioners alike are divided as to the importance of this ‘critical mass’ within the 
contested society. Scholars such as Milton J. Esman (1997, 1999) attribute such 
importance to achieving passive representation, that although reluctant to accept the 
sacrificing of the merit principle, believe that where the process cannot yield equitable 
representation, then this representation should be guaranteed by formal procedures 
(such as the introduction of community quotas). For Esman (1999), a prerequisite for 
peace and stability is societal perception of a legitimate bureaucracy. This legitimacy 
derives from actual community representation within the state bureaucracy. It is his 
belief that the benefits of a representative bureaucracy outweigh any potential costs – 
loss of efficiency and effectiveness in the public service or resentment among the 
traditional majority, etc:  ‘The costs of illegitimate government resulting from patently 
unrepresentative administration are likely to exceed the grievances provoked in 
ethnically divided societies when the merit system is abridged’ (Esman, 1999: 365). To 
summarise: legitimacy is guaranteed through representation, therefore passive 
representation matters. 
 On the other hand, Brown (1999) takes a different view, being grounded more 
firmly in the Weberian belief that legitimacy is to be found in the principles of efficiency 
and impartiality. For Brown (1999), legitimacy is not guaranteed through representation 
but through guaranteeing equity of access to representation. As not all communities 
possess the same tradition of public service or tradition of education, those 
communities will always be under-represented within the bureaucracy – what is most 
189 
 
important however is that these communities perceive the bureaucracy to possess 
legitimacy: this is derived from an efficient, effective, accessible civil service. Evidence 
from Trinidad and Guyana leads Brown (1999) to argue that recruitment by ethnic quota 
can actually contribute negatively to the conflict management process. The legitimacy of 
the bureaucracy is guaranteed by equality of access, and a neutral, impartial and 
professional ethos among public officials (Brown, 1999: 377). Passive representation is 
therefore less of a concern for Brown. Raunch and Evans (2000: 49) too base their 
research on the premise that: ‘Meritocratic recruitment is the most important structural 
feature for improving bureaucratic performance’. As legitimacy is derived from the 
principles of fairness and efficiency, this in turn decreases the necessity for each 
ethnicity to be passively represented. An earlier study by Dresang (1974) found ethnic 
groups within the 1970s Zambian bureaucracy not to have simply represented their 
corresponding ethnics within society; but instead found the personal ambitions to 
succeed within the organisation to neutralise these preferences. However, Dresang 
(1974) also cautions that a passively representative bureaucracy, while not necessary for 
equitable resource allocation, may be a necessity for bureaucratic legitimacy.  
If public administration research which finds bureaucrats to actively represent 
their primary identities is accepted, (studies by Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 
2006 etc) a passively representative bureaucracy is indeed a necessity for resources to 
flow to that group. Similarly, in terms of conflict management literature, if Esman’s 
(1999) and Dresang’s (1974) assertions are true, passive representation is also a 
necessity for bureaucratic legitimacy. This combination of public administration and 
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conflict management research provides the strongest theoretical argument in favour of 
attaining the goal of a passively representative bureaucracy. Thus if passive 
representation (or a critical mass) of the traditional out-group is required for benefits to 
flow to that group, and also for bureaucratic legitimacy, we must ask: can the use of 
community quotas in recruitment, and the corresponding sacrifice of the merit principle 
in bureaucratic recruitment, be justified in order to attain the theoretically justifiable 
goal of passive representation?  
By holding constant other factors that influence minority representation, such as 
education (Roberts, 1965; Brown, 1999), legitimacy, (Esman, 1999; Dresang 1974) and 
accessibility (Rauch and Evans, 2000), we can determine whether or not quotas are 
indeed required to bring about passive representation in these extraordinary 
circumstances. Competent capacity developers are a prerequisite for successful capacity 
development (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010). If indeed passive representation is 
required for bureaucratic legitimacy, and for resource allocation purposes, does this 
provide a valid argument for the introduction of quotas and concurrent reduction in the 
capabilities of the administration? This research finds no necessity for community 
quotas for the attainment of a passively representative bureaucracy. Solutions to the 
problem of an absence of passive representation within the administration must 
address the cause of the problem, which in turn will increase the robustness and quality 
of governance of the bureaucracy. Community quotas, it can therefore be said, treat the 
symptom, masking the cause of unrepresentative bureaucracy, while at the same time 
potentially generating poorer governance capacity. Quotas are not always necessary to 
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attain a passively representative bureaucracy in a contested environment. Brown’s 
suggestion that passive representation is not a necessary condition for successful 
governance is not tested by this research; however evidence is put forward to support 
the maintenance of the merit principle: a passively representative bureaucracy has been 
attained within the bureaucracy of one of Europe’s most deeply divided cities without 
sacrificing the merit principle. 
To summarise, two schools of representative bureaucracy theory have emerged 
in governance research: one in which secondary, organisational norms supersede 
primary norms in resource allocation and a second where primary ethno-national 
identities guide resource allocation. Similarly, we have also seen two divergent strands 
in conflict management research, each attributing differing importance to passive 
representation (and the derivation of legitimacy) within the bureaucracy. Accepting the 
arguments of both schools which support the goal of passive representation64, the 
research question (of the chapter) begins to develop: where education in both 
communities can be held constant, and where accessibility, and legitimacy can also be 
held constant, has a passively representative bureaucracy emerged in Belfast without 
the need for affirmative action? As it is found that passive representation has emerged 
without the use of community quotas, the findings suggest that community quotas are 
not necessary in achieving a passively representative bureaucracy. While not 
investigating the merits of passive representation, such a finding suggests that if passive 
representation is a goal of the traditional out group, community quotas are not 
                                                 
64 Ie. Primary identity guides resource allocation and legitimacy is achieved through actual numerical 
representation (passive representation) within the bureaucracy.  
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necessary. If the cause of the problem is mis-defined, solutions cannot be appropriately 
designed, hence the problem perpetuates. Such a misdiagnosis of the problem in turn 
lends support to Brown’s (1999) thesis which submits that quotas can further 
deteriorate the legitimacy of the administration among the traditional in-group, while at 
the same time potentially decreasing the capacity for professional governance. 
The next section (re)introduces the case of Belfast City Council, providing some 
contextual background to the research presented within this chapter. The following 
section then elaborates on the research design, explaining how, for the purposes of this 
chapter, ‘representativeness’ is gauged. The penultimate section then introduces the 
findings, based on statistics for the entire bureaucratic elite. The latter part of this 
section then takes a representative sample of 42% of these bureaucratic elite delving 
deeper into their characteristics, ascertaining their representativeness of society. The 
final section then discusses these results and their implications for recruitment within 
power-sharing societies.  
 
5.3 Case study: Belfast City Council and the merit principle 
Belfast exhibits a prime example where division has long since existed between two 
communities. Since 1997, Belfast City Council has adopted a mechanism of ‘involuntary 
power-sharing’. Politicians share power, not on the basis of a formal agreement to 
stabilise the city, but on the basis of necessity. In 1997, the Belfast electorate returned a 
hung Council, forcing the political level into cooperation. Despite the ensuing political 
compromises, there was no sacrifice of the merit principle in recruitment to the 
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bureaucracy – the most suitable candidate, regardless of personal background, was still 
to get the job. There was no statutory change to the existing recruitment by merit. The 
following year, section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act obliged the City Council to 
conduct an Equality Impact Assessment where statistics indicating the community 
background of individual bureaucrats were now collated65. A grievance redressal 
procedure also strengthens the merit principle. Therefore, instead of compromising the 
merit principle, Belfast provides an example of a case where the merit principle was 
strengthened following power-sharing. Research by Gusfield (1958: 541) has found that, 
‘Recruitment, although frequently couched in language of technical efficiency, in reality 
proceeds on less formal and abstract assumptions...The process of bureaucratization is a 
human process, with purposes engendered by human values and interests.’ It is 
therefore the exploitation/employment of the rules that determine recruitment and not 
solely the rules themselves. Thus we expect that the merit principle is not the obstacle 
to greater out-group representation; rather the obstacle rests with how these rules and 
procedures are employed, and the subsequent attributable lack of institutional 
legitimacy. Grievance redressal systems provide a forum for those feeling discriminated 
against, while the publication of community data allows for the measurement of 
outcomes of procedures rather than simply measuring institutional outputs, procedures, 
or instruments themselves. Thus in Belfast, while no statutory changes were made to 
the recruitment process, the grievance redressal system and publication of data had the 
potential to alter how the rules were implemented, without actually changing the rules. 
                                                 
65 Section 75 was a consequent of power-sharing at the NI level, not the regional (city council) level 
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Belfast therefore provides an appropriate background in which to conduct our research: 
the merit principle remains constant, reliable data are available, both communities have 
a tradition of education; however the robustness of the recruitment process, and 
consequently accessibility of top positions, is enhanced following power-sharing. This 
research does not seek to empirically determine the causes of passive representation, 
but simply to investigate if a passively representative bureaucracy is possible within the 
contested society, without the necessity for community quotas.66 
 
 
5.4 Research design 
Following Riccucci and Saidel (1997) this chapter departs from traditional research and 
examines the bureaucratic elite, as opposed to entire bureaucracies or street level 
bureaucrats. The bureaucratic elite are defined as those occupying the top three tiers of 
local government: department directors, heads of service and senior managers. While 
significant discretion is available to say, parking attendants, policemen or health 
inspectors, (Lipsky, 1980), the bureaucratic elite within Belfast’s contested environment 
also have considerable discretion, and do affect the management of conflict (Chapter 
Three). Passive representation therefore is equally as important at the elite level as it is 
at the street level. This is further supported by Nachmias’ (1991) study which submits 
that governance in democratic political systems can no longer be understood without 
examining the dominant position of bureaucratic elites.  
                                                 
66Nor am I concerned with the city-state relationship. My concern is grounded in public administration 
research: I seek to determine if a passively representative bureaucracy can emerge within a contested 
society without the need for recruitment quotas. 
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The religious backgrounds of all forty seven top decision makers within Belfast 
City Council were attained. Of these twenty were interviewed at length. Interviews were 
targeted not on the basis of race, gender or creed, but on the basis of job description 
within the Council and were conducted in one wave. Interviews determined the 
bureaucrats religious background, nationality, original social class, and education. On 
condition of anonymity, the remainder of the interview explored the interviewees’ 
norms, values and mechanisms of approaching decision making within the conflict 
environment; aspects not directly relevant to our research question within this chapter. 
Some quotations from these interviews are included here to support the quantitative 
findings. All interviewees described themselves as ethnically ‘white’. All interviewees 
possessed a high level of formal education. Eight held either a degree or a postgraduate 
diploma while twelve had either a Masters or a Ph.D. The interview sample represents 
43% of the targeted universe (entire bureaucratic elite). Where N=47 (entire 
bureaucratic elite), the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is 1:1.14. In this N=20 sample 
the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is 1:1.04. Thus in terms of religion, our sample is as 
representative of the population as can be expected. Women are over represented in 
our sample as are those perceiving themselves to be of neither community. 
This study follows the three ratios employed by Riccucci and Saidel (1997) as a 
means of describing the representativeness of the bureaucracy. These are depicted in 
figure 5.1 below. The traditional baseline measure compares a community’s 
representation within the entire organisation with their corresponding representation in 
society. The stratification measure as employed by Cayer and Singelman (1980) and 
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Dometrius (1984), compares a groups composition in society with their composition 
within the bureaucratic elite. This stratification measure is the measure we are most 
interested in from a passive representation perspective – to what extent do the 
bureaucratic elite within a power-sharing environment, where the merit principle has 
not been sacrificed, passively resemble the society they work for. Finally the Riccucci 
and Saidel measure (New Aggregate measure) averages a community’s proportion of 
the total workforce (ratio 1) and a community’s representation among upper level 
appointments (ratio 2). This integration, they maintain, ‘summarises the 
representativeness of an entire bureaucratic system and permits comparison across 
systems’ (Riccucci and Saidel, 1997: 426). Riccucci and Saidel’s methods however have 
been criticised by Guyot (1998); the new aggregate measure, he finds, can ‘obscure 
important information’, and may actually ‘overstate the representativeness of 
bureaucracies’; he also finds further contextualisation of the ratios is also required to 
achieve the intended comprehensiveness of analysis (Guyot, 1998: 376). These 
shortcomings are however refuted by Riccucci and Saidel (1999). Nonetheless, in an 
attempt to ensure such important information is not obscured, this study departs from 
existing definitions of ‘top level bureaucrats’. SOC1, the traditional term for bureaucrats 
at the top level, in 2004 consisted of 254 people in Belfast (approx top 10%) (BCC, 
Annual Monitoring Return, 2004). Representation for minorities and traditional out-
groups can be easily increased to ‘improve the statistics’ by allocating a number of 
junior management positions to applicants from these communities. In order to prevent 
possibility for such skewing of the data, this research draws only on the top 47 
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bureaucrats in Belfast – all directors, heads of service and senior managers. The top 
three tiers so to speak. Greene, Selden and Brewer (2001) build on Riccucci and Saidel’s 
ratios adding an additional level of analysis investigating a group’s composition within 
the bureaucratic hierarchy. Given the aims of the chapter and the data available, the 
rudimentary Riccucci and Saidel method was found to be most appropriate for this 
study; nonetheless it is also important to be aware of some limitations of the research 
tools. For a fuller discussion on the various mechanisms of gauging representativeness 
see the comprehensive literature review in Riccucci and Saidel (1997: 425). 
Fig.5.1 Representativeness ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 The findings 
Table 5.1 (below) summarises the descriptive data which includes all 47 members of the 
bureaucratic elite within the urban administration, together with the data for the total 
workforce of 251867 (November, 2009). Of the total workforce (N=2518) Catholics 
                                                 
67 Figure includes permanent and casual staff. See also Monitoring Report No. 19; ‘A profile of the 
Monitored Northern Ireland Workforce Summary of Monitoring Returns 2008’  Appendix 2, section 1. For 
2008 figures. http://www.equalityni.org/archive/pdf/MonitoringReportNo19_FINAL_081209.pdf Using 
2008 figures, no substantial difference is recorded; representation of Catholics is marginally greater.  
Traditional Baseline Measure: 
a group's % of the gov't workforce    
a group's % of the population  
   
 
Stratification Measure: 
a group's % of upper-level appointments           
a group's % of the population 
New Aggregate Measure:  
a group's % of the gov't workforce          + a group's % of upper-level appointments         
a group's % of the population   a group's % of the population         
________________________________________________________________________ 
         2 
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comprise 42.7% while Protestants comprise 53.3%. Of the bureaucratic elite, (N=47) 
Catholics account for 48.9%, while Protestants account for 46.8%. 4.5% of the 
bureaucracy, and 4.3% of the bureaucratic elite, consider themselves as belonging to 
neither community68.  
Table 5.1 Overview of the descriptive data, 2009 
 Total urban 
population 
BCC – all employees BCC elite 
 
Catholic 47.2 42.7 48.9 
Protestant 48.6 53.3 46.8 
Neither community 4.2 4.0 4.3 
 
Table 5.2 displays baseline, stratified and aggregated representative ratios for religion 
within the Council. The aggregate measure, which Riccucci and Saidel (1997) describe as 
giving the most accurate comprehensive view of the representativeness of the 
bureaucracy, demonstrates the representative nature of the bureaucracy in terms of 
religion. Catholics, Protestants and those perceiving themselves to be of neither 
community, are all passively represented within the bureaucracy. Breaking the figures 
down further, Catholics tend to be slightly over represented at the elite level 
(stratification measure), while Protestants tend to be over represented within the 
administration as a whole. The differences are not significant although the trend is 
interesting and will be returned to in the discussion69.  
  
                                                 
68 The ‘Total Urban Population’ figure is derived from the 2001 census for Belfast Urban Area, not Belfast 
Metropolitan Urban Area. (NINIS) 
69 The Baseline figures for 2008 are as follows: Catholic: 0.95 Protestant: 1.05; Not determined: 1.07 
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Table 5.2 Baseline, stratified and aggregate measure ratios, 2009 
 Baseline 
2009 
Stratified 
2009 
Aggregate Measure 
2009 
Catholic  .90 1.04 .97 
Protestant 1.10 .96 1.03 
Not determined .99 1.03 .97 
 
A large part of the Northern Ireland conflict however is grounded, not in religion, 
but in nationality. O’Leary and McGarry (1996: 278) in their seminal work on power-
sharing in Northern Ireland see the national question as ‘ultimately’ most important. 
Turning to the interview data, the following paragraphs delve deeper into the figures, 
creating a clearer picture of the Belfast bureaucratic elite with reference to nationality, 
socio-economic background, and education. Data on nationality are not collected by the 
employers in Northern Ireland. Given that the question of sovereignty is as fundamental 
to the conflict as religion, table 5.3 below goes beyond the figures presented above, 
detailing the extent to which British, Irish and Northern Irish identities are represented 
within our sample of the bureaucratic elite. Seven interviewees perceived themselves as 
British in the first instance, five perceived themselves as Irish in the first instance, while 
eight described themselves as being Northern Irish in the first instance.  For the purpose 
of the ratios, the societal figure for nationality was attained from a 2008 ‘NI Times and 
Life survey’ asking the same question as was asked to our sample70. It is found that both 
British and Irish nationalities are marginally underrepresented within the bureaucratic 
                                                 
70 The NI Life and Times survey figure represents nationality in order of preference within Northern 
Ireland. 
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elite. Those in society perceiving themselves as Northern Irish are however over 
represented in these ‘top decision’ positions (N=47).  
 
Table 5.3 stratified measure ratios: nationality, 2009 
 Stratified measure 
British .95 
Irish .96 
Northern Irish 1.38 
 
Nachmias’ (1991) study of the Israeli bureaucratic elite found social structure to 
be central to role convergence within the state bureaucracy as most senior civil servants 
and politicians were recruited from the higher stratum of society. Our Belfast sample 
indicates a broad spectrum of class backgrounds. Socio-economic background was 
measured determining the father’s occupation of the interviewee. Eight interviewees 
came from a farming or skilled manual background, eight came from either civil service 
or professional occupations, while three were from unskilled or elementary occupation 
backgrounds (N=19). Notably underrepresented are those from the ‘unskilled’ 
background. Brown (1999) reminds us that it is unrealistic to expect that those without 
a tradition of public service or education to be represented within the administration. 
Attaining representation of the traditional working classes within the bureaucratic elite 
however is not a problem exclusive to contested societies and is at the very heart of the 
original theory of representative bureaucracy as put forward by Kingsley (1944). In sum 
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our findings indicate both British and Irish nationalities to be equally underrepresented 
within the bureaucratic elite, with those perceiving themselves as Northern Irish being 
considerably over represented.  
5.6 Discussion 
As previously outlined, the costs of sacrificing the merit principle outlined by Esman 
(1999) include loss of efficiency and effectiveness of the public service and resentment 
among the traditional majority. Adding to this Brown highlights the possibility of loss of 
confidence in the system as the majority feel they are the victims of discrimination, 
decreasing morale and consequently the quality of work. This in turn can have negative 
consequences for public sector performance and questions the legitimacy of the regime, 
further destabilising opportunities for reconciliation (Brown: 1999: 369). As we saw in 
the second section, both researchers disagree on the necessity for a passively 
representative bureaucracy. Esman (1999) perceives the costs of disproportional 
representation to be significantly greater than the costs of guaranteeing representation 
by community quota while Brown (1999) holds the opposite belief. Both authors have 
supported their opinions with case studies from around the world. Instead of pitching 
both scenarios against each other, or rehashing the debate, this chapter has drawn on 
public administration (representative bureaucracy) and conflict management research, 
generating a conceptual framework most conducive to the introduction of community 
quotas. This research framework outlined a theoretical justification for achieving a 
representative bureaucracy based on the belief that bureaucrats represent their primary 
identities when allocating resources and secondly that equity of representation was 
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more important than equity of opportunity in terms of bureaucratic legitimacy. 
Accepting this theoretical position (for the sake of the study), passive representation 
was deemed a necessity. It was then possible to test to see how necessary quotas were 
in achieving this goal of passive representation. Even if this theoretical framework is 
accepted, that which is most in favour of a representative bureaucracy, it is found that 
community quotas are not required to attain this goal.  These findings demonstrate that 
in one of Europe’s most deeply divided societies, a passively representative bureaucracy 
is possible without sacrificing the merit principle. Sacrificing the merit principle to 
bolster minority figures treats the symptom while ignoring the cause of the problem. In 
Belfast education, access and legislation can be held constant. As a patently 
unrepresentative bureaucracy existed before power-sharing, this suggests that the 
cause of the problem derives either from the society – lack of organisational legitimacy, 
or alternatively from the organisation – an absence of robust recruitment practices.   
In 1990, seven years before power-sharing in Belfast, Catholics comprised only 
30.6% (Good Relations Document, 22.02.2004) of the BCC workforce. This increased to 
35.6% (Policy and Resources Committee, 08.12.2005) by the 1st of January 1998. By 
2001, the figure had increased further to 37.3%. (Good Relations Document, 
22.02.2004) By 2004, this had risen to 38.7% (Policy and Resources Committee, 
08.12.2005). This figure in 2009 stands at 44.6%71. At the elite level Catholics occupied 
34.2% of the top 254 positions in 2002 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). The results 
from 2009 document that Catholics are found to be passively represented among the 
                                                 
71 Figures obtained for this study 
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top 47 elite level positions. In 2002, the aggregate measure ratio based on the top 254 
positions highlights that Catholics were significantly underrepresented at .7472. 
Protestants were over-represented 1.22. The stratification measure for 2002 (which 
measures the representativeness of the bureaucratic elite) was: Catholics: .72 (Recall 
the 2009 stratification measure for Catholics: 1.04.) and Protestants: 1.21. (2009 
stratification measure for Protestants: .96) Notable also was the overrepresentation of 
non-determined: 1.69. Positions are not reserved for Catholics, yet their proportion of 
the bureaucracy has reached parity with their Protestant counterparts. This has 
happened without sacrificing the merit principle. It also happened over a considerably 
short period of time.  
Application rates to the entire bureaucracy among Catholics had reached 43% by 
2001 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). By 2009 this figure had marginally increased to 
45%. However more significant changes exist at the elite level. Applications rates among 
Catholics to the elite level were 43.9% by 2001 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). By 
2009 this figure stood at just under 55%73. Application rates among Catholics at the elite 
level are seen to have substantially increased. Before power-sharing at least one tenet 
of the equation was missing, arising in a patently unrepresentative bureaucracy where 
one community dominated. These figures suggest that either the legitimacy attributed 
to the administration or the recruitment practices changed (causation is not tested by 
this research). A passively representative bureaucracy subsequently emerged without 
the need for community recruitment quotas. The findings demonstrate that the merit 
                                                 
72 Generated using data from the BCC Annual Monitoring Return 2002  
73 Figures obtained for this research 
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principle need not be sacrificed in order to guarantee passive representativeness at the 
elite level.  
Interviewees in Belfast, both Catholic and Protestant, evidenced a large amount 
of support for the merit principle. In each case interviewees perceived the merit 
principle to be integral to successful policy making: ‘Once you sacrifice the merit 
principle, you are stuffed’ one Catholic interviewee responded74. The only concerns 
interviewees had about the compromising of the merit principle in Belfast were that 
‘office politics’ sometimes played a role in promotion and advancement within the 
service. This would sometimes mean that the best person may not always get the job. 
This office politics however was never based on religious affiliation or perceived 
nationality. Councillors are not involved in low level recruitment within the service. They 
are involved however in the choosing of candidates to fulfil the elite positions. 
Councillors’ involvement in the recruitment of new directors is also viewed in a positive 
light: ‘Councillors know better than to advocate on the part of any particular 
person…the most important thing to Councillors is if the candidate can deliver’75. There 
is a strong commitment to a passively representative bureaucracy within the human 
resources (HR) department of the Council: ‘you need to be as representative as possible 
of the community you serve’. There has also been a notable change in the ethos, norms 
and values of the department: ‘Equality is now so mainstream: ten years ago these 
questions were relevant’.76 We see here that the values guiding recruitment are firmly 
                                                 
74 Interview transcript: Director within BCC 
75 Interview transcript: Member of the bureaucratic elite within the Human Resources department of BCC 
76 Interview transcript: Member of the bureaucratic elite within the Human Resources department of BCC 
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rooted in meritocracy and that there is no support, political or otherwise, for 
compromising it. 
Drawing on his study of the Israeli bureaucracy, Nachmias (1991: 414) found the 
Israeli bureaucracy to be ‘extremely unrepresentative of women’ and to be ‘exclusively 
Jewish’. His findings evidence the fears expressed by Esman (1999: 354) that the 
majority will ‘resort to formal or informal practices that exclude outsiders or provide 
preferential access for their members’. This argument lends support to Gusfield’s (1958) 
assertion that it is not the rules themselves that guide recruitment but how the rules are 
exploited. Surrendering the merit principle for the greater good is however a misnomer. 
Indeed if its sacrifice increased the likelihood of more legitimate governance, these 
costs may be acceptable. Further studies of passive representation within power-sharing 
environments where the merit principle has been sacrificed are required to investigate 
the extent to which quota systems contribute positively to conflict management. 
Mustapha (2009) argues that affirmative action is an important aspect of governance in 
a divided society. The findings presented by this research indicate that it need not be. 
This research has shown that given the robust implementation of recruitment by merit, 
the bureaucracy can mirror society, in terms of the ethno-national divide, without the 
need to sacrifice efficiency, effectiveness, or alienating the traditional majority 
community. This new data has demonstrated that the problem is not with the 
appointing people on merit, but that unrepresentativeness within the bureaucratic elite 
is a symptom of a greater problem: lack of access or lack of perceived institutional 
legitimacy. Esman’s (1999) path, relying where necessary on quotas, is not necessary to 
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bolster passive representation. Community quotas are not a prerequisite for a passively 
representative bureaucracy within an ethno-politically contested society.     
This research adds new data to the domain of representative bureaucracy within 
the divided society. Most importantly however, the study not only argued, but 
evidenced, that the merit principle need not be sacrificed in order to achieve a passively 
representative bureaucracy. Indeed, further studies under differing mechanisms of 
public sector recruitment are required to ascertain a fuller understanding of passive 
representation. Further understandings of the causes of passive representation are also 
necessary – the role of political support for the institutions, education levels among the 
minority, legitimacy of the organisation or recruitment procedures etc. Findings within 
administrations where quota systems govern candidate selection would also develop 
our understanding of passive representation. How are these systems employed? Do 
they achieve the intended outcomes? What about instances where the traditional out-
group demand greater representation than their composition in society. Cases such as 
Brussels where the Flemish population comprise 10-15% of the population but are 
reserved 50% of elite positions cannot be referred to as passive representation and 
need to be investigated independently.   
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
Although each society, and each conflict, is unique in and of itself, the empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter should inform how problems of passive 
representation can be addressed in developing plural societies such as Kirkuk, Kabul, 
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Beirut or Mostar. If power-sharing in these societies is to be politically successful, 
developing administrative capacity through a legitimate, effective and efficient civil 
service is a prerequisite. The first step in attaining Brinkerhoff and Morgan’s (2010) five 
capabilities required for capacity development is to recruit the ‘right’ people. While 
Esman (1999) believed that in instances where the power-sharing process does not yield 
equitable representation, representation should be guaranteed by formal procedures, 
this research argues and evidences that forgoing the merit principle is simply treating 
the symptom and ignoring the cause of disproportionate representation. The Belfast 
experience has shown that in little over ten years a significant change in the 
composition of the administration has taken place, without sacrificing the merit 
principle. The research does not inform us whether it was a change in legitimacy 
attributed to the organisation or a change in how the rules of recruitment were 
implemented, that caused passive representation. However it is demonstrated that 
quotas are not required to create a passively representative bureaucracy.  
As submitted in the introduction and literature review, for a group to actively 
represent their counterparts in society, they must comprise a sufficient proportion (or 
critical mass) of the bureaucracy. In Brussels, this critical mass has been achieved 
through quotas. In Belfast, this chapter demonstrates that the traditional out-group do 
comprise a critical mass of the bureaucracy. The conditions for active representation on 
behalf of a primary identity are therefore present in each city. Chapter six proceeds to 
investigate to what extent these groups within the bureaucracy actively represent their 
counterparts in society. As Keiser et al (2002) suggest, it would be expected that these 
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bureaucrats would represent the interests of their own communities in matters of 
importance to the demographic issue in question. However as Wilkins and Williams 
(2008) and Rehfuss (1986) suggest, any active representation may be curtailed by the 
socio-geographic and organisational environment in which the bureaucrat works. This 
research has found that Belfast has managed to achieve the passive representation of 
both its communities within the bureaucracy without sacrificing the merit principle. 
However the research has not made any claims on active representation. Do Catholics in 
the administration represent Catholics in society or have bureaucrats been socialised by 
institutional norms? What effect has recruitment based on merit alone had on the 
bureaucratic values, resource allocation, norms and identity? In order to answer these 
questions the study of the bureaucracy within the contested society needs to lend more 
emphasis to the importance of active representation. Drawing on the experience of 
Belfast, this research has unpacked just one tenet of Brinkerhoff’s (2010) prerequisites 
for increased capacity development. If the bureaucracy is to be regarded as 
fundamental to good governance, competent bureaucrats are indeed the first step 
toward achieving better governance. While a passively representative bureaucracy may 
be a legitimate demand of the traditional out-group, this does not have to mean the 
introduction of community quotas. 
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6 
Active representation within the power-sharing society: 
the values guiding administrative decision-making in 
Belfast and Brussels 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To date much of the research into active representation has measured how bureaucrats 
actively represent their own personal communities within the bureaucracy, with a 
number of studies also looking at potential restrictions to, and causes of, the 
development of active representation. Drawing on the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, and Reissman’s (1949) and Downs’ (1967) bureaucrat typologies, this 
chapter develops a conceptual framework for gaining an understanding of existent core 
governance beliefs and representation perceptions among bureaucrats within the 
contested environment. Are bureaucrats in power-sharing environments guided by the 
elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders within their own community, by 
professional norms and values, or do they possess values of neutrality? Delving deeper, 
how do they see the role of government in society, and how do they feel when 
confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? Which bureaucrats are most likely 
to actively represent and what will they actively represent when they do so? Using Q 
methodology to investigate bureaucrat role perceptions, five bureaucrat typologies are 
identified – two in Belfast and three in Brussels. These typologies provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of bureaucrat role perceptions within the power-sharing 
society.  
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In chapters three and four the role of the bureaucracy as an organisation within 
the policy process was identified. In this chapter attention shifts to the role of individual 
bureaucrats within the public bureaucracy. Drawing on a method relatively new to 
political science, but well established in psychology: Q Methodology, this chapter 
identifies the core governance beliefs and representation perceptions of a sample of 
elite level bureaucrats in both Belfast and Brussels. Recall that a critical mass or a 
sufficient concentration of the traditional out-group is a precondition for members of 
that group to actively represent their corresponding communities in society. In chapter 
five we saw that a critical mass of both Catholics and Protestants are passively 
represented at the elite level in Belfast. In Brussels, a critical mass of the traditional out-
group (Dutch-speakers) has been guaranteed by ethno-linguistic quotas. The conditions 
for active representation on behalf of an ethno-national/ethno-linguistic identity are 
therefore satisfied in each case (See Kaiser et al, 2002 and Meier and O’Toole, 2006). 
However as will be demonstrated in the conceptual framework, a professional 
attachment or identity can also exist. I then investigate (i) the extent to which active 
representation does exist, (ii) what is actively represented and (iii) if those sharing 
particular beliefs also share primary identities. The chapter investigates the research 
question: Can a professional attachment supersede an attachment to an ethno-political 
attachment among the bureaucratic elite of a contested society.  
As we have seen in previous chapters, resource allocation and decision-making 
are not simply activities for the political level: the bureaucracy too influences the 
allocation of resources. Identity perceptions which guide bureaucratic decision-making 
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are in turn central to our understanding of how power-sharing is managed. As we saw in 
the literature review, conflict and post-conflict societies exhibit numerous examples of 
policy failures – in social cohesion, urban planning and education to name but a few. 
While it is indeed necessary to understand what policies to implement, it is also 
necessary to understand the mechanism through which they may be implemented. 
Without an effective mechanism of policy implementation, even the most well 
considered policies will not avoid failure. The policy outcome, or effect, is directly 
related to administrative outputs and the mechanism through which they emerge. This 
mechanism, through which policies are proposed and implemented therefore, plays a 
pivotal role in the success of any policy. The bureaucracy is a primary partner in this 
governance process whose role has hitherto been underestimated in conflict 
management research. Drawing on the two examples of power-sharing, this chapter 
examines the role perceptions and core governance beliefs of those traditionally 
faceless bureaucrats who contribute not only to governance, but also to conflict 
management, within the city. Scott Bollens (2008: 2) in his influential study of conflict 
through an urban planning lens identifies Belfast as ‘moving towards peace’ and 
Brussels as ‘stable’. Power-sharing is a relatively new form of governance in each city. A 
study of bureaucratic role perceptions in these two cases of ethnic peace can inform our 
understanding of how the administration can develop within the emerging power-
sharing society. Contested societies considering power-sharing as a form of governance 
will then be in a position to learn from the Belfast and Brussels experiences.  
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Bureaucratic discretion in policy making has ‘forced scholars to grapple with 
problems of bureaucratic accountability, responsibility and responsiveness’ (Selden et al 
1999: 179). A greater understanding of how this discretion is employed will therefore 
enhance our understanding of how the bureaucracy contributes to the success of 
power-sharing. In her study of conflict within organisations, Fitzpatrick (2007: 281) 
submits that ‘value alignment is necessary for effective collaboration’. How well aligned 
are bureaucratic values within the contested city? Robert Dahl (1970) submits that the 
primary controls on the behaviour of bureaucrats are those values held by the 
bureaucrat. Research within uncontested societies has in recent years given greater 
weight to individual values that guide decision-making (Sabatier, Loomis and McCarthy, 
1995; Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Hooghe, 2005; Beyers, 2005, among others). As norms 
and values guide behaviour, and behaviour affects resource allocation, a comprehensive 
understanding of bureaucratic norms and values will inform us of the role perceptions 
and core governance beliefs of the senior bureaucrat. If administrative reform agendas 
are to succeed they rely on the accurate identification of the existing problem. While 
much is known about the structures of public administration, less is known about how 
these structures are exploited. To develop this understanding, I draw on representative 
bureaucracy research and bureaucrat typology research to generate a conceptual 
framework. Methodologically, I rely on an inversion of factor analysis, known as Q 
methodology, which is adept at identifying different typologies of perceptions among a 
population. These perceptions are assumed to guide behaviour, and hence resource 
allocation. While scholars such as Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981), Guy Peters 
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(1987) and James Suara (1985, 1990) look for general theories of politician-bureaucrat 
relations, typologies allow us to examine if different bureaucrats interact differently 
with the political level. This approach fits closer with the aims of the dissertation. The 
generation of bureaucrat typologies therefore can be said to deepen our understanding 
of the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy within the contested society. Further, Nachmias 
and Rosenbloom (1978: 173) submit that typologies are ‘not only useful as an analytical 
tool, but also for the selection of public administrators’. Typologies also serve as tools to 
‘predict bureaucrat’s attitudes and the nature of bureaucratic behaviour’ (ibid: 173, see 
also Meier and O’Toole, 2006). Typologies therefore inform how policies are 
implemented, and can be implemented, in a power-sharing society. Typologies give an 
indication of what we can expect from the administration within an emerging power-
sharing society. Identity, for the purposes of this chapter, refers to each individual’s 
unique combination of both individual and group identity. This may reflect broad 
associations such as woman or man, Protestant or Sunni or narrower associations such 
as one’s family (Kriesberg, 2003). For a more comprehensive exploration of identity see 
Seul (1999) where individual and group identities are explained against a conflict 
management background.  
Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy, and existing scholarship 
on ‘bureaucrat typologies’, the following two sections determine the theoretical 
possibility for attachments to primary identities, such as race colour or creed; and the 
generation of secondary identities, such as attachment to an organisation or profession. 
The following section identifies the most appropriate methodology for measuring these 
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theoretically defined characteristics – Q methodology. The findings are then presented 
independently for each city, followed by two sections which seek to bring the findings 
together.  
 
6.2 Representative bureaucracy 
Studies of representative bureaucracy have shown that not only do the norms and 
values of the organisation affect those of the individual, but that the norms and values 
of the individual also affect those of the organisation. A collective ‘organisational’ 
identity is therefore said to emerge. It is for this reason that the bureaucracy should be 
diverse in its composition, representing to some extent the composition of society. 
However, a number of studies have found bureaucrats not to be influenced by these 
secondary organisational attachments but to remain loyal to their primary identities. 
Hindera (1993) defines two types of association: primary associations as those into 
which we are born such as gender, race, ethnicity etc, while secondary associations on 
the other hand are those which we generate, or socially construct – attachment to an 
organisation or football club for example. However in a contested society, what type of 
associations are we to expect from our administrators? Recall that identity guides 
behaviour, which in turn guides resource allocation in instances where the bureaucracy 
is regarded to have discretion. Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy (1944), further 
developed by Van Riper (1958: 552), supposes that decisions made by the bureaucracy 
mirror the preferences, ‘ethos and attitudes’ of the society which they govern. Kingsley 
therefore argued that the administration would always represent the interests of its 
composite class – the middle class. Mosher (1968: 12) further developed the theory, 
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differentiating between “that which the bureaucracy is” and “that which the 
bureaucracy does”. According to Mosher, passive representativeness concerns the 
origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror society, while in 
active representation an individual is expected to press for the interests of those with 
whom an identity, or personal affinity, is shared (Hindera, 1993: 417). The question now 
is to determine who or what the bureaucrat actually represents – a primary or a 
secondary identity?  
Some studies have shown that blacks and women portray evidence of active 
representation as minorities within a bureaucracy – ie. that women would support the 
interests of women within the bureaucracy and members of the black community 
similarly advocate the interests of the wider black population (Mansbridge, 1999; Keiser 
et al, 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). By extension, within a contested society 
one would expect French-speakers, in the case of Brussels, to represent French-speaking 
interests, and Dutch-speaking bureaucrats to represent Dutch-speaking interests, or in 
the case of Belfast, that Catholics would represent Catholic interests and Protestants 
would represent Protestant interests. However another body of research finds 
incorporating qualified professionals into a bureaucracy also incorporates their 
professional values into the bureaucracy (March and Olsen, 2004). Organisations 
depersonalise relationships which allows for a technocratic mentality to develop 
(Ferguson, 1984; Radaelli and O’Connor, 2009). This incorporation of professional values 
into the bureaucracy will lead the bureaucracy to develop its own set of values and 
norms, which through socialisation, could potentially supersede traditional norms. John 
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Rehfuss (1986: 459) not only found that women and minorities differed little from their 
white male counterparts within the administration, but that they appeared to share a 
‘management ideology’. Thus instead of French-speakers representing French-speaking 
interests and Dutch-speakers representing Dutch-speaking interests, we would expect 
to find both Dutch and French-speaking bureaucratic elites to represent common 
professional, technocratic interests; likewise for the republicans, nationalists, loyalists 
and unionists in Northern Ireland. 
Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) are able to show that an increase in female 
police officers corresponds with an increase in instances of rape actually reported to the 
police. They conclude that a passively representative bureaucracy is beneficial: is this 
because female police officers take forward the cases of female victims, or, because 
female norms and values have been adopted by those males working closely with their 
female counterparts, thereby changing the norms of the organisation? If the latter is the 
case, through socialisation with women men can now represent the interests of women, 
the norms of the bureaucracy are now more representative of those in society at large. 
As also indicated by John Rehfuss (1986) above, one therefore does not have to 
‘passively represent’ to ‘actively represent’. Brandy Kennedy (2008) strengthens this 
argument referring to those providing services to the mentally and physically disabled – 
of course one does not actually have to be disabled to represent the interests of those 
who are. In the divided society context, this is witnessed most poignantly in Israel, 
where some Jewish Israelis actively represent issues such as Palestinian human rights. 
Within a divided city, do the bureaucratic elite possess these secondary, learned/socially 
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constructed associations or do they attach themselves to a primary, ethnic, personal 
association? As Reissman (1949: 305) puts forward, the formal structure, interpersonal 
relationships and the surrounding social milieu all contribute to the ‘social role the 
bureaucrat fills’. Within the ethno-nationally contested society are identities within the 
administration as fluid as within the uncontested society? Can we expect bureaucrats to 
represent anything other than their primary identities? 
Meier and O’Toole (2006) ascertain that a critical mass is required for the 
formulation of an actively representative bureaucracy. Thus a department would 
require numerical sufficiency of a particular ethnicity (or set of values) for benefits to 
begin to flow to that ethnicity, (or to those in society holding those values). Put 
succinctly by Keiser et al (2002: 557): 
“If professionals who see advocacy for a particular group as their role dominate a 
bureaucracy, we should expect bureaucratic outputs to be distributed to benefit 
that group.” 
 
Therefore, the argument goes, if Catholics are numerically sufficient within the Belfast 
bureaucracy, benefits should correspondingly flow to that group. Similarly if Dutch-
speakers are sufficiently present within the Brussels administration, benefits should 
begin to flow to that group. In an attempt to avert bureaucrats from representing their 
primary ethno-national identities, Mengistu and Vogel (2006) submit that a national 
Ethiopian identity could potentially supersede primary tribal identities. In countries such 
as Ethiopia, which comprise of over eighty different ethnicities, obtaining a critical mass 
of each tribal group, so that benefits would flow to each group, would be an absurdity. A 
national Ethiopian identity, they submit, would supersede tribal identities, thereby 
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ensuring that ethnic groups are not simply representing their tribal positions within the 
bureaucracy. To surmise their argument: for benefits to flow throughout the entire 
population, a national identity should supersede a tribal identity among bureaucrats. 
However, in ethnically contested societies, different ethnicities or communities 
attribute different importance to the concept of state nationality. In some cases the 
legitimacy of the state is even contested. Unlike uncontested societies where identity 
with the nation and the state usually exists simultaneously as a primary identity, within 
the contested society identification with the governing state is often in a secondary, or 
learned, capacity. Since the traditionally disadvantaged ethnic communities are not 
prone to the acceptance of state authority, such allegiances would be difficult to form as 
they would be in direct contrast to their primary ‘national’ (ethnic/community/tribal) 
identities. Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) suggestion relies on the secondary ‘state 
identity’ superseding the ‘national’ primary identity. While it is possible that a 
secondary, learned, nation-state identity could supersede a primary tribal identity, in an 
environment where resources are finite and demand is high, the opportunity for a direct 
confrontation between both identities is increased. Would the bureaucrat always 
represent the national interest or in cases of demographic importance would the 
bureaucrat, as Keiser et al (2002) suggest, represent their primary tribal or community 
identity? 
This chapter submits that a more likely and stronger bond between civil servants 
in a divided society would therefore be identification with professional or technical 
norms and values – therefore it would be more plausible to expect a greater 
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commonality of viewpoints around professional or technical issues such as ‘a 
commitment to regulatory reform’ or ‘a commitment to poverty alleviation’ than 
around politically constructed concepts such as nationality. A secondary identity of 
‘achieving social cohesion’ is less likely to be in conflict with ones nationality, or primary 
identity. Studies at the EU level have shown that bureaucratic elites from different 
traditions can form common attachments based on professional technocratic norms 
(Radaelli and O’Connor, 2008). This does not necessarily have to be a European identity, 
nor do bureaucrats have to agree on the all aspects of the topic. What matters however 
is that bureaucrats feel attached to the policy area. Is it too farfetched to expect such 
attachments within contested societies? Can policy goals, social goals, or organisational 
objectives supersede an ethno-political attachment in all aspects of a bureaucrat’s 
professional activity? 
Hindera’s (1993) categorisation of associations into the primary and secondary 
are central to this research. It is this conflict between a personal, primary and a 
secondary, learned attachment that is our concern – which guides decision-making in 
arenas particular to the conflict, be this guidance conscious or subconscious. The 
research question of the chapter therefore begins to develop: can secondary norms and 
values supersede a primary identity in guiding the allocation of resources within the 
divided urban environment? Can bureaucrats within a contested environment take on a 
new learned or socially constructed identity that supersedes their own personal ethnic 
identity? If a professional identity is to supersede a personal identity, we would expect 
bureaucrats to identify themselves around technical professional norms and values vis-
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à-vis personal, primary norms and values. Active representation most definitely exists 
within all bureaucracies; however before international organisations consider 
administrative reform strategies, it is necessary to understand what values precisely 
bureaucratic elites actively represent.  
Failure to account for norms and values can lead to the failure of administrative 
reform. In Lebanon, a significant proportion of responsibility for the failure of 
bureaucratic reform is placed on the failure of The Office of the Minister of State for 
Administrative Reform (OMSAR) to work with the existing, indigenous public 
administration, as opposed to working against it (El Zain and Sims, 2004). Despite the 
good intentions of OMSAR, its disregard for the existing individual bureaucratic norms 
and values, contributed to the projects failure. How does each community within the 
bureaucracy perceive the bureaucracy and their role within it? Without this 
understanding, structural change will be manipulated by the unknown human condition, 
generating unintended consequences. Exploring how the bureaucratic elite behave in 
our two existing power-sharing societies can inform our expectations of bureaucratic 
behaviour in emerging power-sharing conditions, and hence demonstrate how 
structural change will be exploited by one of the most influential actors within the 
governance process.  
Do bureaucrats within a divided urban environment actually represent their 
personal community backgrounds or have they, through education, time, socialisation 
etc developed a professional administrative mentality which supersedes their ethnic 
identities? A professional identity is not to mean that a bureaucrat is professional in 
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his/her job but rather that he/she is attached to a professional set of values such as free 
trade, tax harmonisation or regulatory impact assessments. We have seen thus far that 
representative bureaucracy theory allows for the formulation of two broadly defined 
categories of administrative representation – active representation of professional 
norms (attachment to a policy area or professional mechanisms) and secondly the active 
representation of personal norms (attachment based on race, gender, ethnicity etc). 
Thus our conceptual framework begins to develop with a representation continuum. 
(fig. 6.1)  
 
Recapitulating, representative bureaucracy literature acknowledges that 
organisational alignment through socialisation can influence bureaucrat preferences. 
However, there is also evidence in the literature to suggest that a bureaucrat may also 
align him/herself with his/her primary identity in certain circumstances. In the 
contested society can a secondary (professional or organisational) association trump a 
primary ethnic identity? Existing studies of bureaucrat typologies can shed some light on 
what characteristics and values we should expect among bureaucrats where the above 
continuum can be further developed. The study can then proceed to determine how 
universal certain characteristics are among the bureaucratic elite in power-sharing 
societies and hence give us a greater understanding of how, and to what end, they 
employ or exploit administrative structures.  
Personal representation 
 
Professional representation 
Fig.6.1. Representation Continuum I 
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6.3 Typologies 
What does existing public administration literature tell us about bureaucrat typologies? 
How do these typologies lend themselves to the identification of professional and 
technocratic norms? Reissman (1949) found that bureaucrats exhibited allegiances, not 
only to their job and government but also to the ‘professional organisations’ and ‘social 
constellations’ to which they were attributed. In the contested city, how does this 
‘surrounding social milieu’ affect the norms, governance beliefs, and values of the 
bureaucratic elite? Turning to existing research into bureaucrat typologies a number of 
theoretically existent traits among the bureaucratic elite can be identified. These in turn 
may emerge among bureaucrats within the contested environment. Among others, 
Reissman (1949) and Downs (1967) have attempted to define various ‘typologies’ of 
bureaucrats. Although generalist in their approaches, their theoretical frameworks 
contribute markedly to our understanding of bureaucratic norms. These typologies are 
seen as what Stephenson (1935) would have termed clusters of subjectivity. The 
following paragraphs identify the traits and characteristics that can be expected within 
the bureaucracy.  
Anthony Downs (1967) categorises two general types of bureaucrat, purely self 
interested bureaucrats and mixed-motive officials, breaking these down further into five 
categories. Purely self-interested officials (two types) are seen to be loyal to their own 
personal goals. I do not test for these characteristics within my sample. I am more 
interested in his second collective category, mixed-motive officials of which there are 
three types: Zealots are loyal to a narrow set of policies, advocates are loyal to a 
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broader set of policies, while statesmen are loyal to the ‘nation or society as a whole’. 
These categorisations, although beneficial in an uncontested environment, do not in 
their present form distinguish between variant representations within a contested 
society. For example, in a contested society, a zealot is not a particularly informative 
categorisation as, although one may be loyal to a narrow set of policies, it is the precise 
policies that the zealot is pursuing which are of interest. Alleviating the problems of the 
urban poor through the implementation of a particular reform could be seen as a 
positive professional attachment, while alleviating the problems of the poor in one’s 
own ethnopolitical community could be considered a less amiable quality. Similarly, 
statesmen are purportedly loyal to the nation or society as a whole – in a contested 
society, these concepts can be very unstable, where in some cases many different 
‘nations’ contest the one space77. Psychological motivations, structural factors and 
loyalties are used to define Downs’ classifications. Reissman’s (1949) categorisations are 
more firmly rooted in sociological norms and may be more appropriate for explicating 
the individual norms of the bureaucrat within a contested society. We find that three of 
his typologies lend themselves to the development of a professional identity (functional, 
job and specialist), whereby a bureaucrat perceives his/her role in a professional 
manner. He identifies bureaucrats who are motivated by professional and institutional 
norms, be this for personal or altruistic reward, as ‘job bureaucrats’; while the 
functional bureaucrats are further submerged in the policy area. The specialist 
                                                 
77 Indeed each of these researchers explores in detail the characteristics of each ‘typology’. There is not 
the need, nor the space, to reproduce their detailed findings here but those interested should refer to the 
original texts.  
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bureaucrat, although professionally leaning, is meticulous about rules and regulations, 
remaining safely within these limits. The service bureaucrat meanwhile, he identifies as 
seeking recognition from a particular group outside the civil service. While in the 
uncontested society, this could be perceived as a more benign association, such as 
representing the under-privileged or children, in the contested society context we 
restrict the interpretation to acting on behalf of one’s primary identity. Thus, for the 
purpose of our study the service bureaucrat is regarded as one who maintains his 
primary ethnic or community identity when making decisions. 
Similarly, Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) also develop a number of 
typologies, drawing on two broad dimensions: importance attributed to the obtaining of 
a position within the bureaucracy and personal motives for seeking such a post. These 
categories generate four typologies with similar characteristics to those of Downs and 
Reissman. Selden et al (1999) too generate typologies grounded in the value orientation 
of the bureaucrat. Balancing the values of managerial efficiency, social equity, political 
responsiveness, pro-active administration and neutrality, Selden et al (1999) generated 
five typologies using Q methodology. As expected however, as their conceptual 
framework was designed to be tested within an uncontested society, their 
categorisations are not particularly informative in answering our research question. For 
example, typologies such as ‘stewards of the public interest’ may represent a gallant 
typology within an uncontested city while within a divided city; the same category can 
be less than appealing pending on how ‘the public interest’ is defined. I therefore draw 
on their research experiences and approaches, together with those of Reissman (1944), 
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Downs (1967), and Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) to develop a conceptual 
framework suitable for the contested society.  
As identity is such a critical aspect of conflict, value alignment will play a central 
role in the generation of the typologies within the contested city. Kaufman’s (1956) 
theory of bureaucratic values (1956), as employed by Mengistu and Vogel, (2006) 
provides a foundation for bridging the gap between public administration research 
within uncontested and contested societies. They explore the ‘inherent conflict between 
a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or 
executive leadership’ within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity 
(Mengistu and Vogel, 2006: 205). Any study of bureaucratic values must incorporate 
Kaufman’s values where he submits that over the course of time, the balance of these 
three values have determined the nature of public administration (in the United States). 
From the representative bureaucracy literature we know that a professional 
identity or association can exist within a bureaucracy. Reissman’s (1949) and Downs’ 
(1967) typologies further distinguish degrees of professional and personal identification. 
Based on existing typologies, theoretically we can differentiate between a professional 
bureaucrat (Job bureaucrat, functional bureaucrat etc) and a personal bureaucrat 
(Service bureaucrat, purely self interested bureaucrat) and a neutrality bureaucrat, 
prioritising the values of the organisation (specialist). Downs’ zealot or advocate may be 
conducive to the creation of either identity, pending on the attachment. Downs’ (1967) 
study builds these typologies along a single continuum. Given that we have established 
that a bureaucrat may deviate from the Weberian ‘ideal type’ to the oft referred to 
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personal representation but may also deviate towards professional representation, the 
contested city continuum needs reflect this. 
Fig 6.2 Representation continuum II 
 
This representation continuum measures that what a bureaucrat represents 
when making decisions. As Downs’ (1967) typologies in their original form are not 
conducive to constructive analysis in contested cities, the continuum is broken in the 
centre – A bureaucrat can be an advocate or zealot for either a narrow or broad set of 
policies that are faithful to his/her primary identity, or equally to his secondary identity. 
Thus the continuum allows for two types of zealot and advocate. This also incorporates 
Reissman’s (1949) typologies: A service bureaucrat being represented by the continuum 
to the right of neutral (ie. representing his personal associations), a specialist at neutral 
(representing the organisation), a job bureaucrat, close to advocate on the left 
continuum (towards the professional association) and a functional bureaucrat to the 
extreme left of the continuum (ie. representing professional associations). Kaufman’s 
(1956) three bureaucratic values are also therefore represented in the diagram: by 
neutrality (along with specialists), representation along both representation continua 
while executive leadership can also be identified at the polar end of each continuum (ie. 
the bureaucrat may have carved out sufficient discretion to represent either personal or 
professional attachments). 
Personal  
representation 
Zealot Advocate Advocate Zealot 
Functional  Job Service bureaucrat 
(Downs) 
Professional  
representation 
Specialist 
Neutrality 
(Reissman) 
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This continuum however fails to incorporate the factor of political 
responsiveness. ‘The political responsiveness of public bureaucracies [is]... also of great 
importance to the development of bureaucratic culture (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 
1978: 19). A bureaucrat may deviate from the Weberian ‘ideal type’, being instead 
responsive to the political elite. As Meier and O’Toole (2006:29) put forward in their 
seminal research into political influence: ‘measuring bureaucratic values...is essential to 
resolving the issue of how much political control is available or possible, and under what 
conditions.’ Following Selden et al (1999), the additional factor of political 
responsiveness is therefore included, generating a new representation web, gauging 
individual preferences against four key theoretical sites of responsiveness – Does a 
bureaucrat represent a professional mindset and allocate resources accordingly 
(Professional responsiveness)? Or is the bureaucrat guided by the political leaders 
within his/her own community (Personal community responsiveness)? Or does the 
bureaucrat follow closely the direction given by the elected government of the city 
(Political responsiveness)? The bureaucrat could also (theoretically) possess completely 
neutral Weberian-style values, akin to Reissman’s ‘specialist’ bureaucrat. These 
neutrality attributes differ markedly from those responsive to the political level – 
Bureaucrats with neutrality values give prominence to legislation and treaties, not the 
political policies of the minister, they maintain a neutral position on potentially divisive 
decisions and find that they represent the integrity of the organisation as opposed to 
serving the minister. 
 
 Fig. 6.3: Representation network
The representation web or network however only tells part of the role 
perception story – we must delve deeper to understand the core governance beliefs. To 
this end, a further set of continua are required, measuring individual perceptions of 
equity and efficiency and measuring bureaucrat perceptions of state involvement in 
public service provision – 
generation of more informative typologies, useful in the contested environment. 
Relating characteristics used to generate existing typologies on a representation web, 
together with a mechanism for determining core governance beliefs, grounded in 
representative bureaucracy, provides the most comprehensive and informative 
framework for use within the contes
attitudes within this framework will provide a detailed understanding of how the 
bureaucracy acts in a contested urban environment. Drawing on the theory of 
representative bureaucracy and numerous bureaucrat typ
representation variables are mapped on the webbed ‘representation’ diagram above. 
The graph below further incorporates respondent values, generating a greater 
understanding of the core governance beliefs of our sample.
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 Fig. 6.4: Core governance beliefs
Definition and categorisation of these characteristics adds a further level of 
complexity. Previous typology scholarship in less contested societies gives an indication 
of key aspects of these categories. Kaufman (1956) relies on
basis for informing our understanding of public administration. Downs’ typologies are 
grounded in individual psychological predispositions and the extent to which the 
environment provides the bureaucrat with the opportunity to m
Selden et al (1999) and Reissman (1949) both rely on a more sociological approach 
drawing on role perception to generate their typologies while Nachmias and 
Rosenbloom (1978) use recruitment and motivation for organisation membership t
inform their categorisations. The experience of these researchers gives an indication of 
how research within the contested society can be designed. What attributes of the 
characteristics identified above are relevant to the contested city? Focusing on co
such as legitimacy, representation, role perception, identity, scope of governance and 
motivation, 46 statements (or questions) were formulated; each statement relating to a 
 
 bureaucratic values as the 
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point on either the representation or ‘core governance beliefs’ graphs78. Eight 
statements were attributed to each point on the representation web, five statements to 
each equity and efficiency and two statements to each public and private sector service 
provision. Classification of statements can be found in annex 6.6 in the appendix. These 
statements were then put to the bureaucratic elite within our contested cities, where 
‘clusters of subjectivity’ could be identified (Stephenson, 1935).  
To summarise, the conceptual framework suggests that it is theoretically 
possible for a bureaucrat to actively represent both a primary and a secondary identity. 
While most studies of active representation investigate the extent to which a 
bureaucrat represents his/her primary identity, this study also investigates the 
possibility of a bureaucrat actively representing a secondary socially constructed, 
learned identity. This may take the form of a professional identity, an organisational 
identity or alternatively the bureaucrat may not be involved in active representation at 
all, thereby being completely responsive to the political elite. Two further dimensions 
are added to the framework to try and ascertain core governance beliefs, measuring 
perceptions of state involvement in public service provision and the equity-efficiency 
trade off. In the following section, an overview of the most appropriate mechanism for 
measuring such a framework is outlined.  
 
 
                                                 
78 Of course some statements contain elements of two of these theoretically defined characteristics. 
Classifications are of course subjective. While the classification of the statement may be disputed, as 
statements are interpreted with reference to the position of all other statements, classification does not have 
a significant effect on findings. 
231 
 
6.4 Q Methodology: measuring bureaucratic values  
This short section is devoted to outlining the merits of Q methodology in determining 
bureaucrat preferences and the process by which Q research is conducted. Given that 
we are in search of core personal beliefs, the methodology used to extrapolate this 
information is of paramount importance. Selden et al (1999) borrow from psychology a 
noteworthy methodological approach: Q-methodology. Q methodology, they submit, 
provides the most appropriate basis for measuring individual norms and values. Q is an 
inverted factor analysis. In traditional r research, the respondents are subjects and the 
questions are variables. In Q subjects and variables are inverted. The statements or 
questions put to the interviewee are the subjects and the respondents themselves are 
the variables. Q method therefore does not seek to answer r questions such as: do elite 
level bureaucrats who represent their own communities correspondingly advocate for 
the division of the city? Rather, in Q we seek to determine if the positioning of the 
statements (questions) by a respondent is related to the positioning of the statements 
by another respondent. Individual respondents that have placed the statements in a 
similar fashion are then said to share perspectives. The Q process, while involving some 
simple computation, relies extensively on the knowledge of the researcher, and is 
therefore termed a mixed methods approach. 
Following Selden et al (1999), Steelman and Maguire (1999), Callahan and Olshfski 
(2006), Q methodology is accepted to be the most appropriate method for measuring 
subjectivity among the bureaucratic elite. Developed by Stephenson (1935), Q 
methodology allows candidates to categorise their preferences over numerous 
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statements according to how strongly they disagree or agree with each statement (See 
also Brown, 1980; Durning, 1999). Q methodology allows public administrators to reveal 
their subjective point of view (Smith, 2001) or their personal profiles (Brouwer, 1999). 
While much of social science research draws on survey data to characterise individual 
opinions toward an issue, Q methodology produces a comprehensive observation of an 
individual’s attitude (Brown and Ungs, 1970). Q methodology has not been designed to 
discover the truth or establish facts but to collate the variety of accounts people 
construct (Kitziger, 1987). Nor is Q methodology concerned with population statistics: it 
doesn’t seek to establish the proportion of the population weighing significantly on a 
particular set of preferences. Q Methodology serves to elucidate the range of views on a 
given topic – not the extent to which they are subscribed to among the wider 
population. That said, while Q methodology measures individual perceptions and not 
those of entire populations, some cautious inferences, akin to those of Selden et al 
(1999), can be made.  
Unlike Likert scales or the Semantic Differential method, Q methodology provides an 
opportunity for the interviewee to identify preferences against competing statements. 
Put differently, in a questionnaire, the response to each statement or question is made 
independently of the previous statement or question. In Q the placement of each 
statement influences the placement of the other statements, generating a greater 
understanding of individual attitudes and perspectives. In my research, Q methodology 
has been used to consider and evaluate simultaneously theoretically established 
bureaucratic norms and values in terms of both representation and core governance 
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beliefs. As was the case in Anthony Downs’ (1967) bureaucrat typologies research, 
bureaucrats are acknowledged to possess mixed motives. Thus, as in reality, the method 
provides for the respondent to prioritise values that are simultaneously in conflict with 
each other. Concerns have been raised about the possibility for generalisation from Q 
studies, replicability being the primary factor of concern. Thomas and Baas (1992) have 
conducted a study to allay any fears in this regard. Respondents in Q methodology are 
not random. As in all methods of elite interviewing, they are carefully targeted, based 
on their relevance to the research design. As submitted by Brown (1978) Q methodology 
is less concerned with the number of persons, rather focusing on who the interviewees 
(P sample) are. 
In summary, Q has been designed to determine core beliefs and individual 
perceptions. Unlike traditional interviews or degrees of attachment questionnaires, 
interviewees compare statements against each other as opposed to viewing statements 
as separate entities. It is therefore the interviewee that determines the importance to 
be attributed to each statement, not the researcher. While Q has its limitations, it is well 
suited to measuring norms and values of small numbers of people, and is specifically 
designed to address the questions posed in this chapter.  
 
6.4.1 The Q process 
In Q, two sets are identified – the Questions set (Q set) and the Respondents or Person 
set (P set). Respondents (P) are requested to rank a series of statements into five 
categories, from agree to disagree. This differs from traditional survey ‘degrees of 
attachment’ questions in that the interviewee must categorise the degree of their 
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agreement with each statement, in light of all of the other statements. As norms and 
values, and hence their interpretation, are particular to each individual, definitive 
exclusive groups cannot be created. We can however, as submitted by Stephenson 
(1935) create clusters of subjectivity, whereby individual perceptions can be collated and 
analysed. Risdon (2003) describes Q as a method of studying a population of view 
points, as opposed to a population of people. Walker Connor (1997: 33) submits that 
‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions, perceptions are 
as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues’. Therefore, we need a 
methodology specifically designed to measure perceptions and preferences, not facts.  
 The Q sample derives from a broad review of the literature. Akin to the design of a 
questionnaire, a literature review is conducted, where about 500 - 800 questions usually 
emerge. These can be whittled down to about 100 – 150 as many questions are found to 
be either repeated or seek the same information. The research then subjectively 
identifies between 30 and 50 statements that are considered to be most relevant to the 
research question, just as would be done in a questionnaire.79 These statements do not 
have to emerge from a conceptual framework, but usually do have some theoretical 
rationale. Recall figs 6.3/6.4 which present the conceptual framework for this research: 
a respondent could theoretically define themselves according to one, or a number, of 
the theoretically existent representation perspectives outlined on these figures. The 
concourse for this research has been established around these theoretically existent 
characteristics.  
                                                 
79 Alternatively, if resources permit, the researcher could conduct a focus group or preliminary interviews 
with a sample of the population and use statements emerging from this process to formulate the concourse.  
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The next step is to print each of the statements on a separate piece of card and 
attribute each card a random number. These statements are now ready to be presented 
to the interviewee. One of the subtle differences between the questionnaire and the Q 
method should now be evident. The respondent will be able to see all of the statements 
(questions) that are attached to each of the theoretically derived positions 
simultaneously. The next step is to define the P-set (person set). The P set is usually 
numerically smaller than the Q set. The aim is to have four or five respondents agreeing 
with the same statements. Recall, we are more concerned with WHO the interviewees 
(P-set) are, than the quantity of interviewees. The next step is to define the distribution 
(See Fig. 6.5 below). Before conducting the interview, the researcher must decide on the 
range of the distribution of responses. This determines how differentiated the 
researcher wishes the responses to be. In some instances this can range from +5 to –5; 
(in my research I used a range of +3 to –3 as I felt a range of 7 points provided sufficient 
opportunity for respondents to satisfactorily differentiate themselves.) One final 
decision before conducting the interview must be taken: the researcher must also 
determine how many statements a respondent can place in each category. This does not 
have to be fixed but was in my research in order to guarantee a normal distribution. 
Brown (1980) found this restriction to have hardly any bearing on the results. As van 
Exel and de Graff (2005) submit – this is a practical, but not necessary, step. The Q 
sheet, Fig. 6.5, is now printed and ready to be presented to the interviewee together 
with the printed Q cards. 
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Fig. 6.5: Q Sheet sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the Q-sample and the P-set have been identified, the interview process may begin. 
Interviewees are handed the Q cards and requested to place the cards into three 
categories – statements they tend to agree with, statements they tend to disagree with 
and finally statements they feel ambivalent towards. Interviewees may talk through 
their reasoning for putting a card in a selected category or refer to specific examples 
which aid the researcher in the data analysis phase. Once the interviewee has placed all 
of the cards into one of the three categories (agree, ambivalent, disagree), s/he then is 
asked to further sub-divide the cards into the seven categories as identified in Fig. 6.5. In 
the case of my sample s/he was asked to identify the four cards s/he most agreed with 
followed by the following six. The interviewee was then asked to do likewise with the 
disagree pile – identify the four statements s/he most disagreed with, followed by the 
following six. The interviewee is then asked to complete the remaining boxes, 
identifying a further eight statements that they find some way agreeable, and eight 
statements that they find in some way disagreeable, leaving ten statements in the 
Most Strongly Disagree           Neutral   Most Strongly Agree 
–3  –2  –1  0    +1   +2    +3 
(4)  (6)   (8)  (10)  (8)  (6)    (4) 
___  ___  ___ ___  ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___ ___ ___  ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___ ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
___  ___  ___ 
___  ___  ___ 
        ___ 
        ___ 
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neutral pile. The Q-sort is now completed. A semi structured interview followed where 
the interviewee were asked to reflect on certain choices. This process was 
supplemented with a simple Questionnaire in order to determine the primary (factual) 
characteristics of the interviewee – eg. Age range, gender, nationality, length of service, 
regularity of attendance at inter-departmental committee meetings, extent of contact 
with other officials etc... 
 The next phase is the data analysis phase. As previously outlined, Q 
Methodology can be described as an inverted factor analysis. This data analysis phase is 
assisted through a freely available software package: PQ Method. The correlation matrix 
of all Q-sorts is calculated (ie. The relationship between all of the responses). Principal 
Component Analysis is the most common factor analysis method. Factors are then 
rotated according to Varimax criteria (a statistical principle)80. Rotation does not distort 
the consistency in sentiment but shifts the perspective from which they are observed 
(van Exel and de Graff, 2005). A numerical representation of how closely each 
individual’s statements relate to the make-up of each factor is then determined (Factor 
scores). People with similar views weigh on the same factor. Factors in Q are collectives 
of respondents who share the same viewpoints. Those who possess similar views are 
said to belong to a factor. The word factor can be substituted with ‘typology’, ‘group’ or 
‘cluster’, whichever the researcher finds most appropriate for the discipline. The 
meaning remains unchanged: a collection of individuals who placed the cards in a 
similar fashion and are therefore assumed to hold similar perspectives on a subject.  
                                                 
80 Factors can also be rotated manually. 
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A further qualitative element is now introduced into the research. The 
researcher must determine the Q sorts (individual’s perceptions) that weigh significantly 
on each factor. This is normally a straightforward process. Based on the factor analysis, 
the research determines what numbers are significant and what numbers are not in the 
make-up of that factor, paying close attention to negative scores as well as positive 
scores. The number of factors is then subjectively determined by the researcher. In my 
research two factors emerged in Belfast, while three emerged in Brussels. This means 
that in Belfast I perceived two distinct groups of individuals to emerge while in Brussels I 
perceived three distinct groups to emerge. A number of criteria for determining how 
many factors to proceed with have been suggested by Webler, Danielson and Tuler 
(2009: 31) and are reproduced here. 
Table 6.1 Criteria for determining how many factors to proceed with 
1. Simplicity: All else being equal, fewer factors is better, as it makes the viewpoints 
at issue easier to understand. Of course, simplicity should not be taken so far that 
you lose important and interesting information about differences in people’s views. 
2. Clarity: The best factor solution is one in which each sorter loads highly on one, 
and only one, factor. You should try to minimize the number of “confounders” 
(people who load on multiple factors) and “non-loaders” (people who do not load on 
any factor). If a few confounders persist, that indicates that those people have truly 
hybrid views. 
3. Distinctness: Lower correlations between factors are better, as highly correlated 
factors are saying similar things. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily bad to have high 
correlations, as long as the factor is otherwise satisfactory. It may be that two factors 
agree on many issues, but their points of disagreement are particularly important 
(e.g. if they disagree about a remedy that is being proposed as the next step at your 
site). 
4. Stability: As you compare the results of using different numbers of factors, you 
will notice certain groups of people tend to cluster together. This is an indicator that 
those individuals really do think similarly. A good set of factors will preserve as many 
as possible of these stable clusters. 
Source: Webler, Danielson and Tuler (2009: 31). 
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Once the number of factors or groups of respondents has been identified, the make-up 
of these groups can then be analysed. We can then see the individuals that share similar 
perceptions and more importantly, what these perceptions are. Thus the next phase is 
factor interpretation. Brown, Durning, and Selden (1998) suggest a threefold approach 
to interpret the factors. First, examine the composite Q-sort for each factor focusing on 
the statements individuals agreed and disagreed with most strongly (in my case, 
statements assigned the +3, +2, –3, –2 scores). Second, identify the common theme(s) 
underlying the distribution. Third, compare and contrast the factor with other factors 
revealed in the analysis (Selden et al, 1999).  
 To summarise, emerging from the Q method, researchers should pay particular 
attention to three aspects. All three aspects are numerically represented in the output 
sheet of PQ method. Firstly, the relationship between individual respondents and the 
typology: how closely aligned is each respondent to the typology. Secondly, how 
divergent (in terms of distance) are the typologies: in other words, how many 
statements do the factors disagree on. Finally, close attention should be paid to the 
nature of the statements that the respondents disagree on: while two factors may be 
statistically fairly similar, they may be divergent on one important aspect.  
 In this final paragraph I describe in greater detail some of the methodological 
processes particular to this research which should assist in the interpretation of the 
findings in the next section. As in Q the interviewees are now the variables and 
statements are the subjects, it is still important to have more subjects than variables: 
therefore the number of statements should exceed the number of Q participants. In this 
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study I present the results of 21 members of the Brussels bureaucratic elite and 19 
members of the Belfast bureaucratic elite. (One of the Belfast interviews had to be 
discarded as I was not convinced the interviewee had given full attention to the 
process). I draw on 46 statements, or subjects. These are presented in table 6.6 in the 
annex, in the order they were presented to the participant. A descriptive overview of 
the personal characteristics of the interview sample is referred to in Chapter One (see 
Annex table 1.1). Suffice to acknowledge here that interviews were targeted on the 
basis of seniority of position, not perceived language, religious or national affiliation. As 
it transpired, eight Catholics, seven Protestants, and five of neither background were 
interviewed in Belfast. Seven identified themselves as British, five as Irish and eight as 
Northern Irish81. In Brussels, ten Dutch-speaking, eight French-speaking candidates and 
two bilinguals responded. Ten perceived themselves as Belgian in the first instance, 
three as Flemish, three as French-speakers, one as Dutch-speaking, one as Bruxellois 
and two with the EU. These national identities reaffirm that the bureaucratic elite 
possess very different nationalities in each city. A shared identity based on a nationality 
(Mengistu and Vogel, 2006) does not appear to have been achieved within these two 
contested environments. (The reasons why no such common national identity emerged 
is not investigated by this research.) As with references to interviewees throughout the 
dissertation, each interviewee was assigned a random number and is referenced 
accordingly. 
 
                                                 
81 I have maintained the N=20 for the (factual) descriptive data.  
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6.5 The findings 
Are bureaucrats guided by elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders within 
their own community, by professional norms and values or are they entirely neutral? 
How do they see the role of government in society, and how do they feel when 
confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? Which bureaucrats are most likely 
to actively represent and what will they actively represent when they do so? Our 
conceptual framework and methodology have been inspired by these questions.  To 
investigate responses to these questions, each city is examined in turn. The Q analysis 
has been conducted separately for each city to prevent city-specific factors skewing the 
results. This also provides a basis for further independent studies to be conducted in 
other contested environments. In each case the Q-sorts were entered into the software: 
PQ method, subject to Principal Component Analysis where the emerging matrix was 
then rotated using Varimax criteria (as previously outlined), revealing two factors in 
Belfast and three factors in Brussels.  
Attention is first turned to Belfast where two fairly similar factors (F) emerged, 
indicating a high degree of cohesiveness and harmonisation of values within the 
administration. In Brussels, three quite distinct factors emerge. Each factor represents a 
conceptual template originating from where each respondent categorised the 
statements. Recall, factors are simply interviewees who share similar beliefs about a 
given subject. The diversity of the groups is represented in tables 6.2 and 6.3 below. 
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Correlation Factor scores:  Belfast          Correlation Factor scores: Brussels   
Table 6.2            Table 6.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Annex 6.4 (Belfast) and 6.5 (Brussels), the respondent is identified in the left hand 
column, while the remaining columns indicate how heavily each respondent weighs on 
each factor. Participants loading significantly on a particular factor placed the Q cards in 
a similar fashion and are now assumed to share similar norms and values. Recall that 
these perspectives that emerge are generalizations of attitudes held by individuals. They 
therefore permit direct comparisons of attitudes irrespective of the number of people 
who subscribe to them (McKeown and Thomas, 1988). It is indeed acknowledged that 
some respondents will be closer to this new central axis than others – ie. that their 
loading on each factor differs. Factor weights are merged with the raw data to generate 
each of the factors identified in tables 6.4/6.5. The X denotes that the individual’s 
responses contributed to the composition of that factor. Put differently, the respondent 
of course shares some attributes of each category, however the respondent has more in 
common with one group than the other groups. How that same individual relates to 
each of the other factors can also be understood by looking at the other figures in the 
row.  
Annex 6.6 identifies where each factor (or group of interviewees) placed the 
statements. We can see the prominence attributed to each statement by each group. 
For example, statement 17 indicates that factor one placed the Q-card in column three, 
or the ‘strongly agree’ category, while factor two placed it in column 0, or the ‘neutral’ 
              F1             F2          (Belfast) 
    1     1.0000  0.7236 
    2     0.7236  1.0000 
              F 3            F4          F5      (Brussels) 
    1     1.0000  0.4780  0.5695 
    2     0.4780  1.0000  0.4485 
    3     0.5695  0.4485  1.0000 
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category. In sum, tables 6.4 and 6.5 explain how each respondent contributes to the 
definition/make-up of each of the factors (or how they come into being), while table 6.6 
identifies the characteristics of each of our five factors. It is to these factors or ‘clusters’ 
or ‘groups’ or ‘typologies’ that we now turn. In order to cluster like-minded individuals 
together, bureaucrats loading on a particular factor are now assumed to hold similar 
beliefs, values and role perceptions. As eight statements correspond to each of our 
representation points, this allows for cross comparison of representation statements. 
Only five statements are attributed to each equity and efficiency and two to each side of 
the ‘role of the state’ debate. Each factor is presented below in turn. At the beginning of 
each factor definition a number of ‘key statements’ are presented. A graphical depiction 
of the results is also presented in the annex. These are only intended as visual aids; for a 
more complete understanding, and a comprehensive list of factor preferences, 
reference should always be made to table 6.6. Throughout the findings section 
reference is made to various statements presented in table 6.6 (statement number is 
indicated in brackets), together with evidence from the interviews (Interviewee number 
is identified as ‘Interview X’. For the following section it may be useful to have a copy of 
table 6.6 from the annex to hand.  
 
6.5.1 Belfast 
Following rotation and analysis of various factor returns, two closely related factors 
emerged from the Belfast results, indicating a high level of coherency in opinions, norms 
and values within the administration (See table 6.2 above). It is found that eleven 
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respondents contribute to the make-up of factor one, while eight contribute to the 
make-up of factor two. While both factors share many views, let us first consider what 
differentiates them.  
 
6.5.1a Factor One (Belfast) 
Table 6.7: Key agree statements for factor one (See corresponding graphs 6.7a, 6.7b and 6.7c in appendix) 
Administrators are not neutral. They should be committed to good management and 
social equity as values 
I recommend positions that I perceive represent the needs and interests of the 
entire urban public 
As I am involved in policy-making, it is my role to advance the needs of those less 
well off in society, regardless of their background 
I take initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for these policies and 
questioning policies that may run counter to the general public interest  
The best way to ensure efficient public service to the entire urban public is through 
public sector reform so that services may be provided equitably and efficiently by 
the public sector 
In my daily work I value the views of international organisations such as the OECD, 
EU, World Bank, Policy-specific think tanks and NGOs etc 
Factor one have a good working relationship with the political actors within the city. 
While they do not substitute their own political values with those of the political elite 
(42), they perceive their actions to be legitimate as the political level agrees with their 
decisions and recommendations (22, 26). This factor however does not believe that 
resources should be allocated according to the wishes of the political level regardless of 
their opinions (7). Their role is not simply to advise the Minister (10) but to actively 
pursue positions they perceive to represent the interests of the entire urban public (11). 
When differences do emerge, they maintain their expert beliefs for as long as politically 
possible (40). While they do attribute importance to the neutrality of the bureaucracy, 
(28) neutrality is interpreted to mean that all urban citizens are represented by the 
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administration. This factor does not follow the rules of the administration under all 
circumstances (8). They are not overtly technocratic, accounting for political factors 
when making decisions (19). Administrators should not be neutral, but prioritise good 
management and social equity (17). They take the initiative in proposing policies, 
mobilising support for them and question policies that may run counter to the general 
interest of the urban population (36). The views of think tanks and international 
organisations such as the OECD and EU are held in high regard by this factor (41). Those 
weighing significantly on this factor actively advocate in favour of policy positions that 
they perceive represent the needs of the entire urban public (11), being the only factor 
to actively advocate in favour of policy positions that address the needs of minority 
citizens (3). Conflict management is a function for this factor – where differences exist, 
they see it as their role to mediate and determine a course of action that satisfies 
everyone (14).   
 This factor is not overly attached to a particular policy area (44), but instead 
represents a broader vision for the city. Equity commitments trump policy specific 
commitments among those weighing on this factor, (1, 31) particularly as they operate 
within a contested city (6). Equity between ethnic groups however should not be a 
determinant in resource allocation – just because one community is given a resource, 
this should not be a reason to give the other community the resource (20). This factor 
also possesses a concurrent commitment to efficiency (21, 2).   
The legitimacy of their actions is derived from their responsibility to attain an 
equitable, fair and prosperous society – not the law, political direction, or their expert 
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beliefs. As indicated by the positioning of statements 38, 33, 18, 32, this factor believe in 
the public provision of state services and are open and committed to public sector 
reform. This factor disagrees most strongly with the idea of representing one’s 
community within the bureaucracy (24, 30, 35, 39, 43, 45, 46). A further noteworthy 
finding is the irrelevance the factor attributes to recruitment statements (2, 15). The 
following quotations from the following informal interview with Q participants weighing 
significantly on this factor gives a further insight into the motivations, norms and values 
of this factor. 
‘It is only when we bring things to the attention of the political level that they 
have influence’ (Interview 1) 
‘There is an incapacity at the political level to deal with the more technical stuff’ 
(Interview 2) 
‘I only present an options paper when cuts are to be political’ (Interview 4) 
‘My area is quite technical…the political level rubber stamp my decisions’ 
(Interview 5) 
‘I view my role as a coordinator…I put things in a framework in which they can 
agree’ (Interview 9) 
‘My role is to steer them [political level] in the right way’ (Interview 12) 
‘I have a broader view for the city, as opposed to a political view’ (Interview 15) 
‘My role is to manage the decision-making process’  (Interview 17) 
‘You have to do your homework before Council meetings…I build a relationship 
with Councillors so they may have confidence in me’ (Interview 19) 
 
 Those aligning themselves along this factor come from both communities in 
Northern Ireland. Three were from the Protestant community, while five had a Catholic 
community background. Three identified with neither community. Two felt British, Four 
Irish and Five Northern Irish. Five respondents had a degree and six held a Masters or 
higher qualification. Four were fairly attached to their religion; four were not attached, 
while a further three described themselves as not at all attached.  
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6.5.1b Factor Two (Belfast) 
Table 6.8: Key agreement statements of factor 2(See corresponding graph 6.8a, 6.8b and 6.8c in appendix) 
In my daily work, I represent the elected government of the city 
My role is to carry out the wishes of the urban government 
My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures established by law and/or 
secondary legislation 
Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally trained, technically competent 
individuals. The most qualified person should always get the job. 
When there is a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the urban 
government and my own expert beliefs, I automatically and unquestionably follow 
the wishes of the government. 
I recommend or actively activate in favour of policy positions that I perceive 
represent the needs of the entire urban public. 
Those aligning with factor two see themselves as representing government and see their 
role as to carry out the wishes of the urban government. Overall they are a more 
technocratic factor and are inclined to retreat to the evidence in order to persuade the 
political level to cooperate. Unlike factor one, when there is a conflict of interest 
between their personal, expert beliefs and those of the political level, they are more 
inclined to follow those of the political level (25). They are also the most likely factor to 
suppress their own values in favour of those of the political level (42). Similar to factor 
one however, they are rarely pressurised by elected officials to alter their expert 
recommendations or decisions (26). They see their role as to carry out the wishes of 
urban government (5, 12). While this factor is highly responsive to the political level, 
they do not simply provide advice to the political level (10). They aim for government 
that works better and costs less (21). They are against private sector provision of state 
services (8, 18), but are also less enthusiastic about public sector reform (38) and less 
concerned with directly representing the interests of citizens than factor one (33). They 
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are also attached to professional norms and values (11, 36, 40), however this factor 
possess simultaneous attachments to the political level.  
 While factor one actively pursue broader societal objectives, factor two are more 
technocratic. They attribute significant importance to their policy area (44). They tend 
to prioritise the goal of efficiency, providing technically feasible and efficient solutions 
to the political level (27). This is not to mean that they allocate resources according to 
technical criteria only (4). Political factors also need to be considered when taking 
decisions and making recommendations (19). While they disagree with affirmative 
action (2, 15), this factor are aware of the contested nature of the environment in which 
they work and like factor one involve themselves in conflict management, mediating 
between political differences (14). Unlike factor one however, as they operate within a 
contested city, resources should balance technical and demographic criteria (20). 
Efficiency is not always a priority (1). In terms of equity, they do not disproportionately 
represent minority groups (3). Neutrality is highly regarded by this factor (28). Unlike 
factor one, neutrality is seen more traditionally, being grounded in the law (13) and 
technocracy (2).  
Together with factor one, factor two possesses a strong commitment to public 
service. They are however more rule bound; viewing public service in a supporting 
capacity to the political level rather than in an active capacity. Factor two similarly reject 
any possibility of actively representing their personal communities; their primary 
concern being to develop an efficient administration so as to be responsive to the 
wishes of the urban government (2, 21, 12, 5, 25). However, while they are responsive 
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to the political level, they also expect the political level to be responsive to them (7, 9, 
40).  
On our representation continua, factor two, while incorporating a commitment 
to professional ideas, can be found closer to the ‘political responsiveness’ and ‘neutral’ 
axes. Whilst taking into account the equity concerns of a contested city, this factor’s 
values lean more towards efficiency concerns. In sum, this factor are less likely to 
actively represent broader societal goals, and are more interested in actively developing 
a more efficient administration to carry out the wishes of the urban government. They 
are however significant stakeholders in the policy design process and significantly 
influence the outcome of public policy. Similar to factor one they can be described as 
‘co-producers’, however they are more likely to seek out and  represent the policy goals 
of the political level rather than broader societal goals. The following quotes from the 
informal interview support these findings:  
  
‘If ABC is good for the economy but not a priority for the political level, I adjust it’ 
(Interview 20) 
‘I meet with the political level to determine what their priorities are or knowing 
where they are at…I need to know what tactic to deploy’ (Interview 20) 
‘When Councillors disagree I retreat to the evidence’ (Interview 18) 
‘provided I show rational for decisions, I have no problems with Councillors’ 
(Interview 16) 
‘Generally I like to give a recommendation to Councillors, if there are a number 
of options I will discuss it with individual Councillors before hand’ (Interview 16) 
‘I keep the debate technical’ (Interview 14) 
‘Our role is to inform, not to take decisions’ (Interview 7) 
‘My role is to make sure they take a fully informed decision’ (Interview 8) 
‘Primary value of the administration is neutrality’ (Interview 8) 
‘There is always a technical basis for decisions’ (Interview 14) 
‘Equity is so mainstream today, it is no longer a major concern’ (Interview 18) 
‘We come up with a policy, test it and the political level endorse it’ (Interview 3) 
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Four Protestants, two Catholics and two from identifying with neither community 
weighed significantly on this factor. Four possessed a British identity, one an Irish 
identity and three possessed a Northern Irish identity. One held a degree while seven 
had a Masters degree or higher. Again four were fairly attached to their religion, while 
four described themselves as ‘not at all attached’. Once again we can see that a shared 
identity around a ‘nationality’ seems unachievable. As identified in table 6.3, both 
Belfast factors share many beliefs and perceptions of governance. Factor one however 
are motivated by their own personal goals and objectives, grounded in their 
technocratic expertise or broader social objectives. Factor two, while still actively 
involved in the policy-making process, try and ascertain and implement the goals of the 
political elite.   
 
6.5.2 Brussels 
Following rotation and factor analysis, three distinct factors emerged in our Brussels 
sample. Factors three and five, while evidencing similar ‘neutral’ characteristics, differ 
markedly in their role perceptions. Factor three are most likely to actively represent the 
organisation, factor five are the most politically responsive of all of our factors while 
factor four emerges as the most likely Brussels factor to actively represent a 
professional attachment. Nationality or language does not determine typology 
composition. However, as will become apparent, Brussels factors tend to be more open 
to representing their ‘co-ethnics’ in society.  
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6.5.2a Factor Three (Brussels) 
Table 6.9: Key agree statements for factor 3. (See corresponding graph 6.9a, 6.9b and 6.9c in appendix) 
When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the political level and my 
personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible 
Public employees should aim for governance that works better and costs less 
My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures established by law and/or 
secondary legislation 
My decisions are legitimate on the basis of my technical expertise and by the fact 
that I provide technically feasible solutions 
I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to what is legal 
In contemporary social and economic affairs, technical considerations should be 
given more weight than political factors 
I represent the elected government of the city 
 
This factor can be described as the most ‘technocratic’ of all our factors. They are the 
staunchest defenders of the organisation. The rules of the bureaucracy are paramount 
in their daily work. This does not mean that resources should be allocated according to 
the wishes of the political elite (7), but that the law should guide resource allocation 
(13). In instances where there is a conflict between their considered expert (technical) 
position and that of the political level, they will not unquestionably follow the wishes of 
the political point of view, maintaining their expert opinion for as long as possible (40, 
25). Their expert point of view is grounded in the rules of the bureaucracy. Decisions 
made are legitimised through law (13), and through their personal expertise (29), not 
through the political level (9, 22). They are the only factor to consider technical 
considerations more important than political factors in contemporary social and 
economic affairs (19), and define their roles accordingly (27). While indeed the most 
closely related factor to the Weberian ideal-type, they are also aware of the 
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consequences of their actions and will not follow the rules of the bureaucracy under all 
circumstances (8). 
Driven by the goal of seeking public sector efficiency (21), this factor places most 
importance on maintaining the rules of the administration. Much of their focus is on 
ensuring the political level stay within their competencies and within the law. They are 
willing to stand against decisions made by the political level (40) if they believe them to 
be contrary to the law. This is their role as a bureaucrat. They stick to what is legal, not 
what is right (37). In line with the Weberian ideal-type, they do not represent their 
personal communities (24, 35, 45), nor are they concerned with equity considerations 
(1, 20, 31). However, as will become apparent, it is found that the Brussels factors 
disagree to a lesser extent with the idea of representing their own personal 
communities than their Belfast counterparts. In terms of our representation continua, 
this factor embodies a commitment to professionalism and to the neutrality of the 
bureaucracy. Efficiency takes precedence over equity. Efficiency is a necessary 
mechanism through which to better represent the public through a more effective 
organisation. The organisation, through its rules and procedures, serves the public. This 
factor could not be described as policy makers but are closer to ‘functionaries’. They are 
involved in policy implementation, and are not attached to a particular policy or social 
agenda.  
To summarise, factor three are the most rule bound public servants: the law is 
given priority. There are no goals outside this. It is the job of the political level to have 
goals – correspondingly it is the job of the administration to ensure that all actors 
253 
 
involved in the governance process do so within the law. This group, while neutral, have 
no problem in questioning the political level if they perceive them to be acting outside 
their competencies. Considering our equity-efficiency continuum, factor one are firmly 
on the efficiency segment (1, 2, 4, 27). The following quotations from this group 
elucidate the primary values of this factor. 
‘Sometimes the political level want us to act outside our domain of 
competence…they need to be told no’ (Interview 39) 
‘I must make sure all subsidies are legal’ (Interview 37) 
‘When a problem arises I let the political level know of all of the possible legal 
solutions and their consequences’ (Interview 36) 
‘Political cabinets usually ask me to find a way to make it legal to give a subsidy 
to a person or business’ (Interview 34) 
‘Sometimes political cabinets only think on behalf of third parties to which they 
are related…they need to be reminded of the law’ (Interview 34) 
‘The administration must get the job done legally…we still only propose 
solutions…it is for the political level to take decisions’ (Interview 33) 
‘I would often say to the political level, if you want me to do that change the law 
and I will do it then’ (Interview33) 
‘Neutrality is impossible…and even then it is probably not a good idea’ 
(Interview37) 
‘Politicians don’t know the rules…we must translate good ideas into practice’ 
(Interview 36) 
‘As an expert I must also serve society [as well as the political level]’ (Interview 
34) 
 
Three French speakers and three Dutch speakers aligned themselves with this factor, 
two describing their nationality as French-speakers, two as Dutch-speakers (but not 
Flemish) while one respondent possessed an EU and another a Belgian identity in the 
first instance. Most noteworthy, each respondent was aligned with a cross-community 
administration. Two respondents were within the CCC while four were from the BCR 
administration. Five members of factor one have held their positions for over ten years. 
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Two felt very attached to their language group, three fairly attached and one was not at 
all attached.  
 
6.5.2b Factor Four (Brussels) 
Table 6.10 Key agree statements for factor 4(See corresponding graph 6.10a, 6.10b and 6.10c in appendix) 
Administrators are not neutral: they should be committed to good management and 
social equity as values 
I recommend, or actively advocate, in favour of positions that I perceive represent 
the needs and interests of the entire urban public  
I take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and 
questioning policies that may run counter to the general public interest 
When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the political level and my 
personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible.  
 
Factor four possesses similar concerns about the influence of the political level. Akin to 
factor three, resources should not be allocated according to the wishes of the political 
level (7, 22). While factor three (above) also question the authority of the political level, 
they do so on the basis of the legality of the decision, not on the potential effects of the 
decision. Those weighing on factor four however are less concerned with the rules of 
the bureaucracy (8, 13, 37), and pay more attention to the effects of public policy on 
social cohesion (17, 31). Their relationship with the political level is the most difficult of 
all our factors (26), as politicians regularly disagree with their expert opinions. While 
their role is to carry out the wishes of urban government (5, 12), resources should not 
be allocated according to the wishes of the political elite, regardless of their 
[bureaucratic level] opinions (7). When a conflict arises between the bureaucratic and 
political level, they too will maintain their expert position for as long as politically 
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possible (40), the important difference being this factors commitment to representing 
larger societal goals. Factor four is the only factor not to regard neutrality as a primary 
value within the bureaucracy (28). Similar to factor one in Belfast they are most likely to 
take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and questioning 
policies that run counter to the general public interest (36). Their role is not to simply 
provide advice to the political level (10) but to actively advocate in favour of policy 
positions that they perceive represent the wishes of the entire urban public (11). This 
factor devises solutions that are technically feasible and efficient (27), seeking 
government that works better and costs less (21). Factor four is the only Brussels factor 
to indicate a willingness to involve itself in conflict management (14) and similar to 
factor one in Belfast, is influenced by think tanks and international organisations such as 
the OECD and EU (41). This factor agrees with more efficiency statements than equity 
statements. However, both equity and efficiency are both held in high regard (1, 6, 31, 
17). However demographics or ethnicity should not be the basis for resource allocation 
(15, 20). As with all of the Brussels typologies, factor four are against any form of 
affirmative action (15, 2). 
Factor four are further removed from the policy making process than they would 
like. Active representation of societal goals by the bureaucratic elite is therefore more 
difficult in Brussels than in Belfast. Those aligning themselves with this factor have a 
professional identity, and are driven by equity concerns. They try to involve themselves 
in the policy making process and see their primary role as to advance the needs of those 
less well of in society, regardless of background (31). Most noteworthy, this factor is not 
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averse to representing the wishes of the political representatives of their own personal 
communities (39, 45), nor are they averse to advancing procedures that would give their 
community greater access to public services (16, 30). In sum, this factor possesses a 
commitment to administrative efficiency but this is trumped by equity concerns. In 
terms of representativeness, they possess a strong professional identity; however of all 
our factors they are most likely to represent their own personal communities when 
necessary. The quotes below further describe the views of those weighing on factor 
two.  
‘I don’t let the political level get involved with my administration without 
knowing about it first…I must know of any contact’ (Interview 21) 
‘At the moment I have proposed four policies and they have all been accepted – 
this is unusual, my Minister has never been in power before’ (Interview 21) 
‘the politicisation of the administration is often a problem, but always workable 
(Interview 24) 
In the past it was a problem that the cabinet would contact my department 
without me knowing…it could happen again of the cabinet changed but at the 
moment it works well’ (Interview 25) 
‘At the moment there is more experience in the administration than in the 
cabinet’ (Interview 25) 
‘Their [political level] ideas are good but it is not possible to translate their ideas 
into practice’ (Interview 26) 
‘Too many people have too many personal objectives…there is no teamwork’ 
(interview 27) 
 
 
 
One respondent identified with each a Brussels, Dutch-speaking and French-speaking 
‘nationality’ respectively, while the remaining two saw themselves as Belgian in the first 
instance. Two had held their position for more than ten years while four held their 
position for less than ten years. Three felt ‘very attached’ to their language group while 
two described themselves as ‘fairly attached’. 
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6.5.2c Factor Five (Brussels) 
Table 6.11:Key agree statements for factor5 (See corresponding graph 6.11a, 6.11b and 6.11c in appendix) 
I know what is legal, not what is right, I stick to what is legal 
Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally trained, technically competent 
individuals. The most qualified person should always get the job. 
My role is to carry out the wishes of the urban government 
I believe that citizens needs are best advanced through directly putting their needs 
first 
When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the urban government and 
my own technical beliefs, I automatically and unquestionably follow the wishes of 
government.  
My role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy no matter what the circumstances 
When a conflict of interests arises between the wishes of the political level and my 
personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible 
Resources should be allocated according to the will of the political elite, regardless of 
my opinions 
Those weighing significantly on factor five are more distant from the policy process than 
any of our other factors. While factor three possesses a professional identity which is 
grounded in the rules of the bureaucracy and factor four possesses a professional 
identity grounded in a commitment to social equity, factor five is the category least 
likely to actively involve themselves in the policy process (36, 11). Neutrality is perceived 
to be the primary value of the administration (28, 37, 23). Similar to factor three, they 
are guided by what is legal, not what is right (37), yet factor five go further being the 
only group to agree with statement 8: my role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy 
no matter what the circumstances.  
 Contrary to the other factors however, those relying on factor three are most 
willing to accept the decisions of the political level – resources should be allocated 
according to their [political level] wishes and when there is a conflict of interests, they 
follow the direction of the political level (25, 7, 10). Statements 40 and 22 do indicate 
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some attachment to a professional identity; however our interest is in the outcome of 
situations where the political level and bureaucrat disagree. While factor five do act 
without political direction, when their decisions come into conflict with political level 
goals, factor five is most likely to follow the political level direction. This factor also 
differs from factor two (Belfast). While factor two see themselves as part of the decision 
making structures of the Council, this is not the case for factor five (12, 36).  Factor five 
is also less inclined to involve itself in mediating political differences (14, 20), and are 
more grounded in the law (37). While equity in decision-making receives some 
consideration (1, 31), policy-making should be guided by efficiency concerns (2, 4, 15, 
17, 27). As with the other Brussels factors, the use of quotas in recruitment is rejected 
(15) as this impedes the efficiency of the public provision of service (33, 38; 32, 18). This 
is the Brussels factor that rejects most strongly the belief that they should represent the 
interests of their own communities (16, 24, 30 35, 43, 46, 39, 45). The level of 
disagreement with these statements however is greater in both Belfast factors. 
In sum, factor five possess more theoretically neutral attributes than factor three 
and are more responsive to the political level than factor three. While factor three will 
question the political level if they feel them to be acting outside the law, factor five is 
less inclined to question the political level. Factor five is closer to the efficiency axis than 
to the equity axis. They are closest to the political responsiveness and neutral quadrants 
of the representation web. This is not to say that these bureaucrats do not act 
independently of the political level. However returning to Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) 
use of the traditional definition for political control, this group are most likely to act in 
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ways that they otherwise would have done due to political level actions. The following 
quotes support this assertion.  
‘Our minister has time for us…he has doubled our effectiveness’ (Interview 35) 
‘My work concerns the application of the law’ (Interview 32) 
‘We are functionaries; we do not involve ourselves in political questions’ 
(Interview 32) 
‘In principle we prepare dossiers – we don’t govern, this is a political role’ 
(Interview 29) (response in reference to statement 21)  
‘I have no political decisions to take’ (Interview 29) 
‘Ministers today put less importance on the administration…they speak of good 
governance but never with us’ (Interview 28) 
‘We empathise with the political level, if we think it wont pass we try and 
manipulate it so it will pass’ (Interview 22) 
‘Decisions are only legitimate when you follow the law’ (Interview 22) 
As no regional money is implicated in what we do in this department, I have a 
more scope than many of my colleagues...if the political level ask me to check an 
area I will’ (Interview 40) 
 
Six of those lying on factor five described themselves as Belgian while the 
remaining respondent identified with the EU in the first instance. Three were French-
speakers, two were Dutch-speakers and two described themselves as belonging to both 
linguistic communities. Two originated in the COCOF, two in the CCC, two in the BCR 
and one in the VGC. Three had held their positions for more than ten years, while four 
held their positions for less than ten years. This factor, in the questionnaire, described 
themselves as being ‘not attached’ to their linguistic communities.  
 
6.6 Towards a convergence in role perceptions? 
While five distinguishable typologies do emerge from our study, a number of core 
governance beliefs were held by all the respondents in each city. In Belfast two closely 
related factors emerge. We see that both factors agree with the principle that equity is 
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more important than efficiency (1, 6), however as outlined above, there is a marginal 
difference in how equity is interpreted. Both factors have a strong commitment to good 
governance (21). They are not willing to follow the rules of the bureaucracy under all 
circumstances (8, 37); nor do they perceive their role as simply to provide input with 
their expertise or to provide advice (10).  Both factors see themselves as co-producers 
within the policy process, providing technically feasible and efficient solutions (27). Both 
factors also involve themselves in conflict management decisions, and consider 
mediation between differing political viewpoints as a function (14). Neutrality and 
impartiality are of paramount importance (27), but both factors differ on how the 
concept is interpreted (17). In summary, while both factors are equally active in the 
management of conflict, factor two are more likely to pursue the goals of the political 
elite, while factor one are more likely to pursue their perceptions of societal or 
professional/technocratic goals. 
 In Brussels, three distinct factors emerge, however once again some 
commonalities of beliefs emerge. Contrary to Belfast, Brussels factors interpret their 
role in a more technical manner (27). While some Brussels factors are more involved in 
the policy making process than others (Factor 4), the generally held perception is that 
bureaucrats provide advice and expertise to the political level – they do not make policy. 
They are unanimous in their belief that the legitimacy of their actions does not come 
from the political level (22). Factors differ however on why they perceive their decisions 
to be legitimate. Factors in Brussels are more inclined to represent their own 
communities than factors in Belfast (who completely reject the idea) (39, 45). Factors in 
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Brussels also unanimously disagree with the privatisation of public services (18) and are 
committed to public sector reform (38).  
 In summary, the Belfast factors are closer aligned than the Brussels factors. It is 
evident that bureaucrats in each city differ in their role perceptions – bureaucrats in 
Brussels interpret their roles in a more technocratic manner, they are more inclined to 
represent their own communities and are generally less ‘actively’ involved in the conflict 
management and policy-making process. In each of the factor descriptions we have seen 
that bureaucrats do actively represent. The Brussels bureaucrat does not completely 
reject the idea of representing his or her own community, however does possess a 
greater attachment to other preferences as indicated by the discussion of factors three, 
four and five. The aim of this chapter has been to determine the values guiding decision-
making within the public administration so as to predict bureaucrat behaviour and 
understand conflict management82. The typologies identified above provide an insight 
into the motivations of bureaucrats within two different consociational mechanisms of 
power-sharing and present a description of bureaucrat’s governance and representation 
perceptions. Nonetheless, the data allows for some cautious inferences to be made 
about typology composition. In other words, what bureaucrats possess these similar 
norms and role perceptions? As bureaucrats in Belfast and Brussels differ, does the 
conflict management mechanism cause this difference? In the following section I firstly 
provide a brief summary of the chapter findings and then proceed to examine the 
extent to which the conflict management mechanism determines these differences in 
                                                 
82 Further inferences can be made from the Q findings however I have limited the interpretation of the 
findings to answering the research questions as posed in Chapter One. 
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role perceptions. Can it be deduced that bureaucrats in more comprehensive forms of 
power-sharing have greater influence in the policy-making process than those in LCD 
mechanisms?  
6.7 Inferences from the findings 
This chapter has explored the attitudes and role perceptions dominating the politico-
administrative axis for ‘without knowledge of the values held by the bureaucracy, it is 
futile to attempt any full determination of the degree of political control’ (Meier and 
O’Toole, 2006:29). It is this politico-administrative axis that most concerns our 
investigation into how conflict is regulated. As power-sharing emerges, the political-
administration dichotomy is the primary determinant in the policy-making process. Our 
typologies give an insight into this dynamic process. While Meier and O’Toole (2006) 
investigate the bureaucracy-democracy relationship, my focus has been on the 
bureaucracy-conflict management relationship. Recall I put forward that typologies are 
the most conducive mechanism of explicating the existent dynamic relationships as they 
do not assume bureaucrats as a collective to behave in a particular manner. 
Consequentially, the different modes of bureaucrat-politician interaction can be 
identified and documented. The questions posed at the outset of this chapter were 
designed to help understand what bureaucrats will actively represent in instances 
where they have discretion. Recall I asked: are bureaucrats in power-sharing 
environments guided by the elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders 
within their own community, by professional norms and values, or are they guided by 
values of bureaucratic neutrality? How do bureaucrats see the role of government in 
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society, and how do they feel when confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? 
The research in this chapter has uncovered a number of important findings. First and 
foremost it has given an insight into how the public administration within two different 
types of power-sharing works. The traditionally faceless bureaucrat has been given an 
opportunity to convey the role of the bureaucracy in regulating conflict. While much has 
been assumed about the role of the bureaucracy, the bureaucrat rarely gets the 
opportunity to contribute to the debate. Secondly, active representation on behalf of a 
secondary learned identity can emerge in a contested society. Drawing on Meier and 
O’Toole’s (2006) research it is accepted that values affect behaviour. Akin to Meier and 
O’Toole (2006:93), the dissertation finds that certain groups within the ‘bureaucracy 
[are] acting consistently with [their] own values rather than being directed by electoral 
institutions’. However, their own values are not necessarily their primary identities. 
While indeed our factors are found to be involved in active representation, this active 
representation is grounded not necessarily in primary identities but active 
representation is found to exist on behalf of a secondary learned identity. The results 
also demonstrate that not all bureaucrats are inclined to actively represent. Two of our 
typologies indicated high levels of political responsiveness. Factors one and four are 
most likely to actively represent, and when they do so they represent what they 
perceive as the interests of society. Factor three was also seen to actively represent but 
instead of actively representing groups or ideals outside the bureaucracy, they were 
identified as actively representing the organisation. Thus active representation 
definitely exists within the contested society and that which is actively represented 
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varies between bureaucrats. In response to the second research question outlined in 
the introduction – a professional attachment can supersede a primary attachment and 
therefore guide bureaucrat behaviour within consociational forms of governance, be 
these bureaucrats operating within the lowest common denominator mechanism or 
within the more traditional comprehensive mechanism. It is also clear that a shared 
national identity has not emerged in our two cases; furthermore bureaucrats who do 
share an identity (in other words, weigh on same factor) do not share primary identities. 
However this finding begs the question: why do certain bureaucrats possess a secondary 
learned attachment? As the type of attachment varies in each of our two ‘most different 
cases’ of consociationalism, can the two different types of conflict management 
mechanism employed explain these variances? Quantitative correlations are not 
possible for such a small number of responses; however some indicative findings are 
presented by the research. While Q methodology measures individual perceptions and 
not those of entire populations, some inferences akin to those of Selden et al (1999) are 
suggested in the paragraphs below.  
Approaching the typologies through both the analytical lenses of public 
administration and conflict management two interrelated themes emerge. What do the 
typology descriptions tell us firstly about policy-making and secondly about conflict 
management in each of our cases? Beginning firstly with our public administration lens, 
bureaucrats in Brussels have generally less of an involvement in the policy process than 
their Belfast counterparts. In Belfast both factors play an active role in policy-making. 
Factor one is found to actively propose policies that they personally feel attached to. 
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This is most often a professional attachment to either social equity or a policy area such 
as environmental management. Factor two also has a significant role to play in the 
policy process. While the goals of factor one come from their own personal 
attachments, those closest to factor two try and determine the goals of the political 
elite and try to implement them. In both Belfast factors the bureaucrat has more 
influence on policy making than their counter-parts in Brussels. When the Brussels 
results are contextualised within the findings of chapter four – Power-sharing ‘light’ – 
the reason for this difference is found not to be related to the conflict management 
mechanism. Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator should not influence 
the degree of bureaucrat involvement in the policy-making process. A more likely 
explanation is the gap between the elected representative and bureaucratic level filled 
by political ‘advisory’ cabinets83. In Belfast five respondents met with the political level 
at least once a month, while in fifteen cases this was at least once a week. In Brussels 
however, contact with the Minister was usually a bi-annual or quarterly occurrence. 
Most interaction with the Minister was via the political cabinets which, as demonstrated 
in chapter four, reduced the ability of the bureaucratic elite to influence policy. Thus, 
this difference between our typologies, while explained by city-level variables, is not a 
result of the conflict management mechanism but more to do with how the mechanism 
is employed. 
Our typologies also demonstrate a difference in their approach to conflict 
management. The Belfast factors identify mediating political level differences as one of 
                                                 
83 As identified in chapter four, these advisory cabinets consist of about 40 people directly appointed by the 
minister’s political party for the term of the government. 
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their primary roles. This is not seen as a role in Brussels. Contextualising these results 
within the findings of chapters three and four, a clearer picture of the two bureaucratic 
systems emerges. Bureaucrats in Belfast not only shape policy at every stage, but when 
they do so they consider the contested nature of the city, recommending policies 
accordingly. When looking at the role of bureaucrats through the conflict management 
lens in Brussels, bureaucrats are found to view their roles in a different light, perceiving 
themselves as implementers of policy. Conflict management is not directly a function of 
the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat does not take into account the contested nature of the 
city when providing advice – this is the prerogative of the political level. Again however 
this difference may not be due to the conflict management mechanism but due to the 
reduced ability of the bureaucrat to influence the decision-making process. This being 
said, the role of the bureaucracy in maintaining the power-sharing regime must not be 
underestimated. In Belfast this is done actively through the bureaucrat directly 
influencing policy. In Brussels the bureaucrat is strong enough to stand up to the 
political level when they act outside their competencies. Bureaucrats in Brussels are 
often cajoled by political cabinets to allocate funding to particular constituencies. While 
they do not have the same influence over the policy process, they are strong enough to 
rely on the law to stand up to the political level if they feel the political level to be acting 
outside their competencies. In a post conflict society, this is an important function. 
Almost every bureaucrat in Brussels referred to ‘ensuring the political level operated 
within the law’ as a primary function. Thus the bureaucrat in Brussels is found to be 
involved in the management of conflict, not through influencing policy but by ensuring 
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the political level operate within the legal power-sharing framework which they created. 
Thus far we have seen that bureaucrats operate differently in each city, both in terms of 
conflict management and public administration. The mechanism of conflict 
management in each city however is found not to explain these differences in role 
perceptions. Closer attention should also be paid to the role of recruitment mechanisms 
and typology alignment in future research. While chapter five found sacrificing the merit 
principle to attain passive representation to be unnecessary, no firm conclusions were 
made on the hypothesis that recruitment by ethno-linguistic quota assisted in the 
maintenance of primary identities. The evidence presented would suggest support for 
this hypothesis, however further studies are required to validate this assertion.  
However policy level variables may not explain typology alignment; this could be 
explained by more sociological variables. As the Belfast typologies are similar, does this 
suggest the emergence or re-emergence of an underlying common identity among the 
population of Northern Ireland? Has the Good Friday Agreement provided the 
opportunity for this common identity to be more profoundly exposed? Further research 
briefs should take account of the research question ‘why do bureaucrats belong to 
particular typologies’? Such a study would need to be much larger in scale than this 
project.  
 
6.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides an insight into how governance structures are exploited and 
employed by the elite level bureaucrat. While numerous inferences have been made 
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from the research in the previous section it is important not to lose sight of the primary 
findings. Firstly, the bureaucrat may develop a secondary learned attachment to his/her 
profession, be this as a purveyor of social justice, a guardian of the laws or as an 
advocate of certain policies. These socially constructed attachments supersede primary 
attachments in both cities. By how much, and when, these primary attachments are 
superseded by secondary attachments differs in each city. Secondly, the bureaucrat in 
each city possesses a different relationship with the policy-making process. This is found 
to have more to do with the distance of the bureaucratic elite from the policy-making 
process than the governance or conflict management mechanisms employed.  
It is not sufficient to examine bureaucratic structures but we must understand 
how these structures are exploited. Measuring norms and values of bureaucrats to 
predict bureaucrat behaviour has been acknowledged as a necessity by both qualitative 
and quantitative researchers. The innovative mixed methods approach adopted in this 
chapter departs from existing research, providing an insight into how bureaucrats 
behave within two types of power-sharing society. There is no need for bureaucrats to 
develop ‘national’ identities in order for them to possess shared beliefs or attachments. 
Indeed the study has highlighted the vastly different nationalities held by our 
respondents. Common governance and representation beliefs and perceptions can 
supersede, not replace, a primary attachment within the contested society.  
Chapters three and four investigated the influence of the bureaucracy on conflict 
management and policy making in each of our cities. The focus of this chapter has been 
to identify the differing role perceptions of bureaucrats in both Belfast and Brussels, 
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adding to our understanding of how the bureaucrat perceives his or her role within the 
power-sharing society. The chapter has also developed a theoretical framework as well 
as applying an innovative methodology for investigating this research question. While 
the ability of the bureaucrat in Brussels to influence policy is less than that of the Belfast 
bureaucrat, the Brussels bureaucrat does possess a significant conflict management 
role. Further, contrary to expectations, bureaucrats in Belfast are less likely to represent 
their primary identities than those in Brussels. The dynamic nature of the political-
administrative relationship within the power-sharing society has been highlighted. 
While much is assumed about the role of the bureaucracy within the conflict society, 
this chapter has given an insight into actual role perceptions within the power-sharing 
society: what happens after the political agreement so to speak. Bureaucrats within the 
power-sharing city are indeed a divergent cohort, yet preconceived images of the 
bureaucrat are challenged by this research. The findings suggest the emergence of three 
general types of bureaucrat-politician relationship across our two most different cases – 
one that is politically responsive, a second that represents the rules of the organisation, 
and a third group that seeks to advance their own social and economic visions of 
society. 
This study is set within two successful power-sharing regimes. Doing so advances 
our understanding of how societies of different ethno-national/ethno-linguistic groups 
can coexist. The importance of the bureaucracy in maintaining power-sharing regimes is 
underlined. In each of our five typologies we have seen how different collectives of 
bureaucrats respond to their political elite, to the leaders of their own perceived ethno-
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national/ethno-linguistic communities, to social and professional values and to other 
questions of governance such as equity and efficiency or the provision of services. The 
bureaucracy influences conflict management. While the bureaucracy does possess some 
common core governance beliefs, bureaucrats possess different role perceptions and 
therefore each bureaucrat cannot be expected to respond to a given set of 
circumstances in the same manner. In developing and understanding bureaucrat 
typologies we gain a greater insight into bureaucrat behaviour which in turn can assist in 
developing our understanding of how conflict is managed. 
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7 
Conclusion: The bureaucracy, the bureaucrat and conflict 
management 
7.1 Introduction 
Does the bureaucrat have a role in sustaining power-sharing arrangements; and if the 
bureaucrat has a role, what guides or motivates the bureaucrat in instances of 
discretion? These questions are fundamental if we are to understand how conflict is 
regulated. Having explored in depth bureaucrat’s role and governance perceptions, and 
contextualised these preferences within the two distinct cases of consociational power-
sharing, this chapter draws together some of the important findings from the research. 
Recall the purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the role of the bureaucratic 
elite in assisting to sustain conflict management in instances where differing ethnic 
groups manage to actually coexist. The findings therefore contribute to our 
understanding of how societies considering consociation as a form of power-sharing 
could function. Drawing together two areas of scholarly research within political science 
and public administration – political control literature and bureaucratic values literature 
– a more comprehensive picture of the bureaucracy within the power-sharing society 
has been created. This public administration/political science lens has highlighted the 
importance of developing administrative capacity to the conflict management process. 
This lens has been used to view two different conflict management strategies. In 
response to the two primary research questions, it is found that the bureaucrat 
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influences the success of power-sharing and that the bureaucrat can possess significant 
levels of discretion within the policy making process. Further, how a bureaucrat employs 
this discretion is not necessarily determined by his or her primary ethno-political 
background. In arriving at this conclusion six substantive findings important for conflict 
management research emerge from the study. In addition to these conflict 
management findings, it is also proposed that the findings and methodologies employed 
throughout this research should provide indicative for hypothesis generation and 
research design within two further bodies of literature: comparative European public 
administration and urban governance research. Before expounding upon these findings 
let us first contextualise the present study within the wider conflict management 
research referred to throughout the dissertation. 
 
7.2 Overview of the findings 
Divided cities are indeed unique entities. Not only are these contested societies distinct 
from more cohesive societies, but contested societies also differ from each other. The 
physical separation of Nicosia differs from the more psychological divide in Mostar. The 
national/linguistic contestation in Kirkuk differs from the largely sectarian contestation 
in Beirut. Contested societies also differ in that many are at different stages of conflict; 
Scott Bollens (2008) describes Jerusalem and Kirkuk as being combustible, Belfast and 
Sarajevo as fragile, while Brussels and Johannesburg are described as sustainable. These 
categorisations, together with a similar continuum he presents earlier in 200784, (see 
                                                 
84 See Bollens (2007) which describes Belfast as ‘moving towards peace’. 
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Fig. 1.4) provide a valuable starting point for exploring the more macro questions of 
divided cities and societies – why are some cities in the combustible category and others 
not? This dissertation has investigated how cities can manage to stay within the 
sustainable category, or as Varshney (2002) terms it – learning from ethnic peace. A 
brief examination of the cities in the more successful categories indicates that no two 
conflict management solutions are completely identical. In addition, the system of 
conflict management adopted in each society does not determine how successful 
conflict management will be. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on how the conflict 
management mechanisms are actually employed. Further research into the design of 
governance structures is indeed required, however it is equally as important to 
determine how bureaucrats within each city will respond to a set of given structures. 
The results presented above demonstrate that even in instances where the governance 
structures are similar, their effects on bureaucrat behaviour, and subsequently on 
conflict management, are different. Closer attention to how these conflict management 
mechanisms are actually employed is required. Evidence of this is provided in chapter 
four. A city’s categorisation as successful does not mean its governance structures are 
conducive to conflict management. While indeed Brussels may be (accurately) described 
by Bollens (2008) as sustainable, it is in spite of how the conflict management 
mechanism has been implemented, not because of it.  
At the outset of the dissertation it was submitted that conflict management 
mechanisms range from the domination mechanism, as was the case in Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, to various forms of power-sharing which may further be broken down 
274 
 
into various forms of consociationalism, as in the two cases presented here. No matter 
what political design consociationalism takes, political level decisions need to be 
implemented. This is the traditional role of the public bureaucracy. Research within the 
uncontested society leads us to believe that the bureaucratic elite are not simply 
‘implementers’, but are actively involved in the policy process – what is the case within 
the consociational society? While the bureaucrat may not have a significant role under 
domination or authoritarian mechanisms of conflict management, this research has 
demonstrated that the bureaucrat has an important role in sustaining power-sharing 
mechanisms of conflict management. While the extent of this influence is in part 
determined by how the conflict management mechanism is implemented, evidence 
from the two cases suggests that a robust bureaucracy is a necessity if power-sharing 
systems are to be sustained. If cities such as Kirkuk and Mostar are to choose the 
consociation mechanism of conflict management, they will need to get the design of the 
public administration right. While they may choose alternate forms of power-sharing 
with alternate governance structures, the findings demonstrate that in both Belfast and 
Brussels the bureaucrat has played an important role in managing the conflict. The 
principles of good governance remain more or less steadfast across contested societies, 
however the research has identified that bureaucrats possess differing role perceptions 
and in turn interpret these principles differently. Every one of the bureaucrats 
interviewed as part of this project demonstrated a passion for public service. How they 
translated this passion differed within each administration and within each city. While 
no concrete conclusions have been put forward as to why certain bureaucrats share 
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governance and representation perceptions, it is evident that primary identities do not 
determine typology alignment. Further, while bureaucrats working within an 
administration often share numerous role and representation perceptions, these 
similarities are not sufficient to support the hypothesis that institutional structures 
determine behaviour. 
In summary, if we are to understand why some societies manage to peacefully 
coexist and others do not, we need to work on establishing causation – what causes 
power-sharing arrangements to succeed? Indeed politicians, the judiciary and law 
enforcement agencies all contribute to the sustaining of power-sharing arrangements. 
The results of this research demonstrate that those involved in designing solutions 
within the contested society, need also however to attribute greater importance to 
developing administrative capacity, paying closer attention to the bureaucrat rather 
than simply focusing on bureaucracy structures. Developing administrative capacity is 
not simply a condition for good governance once political power-sharing has been 
established – it is also a key tenet of the conflict management process. Both the 
academic and practitioner alike can learn a lot from the governance experiences of 
Brussels and Belfast. Put differently, the argument that emerges from this research is 
that the bureaucracy in the power-sharing society influences not only the quality of 
governance but also the conflict management process. Elite level bureaucrats within the 
power-sharing society are found to possess (various levels of) discretion. The research 
has also investigated how this discretion is exercised. It is found that bureaucrats 
develop secondary, learned attachments and in some cases these are actively 
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represented. What is actively represented differs among bureaucrats. Primary 
background does not influence typology alignment. Further there is no concrete 
evidence to confirm a correlation between the level of involvement of the bureaucrat 
within the policy process and the institution or the conflict management mechanism. As 
outlined in chapter six, bureaucrats in Belfast are more involved in the policy process, 
this however is not determined by the conflict management mechanism but by how the 
mechanism has been employed. The conflict management mechanism may however 
explain the bureaucrat’s representation perspectives. 
The research has responded to calls in the literature to seek to explain conflict 
management through the study of ethnic peace rather than perpetually studying ethnic 
conflict. Chapter two provided a comprehensive review of the state of the art of 
academic research into the role of the elite level bureaucrat within the contested 
society. A number of research questions emerged from this literature review. Chapters 
three and four drew on these emerging research questions, outlining the environment 
in which the bureaucrat acted within two instances of ethnic peace. Chapter five insured 
that the conditions for disproving the hypothesis were met in each city – ie. that the 
traditional out group comprised a sufficient proportion of the bureaucracy in order to 
potentially actively represent their primary identities. To investigate this, the chapter 
addressed an often debated issue in conflict management research – the physical 
appearance of the bureaucracy within the power-sharing society – passive 
representation. The chapter found that a passively representative bureaucracy could be 
achieved within a contested society without the need for community quotas. However it 
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was also argued in the literature review that passive representation itself was not a 
necessary condition for active representation. Do bureaucrats really represent their 
primary identities, or have they through time, education, social and work experiences 
developed greater secondary attachments? Chapter six therefore investigated the 
second of the primary research questions – how is bureaucratic discretion employed 
within the contested society? What attachments or identities are actively represented 
by elite level bureaucrats? The motivations and role perceptions of bureaucrats in both 
cases found it possible that bureaucrats would adopt, and in some cases actively 
represent, a secondary learned attachment. 
Key finding one: The bureaucracy is understudied in conflict management literature. 
Representative bureaucracy is a useful approach in understanding how bureaucracies 
work. While the importance of the bureaucracy in enhancing the quality of governance 
is well researched within the literature, the contribution of bureaucratic structures and 
the role of bureaucrats themselves in sustaining the conflict management process 
remain understudied. Attention within the conflict management literature is often 
focused on the effects of poor governance, leaving the role of the bureaucracy in 
sustaining conflict management less understood. While many academics have suggested 
increasing the role of government agencies in conflict management, little is known 
about how the bureaucracy would behave under such circumstances. It is the 
bureaucracy that either provides or facilitates public service provision within the 
modern state. How the bureaucracy functions under consociation conditions is of great 
importance if we are to understand how the process actually succeeds. Approaching 
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conflict management from a public administration perspective advances this 
understanding. It is not only important to understand what governance structures are 
theoretically most conducive to conflict management; an understanding of how these 
structures will be manipulated by the bureaucrat will provide for a more accurate 
prediction of bureaucrat behaviour. 
Representative bureaucracy is a useful lens through which to examine how the 
bureaucratic elite will employ/exploit governance structures. While there have been 
numerous approaches to developing an understanding of administrative reform within 
both contested and uncontested societies, the theory of representative bureaucracy 
provides the most useful lens through which to predict bureaucrat behaviour. As 
identity guides behaviour, bureaucrat role perceptions determine how governance 
structures actually function. Recall it is not the structures themselves that determine 
how conflict is managed, but how these structures are employed. Since being pioneered 
by Kingsley in 1944, the theory of representative bureaucracy has developed 
considerably. Studies of public administration within the contested society must not 
only examine passive representation, but also must determine who bureaucrats actively 
represent. Passive representation does not always equate with active representation. A 
bureaucrat may develop secondary socially constructed norms, which in turn may 
supersede a primary identity. Only when we understand bureaucratic behaviour and 
motivations will we gain an understanding of governance within the power-sharing 
society.  
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The methodology designed to investigate core beliefs and individual motivations 
is therefore central to this type of research question. Standard questionnaires, while 
informative in ascertaining information, are less robust in determining motivations and 
values. For this reason, a method was introduced to conflict management and 
comparative public administration research from psychology. The dissertation has 
argued that Q methodology is more successful in determining and describing norms and 
values than more traditional methodologies such as Likert scales or the semantic 
differential method. Recall that Q allows for the generation of various typologies of 
bureaucrat-politician interaction that actually exist. Typologies are more useful in 
understanding the workings of an organisation as they do not suggest one model of 
interaction but allow for a number of interaction models to simultaneously exist within 
an organisation. These in turn are more reflective of real world relationships. The 
argument in favour of Q methodology is also targeted at comparative public 
administration and European integration research where much of the research relies on 
norms and values to determine bureaucrat allegiances to say the Council, Commission, a 
policy area or a nation-state. Q methodology could be used in such circumstances to 
investigate the motivations of bureaucrats. To summarise, the role of the bureaucrat in 
the conflict management process is under researched. The theory of representative 
bureaucracy and Q methodology both provide appropriate conceptual and 
methodological approaches for furthering academic research into the contribution of 
the bureaucrat to the governance process and subsequently to conflict management. 
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Key finding two: The bureaucracy and the bureaucrat influence the policy-making 
and conflict management processes. This extent of this influence differs in each city but 
is not explained by the conflict management mechanism. The bureaucrat is found to 
influence resource allocation, decision-making and conflict management – however 
indicative findings suggest the extent to which the bureaucrat is involved in the policy 
making process is not explained by type of conflict management mechanism (Belfast: 
comprehensive and Brussels: LCD) or institution variables (Belfast, VGC, COCOF, CCC, 
BCR). Let us firstly take the type of conflict management mechanism as the explanatory 
variable. In Belfast, the bureaucracy is found to influence the decision-making process, 
particularly in traditionally divisive policy areas. Contextualising both Belfast typologies 
within the research of chapter three we see that the bureaucrat in Belfast has a 
significant mediating role. The bureaucrat is also involved in proposing policies, 
suggesting reforms and questioning policies that run counter to the general public 
interest. The bureaucrat in Belfast is actively involved in policy-making and plays an 
active role in the management of conflict. Bureaucrats, relying on the law and 
operational norms, influence the policy process. To claim that bureaucrats behave 
completely independent of the political elite however would be erroneous. They do not 
act with complete independence of the political level. While the bureaucrat controls the 
process, the bureaucrat operates within a power-sharing political agreement and 
behaves accordingly. The bureaucrat under domination mechanisms of conflict 
management acted as a preserver of the status quo, the bureaucrat under power-
sharing too remains a preserver of the status quo. Preserving power-sharing in Belfast 
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however requires much greater bureaucratic activity than preserving 
domination/hegemonic mechanisms of conflict management. Conflict management is 
therefore a function of the Belfast bureaucracy. This involves mediating political level 
interests. The bureaucrat controls the policy-making/decision-making process, but does 
so within the existing political realities. A symbiotic relationship therefore exists 
between the political and bureaucratic level in Belfast. Once the political level agreed 
that they wished to work together, the role of the bureaucratic elite in Belfast increased 
in order to facilitate the political level cooperation. While both Belfast typologies differ 
in their motivations, they are both found to significantly influence both the policy-
making and conflict management process. 
In chapter six, three typologies emerged in Brussels. Contextualising these 
typologies within the findings of chapter four we find that the bureaucrat in Brussels is 
not as involved in the policy-making process as the Belfast bureaucrat. This however is 
not a direct result of the conflict management mechanism but due to bureaucrat’s 
distance from the policy-making process. Typically, bureaucrats in Brussels would meet 
with their Minister binaurally or quarterly. The role of supporting the Minister is not 
filled by the bureaucracy but with politically appointed cabinets. Bureaucrats in Brussels 
possess a more ‘functionaire’ identity and view their roles accordingly. Conflict 
management is generally not a function of Brussels bureaucrats. The bureaucrat 
however has an implicit role in the management of conflict. In general the bureaucrat in 
Brussels attributes a lot of importance to the law in their daily work. While the trait is 
strongest in factor three, it is not absent in other factors. The bureaucrat prevents the 
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political level from allocating resources outside the legal framework. While this function 
may be taken as given within the uncontested society, within the contested society, the 
absence of such role perceptions would have greater ramifications. Without such role 
perceptions resources could be allocated according to the political level over 
representing their electorate, which within the contested society usually means along 
ethno-political lines. This in turn can have a negative effect on conflict management. 
Hence a bureaucracy that is strong enough to stand up to the political level exists in 
Brussels, which in turn ensures that resources are allocated according to legislative 
criteria. As summarised by one Brussels interviewee: Politicians have the power to 
change the law – if they want to allocate resources in a way that is currently illegal – 
they should change the law! (Interview 33) While bureaucrats in Brussels differ from 
those in Belfast in terms of the nature and level of involvement in the policy-making and 
conflict management process, neither the city nor the type of conflict management 
mechanism are the sole causes of this difference in role perceptions. Contextualising the 
findings of chapter six (the typologies) within chapters three and four, this difference is 
explained by how the conflict management mechanism has been implemented and the 
corresponding distance between the bureaucrat and the politician.  
Turning now to the institutional explanation for typology formulation, indicative 
findings suggest that bureaucrats belonging to the same institution possess some similar 
representation and core governance perceptions, but this is not necessarily to mean an 
attachment to the institution. As also found in chapter six, both Belfast typologies 
shared a large number of characteristics (measured by table 6.2, quantifying the 
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differences between both factors). Despite the large degree of shared perceptions 
among Belfast respondents, bureaucrats in Belfast differed in their motivations. In 
Brussels, most bureaucrats belonging to factor four belonged to the VGC, while the 
bureaucrats in the other factors belonged to the three remaining institutions. However, 
bureaucrats within the VGC also shared a number of role and governance perceptions 
with factor one in Belfast. While further conflict management research should consider 
the influence of the institution on bureaucrat norms and values, this research does not 
find adequate support for the institution determines typology alignment hypothesis. In 
summary, it is found that the bureaucrat in each of the cases actively contributes to the 
sustaining of the conflict management process. However the role and behaviour of the 
bureaucrat within each city and in each institution differs considerably.  
Key finding three: Active representation on behalf of a ‘professional attachment’ 
or ‘professional mentality’ can supersede primary attachments within the bureaucracy of 
a contested city. The research finds that a number of bureaucrats in both cities are 
motivated by secondary, socially constructed norms and values. This is termed a 
professional attachment or mentality. Recall from chapter six that a professional 
attachment is not to mean that a bureaucrat is professional in his/her job but rather 
that he/she is attached to a professional set of values such as free trade, tax 
harmonisation, green policies or particular social policies. While primary attachments 
are stronger in Brussels than in Belfast, these primary attachments are nonetheless 
superseded by professional norms and values in both cases. Thus within the power-
sharing society active representation does indeed exist, however this is not necessarily 
284 
 
on behalf of a primary ethno-national/ethno-linguistic identity but, among certain 
bureaucrats, on behalf of a learned professional identity. Further, active representation 
is not exclusively a minority activity – it is as likely to exist among the majority 
population within the contested society. 
While it has been suggested in the literature that a common ‘national’ identity 
could supersede these tribal affiliations, this dissertation has argued that in an 
environment where demand is high and resources are limited, instances where both the 
national and the ethnic/tribal identity could collide would be frequent. Following Meier 
and O’Toole (2006) and Keiser et al (2002), under such circumstances, the bureaucrat 
would then be expected to revert to his/her primary tribal identity. The results from this 
research found bureaucrats within each city not to share a nationality (see Fig.1.1). The 
research has demonstrated that a secondary learned professional attachment can 
supersede a primary identity and it is put forward that attachments along professional 
lines should be more sustainable than those built along the dubious notion of 
nationality. The opportunity for an attachment to a professional set of principles to 
directly conflict with ones primary identity is less likely. While a mutual existence of a 
national and tribal identity would be difficult, attachment to regulatory reform 
principles or to improving social cohesion or to poverty alleviation should not directly 
conflict with a primary (ethno-linguistic/national) attachment. Capacity building should 
therefore not require nation building or a national identity among bureaucrats in order 
for shared values to emerge.  
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While a collective attachment has emerged, this is not to suggest the emergence 
of epistemic communities (communities of experts). While bureaucrats in factors one 
and four are ‘experts’ in their policy areas and are motivated accordingly, there is no 
evidence to suggest this expertise causes them to share an identity. These attachments 
need not necessarily be the same – ie. a bureaucrat who sees his primary function to 
advance green issues and a bureaucrat who sees his primary function to advance the 
quality of social integration are both motivated by secondary professional ideas; both 
therefore weigh on the same typology (recall F1 Belfast and F4 Brussels were the two 
typologies most likely to actively represent professional attachments from outside the 
civil service). For this reason, the research does not demonstrate the emergence of 
communities of experts.  
This professional attachment is strongest in factors one and four. Bureaucrats 
weighing on factor three also actively represent but they are found to actively represent 
the bureaucracy (institution) itself. Factor five are the most acquiescent to the wishes of 
the political level of all our factors. However, factor four and three in Brussels possess a 
latent attachment to their primary identities. This may in part be explained by the 
conflict management mechanism. While factor three do disagree with representing 
their primary identities, they do not do so as much as their Belfast counterparts. This 
suggests that in instances of ethno-linguistic importance bureaucrats in typologies F3 
and F4 could potentially revert to representing their primary ethno-linguistic identities. 
While these attachments are indeed superseded by professional attachments, a 
significant number of Brussels bureaucrats maintain a primary attachment within the 
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workplace. The conflict management mechanism may explain the maintenance of this 
primary identity: In Brussels two of the four institutions are designed specifically to 
provide service through one language only. Recruitment within the remaining two 
institutions is by ethno-linguistic quota. These features may influence bureaucrat 
representation perceptions. The Brussels conflict management mechanism may be 
found to encourage the maintenance of a primary identity at a subliminal level. 
In summary, I find that secondary learned attachments, not necessarily to the 
institution but to other social and professional objectives, to supersede a primary ethno-
political attachment among a number of bureaucrat elite in both cities. This is strongest 
in factors one and four, but not absent on other factors. Bureaucrats in Belfast however 
are more likely to reject the idea of representing their personal communities than their 
Brussels counterparts. This finding therefore rejects the hypothesis that the external 
environment causes increased representation on behalf of a primary identity and tends 
to accept the hypothesis that the model of power-sharing in Brussels, while successful, 
serves to maintain latent primary identities. 
Key finding four: Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator is a viable 
alternative for societies considering total separation or comprehensive power-sharing as 
forms of conflict management. While the traditional comprehensive mechanism of 
power-sharing may be more familiar, an alternative mechanism of consociationalism 
has nonetheless been successful in Brussels. The lowest common denominator 
mechanism provides a viable alternative to the more common comprehensive 
mechanism of conflict management. While there is much to be learned from the 
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Brussels experience, chapter four demonstrates that power-sharing at the LCD is not 
just theoretically plausible, but practically possible. The problem identified in Brussels is 
not with the mechanism of power-sharing, but with how the mechanism has been 
implemented. Greater consideration to how various conflict management mechanisms 
are to be implemented is required, especially if highly regulated mechanisms such as the 
LCD are to be employed. Mechanisms to ensure joined-up governance, even within such 
conflict management solutions, must be established. If conflict management processes 
are to be successful they rely on the quality of governance decisions. Quality decision-
making is not possible if bureaucrats do not make decisions within the context of the 
contested society. Greater cooperation among the Brussels bureaucratic elite is 
therefore required if the conflict management mechanism is to be successful as a long 
term governance solution.  
Key finding five: Quotas are not necessary for a passively representative 
bureaucracy. In addition, passive representation does not cause active representation. If 
bureaucratic elites are seen to be either motivated by social equity or administrative 
efficiency concerns, or are politically responsive, does this make the question of passive 
representation redundant? The findings support no such assertion. To once again 
paraphrase Reissman (1949), it is the surrounding social milieu and the social 
constellations to which we belong, that affect individual norms, beliefs and values. 
(Recall we cannot determine what social constellations have most influence in 
determining typology alignment). The surrounding social milieu of the bureaucrat in 
Belfast and both the CCC and BCR in Brussels is multi-religious/multi-lingual/multi-
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‘national’. While an ethno-political’s group may, under certain circumstances, be 
represented by members of that group in Brussels, this cannot be said of Belfast. 
Bureaucrats in Brussels (most specifically factor four) therefore lends support to Meier 
and O’Toole’s (2006) research where it is found that ethnics within the bureaucracy are 
more likely to represent their co-ethnics in society in instances of ethno-political 
importance. However as later found by Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) an increase 
in the number of female police officers also corresponds with instances of reported rape 
by women. They were not able to establish whether this was because women were 
directly advancing the concerns of women; or if through socialisation with their female 
counterparts, male norms, values and attitudes had changed which meant that men also 
took forward such cases. At the same time, Lim (2006) found that the representation of 
minorities and women increased with passive representation as minorities and women 
changed the norms and values of their white male counterparts, and hence the entire 
organisation. In the case of Belfast (most specifically factor one), Lim’s (2006) findings 
are supported by this research: I find that it is not Catholics who represent the interests 
of Catholics; nor do Protestants represent the interests of Protestants, but that 
attitudes, norms and values are shared. The findings therefore indicate that passive 
representation can increase representativeness of the traditional minority, not through 
direct representation but through the emergence of shared values among the 
bureaucratic elite. However the results presented above demonstrate that there is no 
causal relationship between passive and active representation. Passive representation 
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will not lead to active representation on behalf of a primary identity, or for that matter a 
professional or organisational identity/attachment.  
Taking this finding further, Grissom et al (2009) found that context matters: Blacks in 
Southern (American) states were more likely to actively represent their counterparts in 
society than Blacks working in Northern (American) states. If this were to be true in our 
cases we would expect representation of a primary identity in Belfast to be greater than 
that of Brussels, due to the more hostile environment in which the bureaucracy is set.85 
However the antithesis is the case. Hence within our two cases of consociationalism, the 
external environment has not encouraged increased active representation on behalf of 
a primary identity. In both cases, for a group’s interests to be represented, (be this 
directly by ones co-ethnics or indirectly by the development of shared norms) that 
group needs to be represented at the elite level. It must therefore comprise at least part 
of the surrounding social milieu in order to influence it.  
Despite the necessity for passive representation, chapter five found that within a 
heavily contested society, a passively representative bureaucracy can emerge without 
the necessity for quotas. Policy makers and advisers would therefore do better to treat 
the reason as to why the bureaucracy was patently unrepresentative vis-à-vis treating 
the symptom. Quotas are not necessary in order to achieve a passively representative 
bureaucracy. The merit principle need not be sacrificed in the name of achieving 
significant representation of the out-group. However it must be reiterated that passive 
representation is not a sufficient aspiration in all circumstances. In cases such as 
                                                 
85 As supported by Bollens in his description of Belfast as ‘fragile’ (2008) and ‘moving towards peace’ 
(2007) vs. Brussels as ‘sustainable’ (2008) 
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Brussels, the traditional out-group (Dutch-speakers) requires disproportionate 
representation. In such circumstances, quotas may indeed be required. While chapter 
five finds no evidence against quota systems of recruitment, it does find that quotas are 
not a necessity in order to attain passive representation, should this be a sufficient 
objective.  
Key finding six: Bureaucrats differ in their interactions with the same structures and 
the primary background of the bureaucrat does not determine typology alignment. The 
study has found bureaucrats to interpret their roles differently and that they have 
differing perspectives on governance and representation. Thus any aspects of the 
Belfast or Brussels institutional/structural design that are to be transposed to other 
societies, will be in turn employed/exploited according the norms and values of the 
bureaucrat within the host state/society (as is well documented in policy 
transfer/learning literature). Further, within this host society, bureaucrats will differ in 
their role perceptions and how they operate within the governance structures. While it 
is necessary to understand the structures that assist differing ethno-political groups to 
peacefully coexist, this research has demonstrated that bureaucrats possessing similar 
primary identities interact with governance structures and interpret their roles 
differently. This difference in role perception has no correlation with the primary 
background of the bureaucrat.  
 Theoretical and empirical contributions: summary of the findings: This 
dissertation contributes to four bodies of literature. While the majority of the findings 
speak to conflict management and public administration research, the findings also have 
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implications for European governance and urban governance research. In terms of 
conflict management literature, the role of the bureaucrat in maintaining the power-
sharing process is substantial. Evidence from Belfast indicates that the bureaucrat 
emerges as a primary regulator in the conflict management process of the city. The 
bureaucrat is also involved in conflict management in Brussels, but the role is less 
prominent. While the bureaucracy did not instigate the change in governance 
mechanism, the administration contributes significantly to sustaining the power-sharing 
process. The role of the bureaucrat has hitherto been underestimated in conflict 
management research. It is found that within emerging power-sharing societies, there is 
no need to sacrifice the merit principle in order to attain a passively representative 
bureaucracy. While scholars may still disagree on the necessity of passive 
representation within the contested society, if it is deemed a necessity, this dissertation 
has demonstrated that it need not be at the expense of the merit principle. 
Nonetheless, in some societies such as Brussels, passive representation is not sufficient 
for the traditional out-group. In these cases quotas may still be required to guarantee a 
disproportionate representation of the traditional minority. Finally, chapter four 
demonstrated that power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. While 
there are many public administration problems within the Brussels system of conflict 
management, these problems are with the implementation of the power-sharing 
system. The problems identified in this analysis do not relate to the system itself. 
Societies considering total separation or federalisation may still consider the Brussels 
example as an alternate solution (in terms of administrative design).  
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Secondly, the dissertation contributes to public administration literature. As 
demonstrated in Chapter three (Belfast) and supported by Chapter four (Brussels) the 
bureaucracy will always support the status quo. The bureaucracy is not the instigator of 
change. This occurs at the political level. However, for the bureaucrat to support the 
status quo within power-sharing societies, the bureaucrat becomes more involved in the 
policy and political process. Further, the dissertation contributes to the body of 
‘representative bureaucracy research’ within public administration literature. While 
active representation on behalf of a primary ethno-national (or racial or gender) identity 
is acknowledged to exist in representative bureaucracy research, active representation 
on behalf of a secondary learned identity is less so. While certain studies have examined 
the emergence of a management ideology and shared values among bureaucrats, 
testing these questions within a contested society provides a robust case study. Within a 
contested society, primary attachments are presumed to be at their strongest. 
Hypotheses on bureaucrat attachments are therefore most robust and clear enough to 
be proven wrong within these contexts (Sabatier, 2000: 138). Within the two case 
studies bureaucrats primary attachments were superseded by secondary attachments. 
While Brussels respondents were more inclined to maintain primary identities, these 
identities were superseded, not replaced, by professional attachments. However in line 
with Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) and Keiser et al’s (2002) criteria for measuring a 
bureaucrats representation activities, the case must involve the contested issue – ie in 
Brussels it is the actions of the bureaucrat within issues pertaining to policies 
incorporating a linguistic dimension. In the case of Brussels, bureaucrats show a greater 
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propensity for representing their primary identities in these situations. Contrary to 
hypothesised expectations, in Belfast bureaucrats clearly disassociated themselves with 
the idea of representing their primary identities and have developed secondary 
professional attachments. It would be expected that in Belfast, in such circumstances 
the bureaucrat would not represent his or her primary identity.  
Contributing to European governance literature, I suggest that Q Methodology is a 
useful tool in comparative public administration, especially for the large body of 
research focused on determining the core values of European Commission and Council 
officials as a mechanism of predicting behaviour and determining policy-making 
processes. While the development of a technocratic mentality (Radaelli and O’Connor, 
2009) has already been researched within European integration and comparative public 
administration research, the use of Q-methodology has not yet been employed in 
investigating such research questions. Further research questions designed by Checkel 
(2003) and Hooghe (2005) are designed specifically to determine bureaucrat role 
perceptions. Q methodology can assist in this process. The methodology is well suited to 
measuring bureaucrat perceptions on given subjects and is adept at clustering like 
minded respondents together. Gornitzka and Sverdrup’s (2008) and Beyers’ (2005) 
research investigates where bureaucrats get their cues: from the national or European 
level. Q methodology would be particularly adept in answering such questions. 
The findings may also be of interest to urban governance researchers. Belfast and 
Brussels, while contested, are growing urban societies. Belfast and Brussels face the 
same problems of urbicide, urban sprawl, unemployment and infrastructure capacity as 
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non-contested cities. This public administration lens used to view the workings of two 
urban administrations identifies the balance between the politician and the bureaucrat 
within these two cases. The findings also provide a foundation for hypothesis generation 
in other urban administrations such as those in Bristol, Paris or London. How are 
decisions made within these administrations, do bureaucrats in hung Councils such as 
Bristol possess similar influences into the policy-making processes as those within 
contested societies, or how much influence do bureaucrats possess within mayoral 
systems of governance such as is the case in London and Paris. This research may 
therefore prove helpful in the research design process and may also prove indicative in 
hypothesis formulation within broader urban governance research. 
 
7.3 Conflict in cities and the contested state 
The project to which this dissertation contributes, Conflict in Cities and the Contested 
State, seeks to understand how contested urban environments can absorb, resist and 
potentially play a role in transforming the territorial conflicts in which they are situated. 
Further the project seeks to advance an understanding as to how heavily contested 
societies may become viable cities for all inhabitants and how structures and institutions 
may bolster cities to withstand state struggles. It is to this aim that this dissertation 
seeks to contribute – I explore how institutions actually work in practice within the 
contested urban society. The dissertation has taken one of the core project cities, 
Belfast and introduced a new city to the project, Brussels. The aims of the dissertation 
are very clearly defined in that I do not seek to analyse Brussels or Belfast, nor do I 
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target the research at academics and practitioners in these cities. My aim has been to 
advance a more common understanding of how conflicts can be managed in the longer 
term and determine the role of the bureaucrat in this process. Thus my project, while 
drawing on Belfast and Brussels, does not seek to directly contribute to the conflict 
management processes of these cities. Rather, my intention has been to look at the 
concept of public administration and through the theoretical lens of public 
administration take a fresh approach at the problem of conflict management. I 
therefore am less concerned with the city-state relationship or with the role of national 
and international institutions and their interactions with the city. While much is known 
about what policies to implement in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, 
little is known about how these policies may be implemented. It is this research deficit 
that this dissertation is aimed. Each of my chosen cities has adopted a different conflict 
management strategy and each city provides for learning from ethnic peace as opposed 
to perpetually focusing on instances of ethnic conflict. This dissertation argues and 
evidences that the bureaucracy is an integral player in sustaining conflict management. I 
have consciously limited my focus to just one of the institutions involved in the 
governance process of the city: the bureaucracy. Further, I have concentrated on the 
role of the bureaucracy in the conflict management process from the perspective of the 
elite level bureaucrat. This has allowed me to document the role perceptions and 
motivations of bureaucrats within two recently formed cases of power-sharing. If other 
heavily contested societies are to successfully manage ethno-political differences, 
sufficient consideration to the design and operation of the public bureaucracy is a 
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precondition. Further, it is reiterated that developing bureaucratic structures alone is 
not sufficient; careful consideration to how these structures are employed/exploited by 
the bureaucrat is also a necessity. There is no transferrable handbook for successful 
power-sharing; however a stable, effective and representative bureaucracy is a 
necessary condition if conflict is to be managed in the longer term. The Conflict in Cities 
project has contributed to a variety of aspects of conflict management and has 
approached conflict management through a variety of lenses ranging from architecture 
and archaeology to sociology, geography, and political science.  In this dissertation I 
focus not on explaining the problems of the violently contested society, nor do I focus 
on what policies would improve the successful management of conflict. Instead I have 
concerned myself with the policy process of the successfully managed contested society 
and the role of the bureaucrat within it. 
 
7.4 Limitations and opportunities for further research 
This research has been conducted with a significant sample of bureaucratic elites in both 
cities. It must however be reemphasised that responses from the Brussels Capital 
Region administration are not as comprehensive as in the other four administrations. 
The findings emphasise the important contribution of the public administration not only 
to good governance but to conflict management under consociation regimes. The public 
administration within the contested society receives very little scholarly attention. 
Further research is required to understand how administrative capacity can be 
developed within other contested societies. While the subject of conflict management 
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receives much scholarly attention, the conceptual findings from this research should 
assist in developing research questions within other contested societies. While there has 
been much investigation into political level cooperation between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots in Nicosia, how would the public administration look in a shared unified city? If, 
as advocated by the EU and UN, Nicosia is reunified and the political levels agree to 
cooperate, how will the supporting public administration function? In the two separate 
administrations that currently govern the city what guides and motivates bureaucrats to 
behave in the way they do? Such an understanding would provide the basis for planning 
a unified public administration should a political level agreement emerge.  
In cities recently emerging from civil war such as Mostar and Beirut, how should 
supporting governance institutions be designed? What individuals or ethno-political 
cleavages do bureaucrats in these cities represent? What are their core governance 
beliefs, and are these shared by bureaucrats across the traditional divide? This research 
has demonstrated that bureaucrats within both cases possess varying levels of 
discretion, what is the case within other emerging power-sharing societies? In cities still 
experiencing violent confrontations such as Kirkuk, how can a stable public 
administration be designed and then implemented? What administrative structures 
would be best suited to its long term needs? While these questions are often surpassed 
by interest in determining political level arrangements, this research has demonstrated 
the importance of the public administration to sustaining conflict management 
mechanisms. While it is indeed necessary to establish political and judicial level 
298 
 
agreements, the evidence from this research demonstrates that the public 
administration within the contested city needs also to be considered.  
It is hoped that the lessons from these two developed, successfully managed, 
contested societies may be able to provide some answers for other emerging power-
sharing societies. Caution however must always be exercised in cases of policy learning. 
While the principles of good governance remain constant across societies and the 
various possible types of governance institution remain limited, contested societies are 
unique entities. The dissertation has found that it is not the conflict management 
mechanism that determines the success of power-sharing but how the ‘solution’ is 
implemented. Closer attention to implementation processes is required as opposed to 
concentrating solely on the types of conflict management solution. The study has, for 
the first time, given a picture of how the administration within a power-sharing society 
can look within ten/fifteen years of a power-sharing agreement. Pre power-sharing the 
administration in Belfast was described by Bollens (2000: xvi) as ‘neutral’, this being 
‘insufficient in a city of dysfunctional sectarian territoriality...’. Today the norms and 
values guiding resource allocation have changed. Belgium too has seen its linguistic 
divisions leave it without political leadership for much of 2007 and 2010/11. Brussels 
Halle Vilvoorde is bitterly divided along linguistic lines at the political level. Despite this 
national turmoil, the sub-state political institutions within the Brussels region (BCR, CCC, 
COCOF, VGC) have, since 1989, maintained four successive full term governments. While 
the Brussels model maintains a number of flaws as outlined in chapter four, it works 
amidst an environment that doesn’t. These cities make evident therefore that 
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administrative reform is not impossible within a short timeframe, even in violently 
contested societies such as Belfast, and unfavourable national influences as in Brussels.  
Predicting behaviours is one of the principal aims of sociology and political 
science. An understanding of the politico-administrative axis also provides indications of 
how an administration may act in particular circumstances. This study provides an 
indication of how bureaucrats in each of the cases operate within the governance 
structures, which in turn assists in predicting policy outcomes. In summary, the 
bureaucracy within the contested society is indeed unique. Evidence from these two 
cases demonstrates that the bureaucratic elite play a significant role in the 
normalisation and stabilisation process. Further, the design of governance institutions 
within which the bureaucratic elite act, must not prevent the progression from conflict 
management to conflict resolution. As the conflict management process succeeds, the 
structures must be able to respond to the emerging demands for good governance. 
Developing institutional capacity is a priority for any post conflict society. The 
bureaucrat, and the bureaucrats’ interaction with the governance structures are 
identified as pivotal to the successful management of enthnopolitical conflict.  
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Appendices 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Annex 1.1 
 
Principles of good governance 
 
Source: Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual 
Challenges Author: Thomas G. Weiss Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Oct., 
2000), pp. 795-814 
 
World Bank: Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources. The World Bank has 
identified three distinct aspects of governance: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the 
process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and 
social resources for develop-ment; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, 
formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions. 
 
UNDP: Governance is viewed as the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes 
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.  
 
OECD: The concept of governance denotes the use of political authority and exercise of 
control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and 
economic development. This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities 
in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in 
determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled. 
 
Institute of Governance, Ottawa: Governance comprises the institutions, processes and 
conventions in a society which determine how power is exercised, how important 
decisions affecting society are made and how various interests are accorded a place in 
such decisions. 
 
Commission on Global Governance: Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-
operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered 
to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions 
either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. 
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UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: Good governance is ensuring respect for human 
rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and 
capacity in public administration.'6 International Institute of Administrative Sciences. 
Governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and 
authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and 
economic and social development. Governance is a broader notion than government. 
Governance involves interaction between these formal institu-tions and those of civil 
society. 
 
Tokyo Institute of Technology: The concept of governance refers to the complex set of 
values, norms, processes and institutions by which society manages its development 
and resolves conflict, formally and informally.  
 
THOMAS G WEISS: It involves the state, but also the civil society (economic and social 
actors, community-basedi nstitutionsa nd unstructuredg roups, the media, etc) at the 
local, national, regional and global levels. 
 
Annex 1.2 
 
Five Capabilities that contribute to system capacity performance from Brinkerhoff and 
Morgan, 2010 
 
1. The capability to commit and engage. Actors are able to: mobilize resources (financial, 
human, organizational); create space and autonomy for independent action; motivate 
unwilling or unresponsive partners; plan, decide, and engage collectively to exercise 
their other capabilities. 
2. The capability to carry out technical, service delivery, and logistical tasks. Actors are 
able to: produce acceptable levels of performance; generate substantive outputs and 
outcomes (e.g., health or education services, employment opportunities, justice, and 
rule of law); sustain production over time; and add value for their clients, beneficiaries, 
citizens, etc. 
3. The capability to relate and attract support. Actors can: establish and manage linkages, 
alliances, and/or partnerships with others to leverage resources and actions; build 
legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders; deal effectively with competition, politics, 
and power differentials. 
4. The capability to adapt and self-renew. Actors are able to: adapt and modify plans and 
operations based on monitoring of progress and outcomes; proactively anticipate 
change and new challenges; learn by doing; cope with changing contexts and develop 
resiliency. 
5. The capability to balance diversity and coherence. Actors can: develop shared short- 
and long-term strategies and visions; balance control, flexibility, and consistency; 
integrate and harmonize plans and actions in complex, multi-actor settings; and cope 
with cycles of stability and change. 
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Annex 1.3 
Questionnaire Sample 
How frequently in your professional activity are you in contact with the political 
actors of the city government? 
At least once a week  ….    At least once a month….  
At least once every three months ….    At least once a year….  
Less often….  
How would you describe the atmosphere at these meetings when discussing 
resource allocation? 
Evidenced based (technocratic) ….   Consensus based   ….  
Conflictual             ….   Chaotic and Unstructured  ….  
 
When conflict does arise in your personal interactions with the department, it is 
generally based on: 
Language/religious differences           ….  Territorial Interests  ….   
Expert/technical/scientific differences ….  Social/cultural differences  ….  
Differences in interpreting information ….   Political differences  ….   
Please state how readily you agree with the following statements: 
 
I trust and have confidence in my Minister and his cabinet    
I Agree       I Agree     I am    I Disagree  I Disagree 
with Reservation indifferent with reservation 
 
I trust and have confidence in the decisions taken by the bureaucratic elite within the 
urban government 
I Agree       I Agree     I am    I Disagree  I Disagree 
with Reservation indifferent with reservation 
 
I trust and have confidence in the decisions taken by my colleagues 
I Agree       I Agree     I am    I Disagree  I Disagree 
with Reservation indifferent with reservation 
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People feel different degrees of attachment to linguistic, social, political or 
religious communities. How about you? 
 
a. to your Linguistic Community? (Brussels) 
        1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached 
                                                                
b. to your Religious Community? (Belfast) 
        1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached 
 
c. to your Ethnic group? 
       1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached  
 
d. to your Social class? 
       1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached  
 
e. to your Political party? 
       1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached 
 
f. to your Urban government? 
       1        2        3    4 
very attached       fairly attached        not very attached          not at all attached 
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How would you interpret the interaction within this department? 
Evidenced based (technocratic) ….   Consensus based   ….  
Conflictual             ….   Chaotic and Unstructured  ….  
 
When conflict does arise in your personal interactions with the department, it is 
generally based on: 
Language/religious differences           ….  Territorial Interests  ….   
Expert/technical/scientific differences ….  Social/cultural differences  ….  
Differences in interpreting information ….   Political differences  ….   
  
In your opinion, to what extent does the political level influence the output of 
resources in their own personal community? 
 
Complete   Considerable  Some   Not Much   No  
Influence   Influence   Influence  Influence  Influence  
1   2         3   4   5 
Please rank (1,2,3…) these organisations concerning their ability to affect the urban 
bureaucratic decision-making processes:  
Brussels government   ….    Brussels Parliament        ….   
Belgian bureaucracy      ….    Individual Politicians        ….  
National-level business    ….    Urban-level business(private sector)  
Linguistically aligned interest groups  ….    OECD/World Bank/IMF/EU      ….  
Policy based interest groups  ….       The media        ….  
 
Other: __________________________________ 
 
Which of the previous organisations has increased its role in urban governance over 
the last five years or so? Please list a maximum of two 
 
1.__________________________     2.___________________________ 
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Annex1.4 Table 1.1 
Descriptive sample of interviewees 
 
Belfast: NO. % 
Male: Female   10:10 50:50 
British: Irish: Northern Irish 7:5:8 35:25:40 
Protestant: Catholic: Neither 7:8:5 35:40:25 
Social origins (by father’s 
profession) 
Manual: Employee: Professional 
11:4:4 55:20:20 
Degree: Postgraduate: MA: PhD 6:2:10:2 30:10:50:10 
Brussels   
Male: Female 16:4 80:20 
Belgian: Flemish: Brussels: French: 
Dutch : EU 
10: 3: 1: 3: 1: 2 50: 15: 5: 15: 5: 10 
Language 
Dutch: French: Bilingual 
10: 8: 2 50: 40: 10 
Social origin (from father’s 
occupation) 
Manual: Employee: Professional 
2: 4: 12 10: 20: 60 
Permanent Affiliation  
VGC: COCOF: CCC: BCR 
 
5: 4: 4 : 7 
 
25: 20: 20: 35 
Education 
High school: Degree: Masters  
 
1: 14: 5 
 
5: 70: 25 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Annex/Table 6.4: The relationship between Belfast interviewees and factors 
This table describes how closely each (Belfast) interviewee (p) weighs on each factor. In 
other words to what extent each interviewee fits into each group. For example, 
interviewee no. 2 is .69 in factor 1 and .29 in factor 2. The X denotes that the 
respondent’s answers contributed to the make-up of that particular factors general 
perceptions. 
 
P                       1             2 
  1            0.4410X   0.3984  
   2            0.6900X   0.2930  
   3            0.3180    0.5756X 
   4            0.8255X   0.2930  
   5            0.6809X   0.3334  
   6            0.7835X   0.2523  
   7            0.4800    0.5878X 
   8            0.4110    0.7521X 
   9            0.6292X   0.4703  
  10           0.1563    0.7290X 
  12           0.6994X   0.2474  
  13           0.6736X   0.4321  
  14           0.5054    0.5914X 
  15           0.7865X   0.1306  
  16           0.4047    0.5140X 
  17           0.5679X   0.4553  
  18           0.4586    0.6509X 
  19           0.7391X   0.3806  
  20           0.0951    0.8344X 
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Annex/Table 6.5 The relationship between Brussels interviewees and factors 
Once again, in the table below we see how the Brussels factors are generated. For 
example, interviewee No.1 is .67 in factor 2 and .43 in factor 3 and only .06 in factor 1. 
The figures relate to how heavily each respondent relates to the factor’s viewpoint.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P                    1               2               3     Administration 
   1            0.0626    0.6742X   0.4374        VGC 
   2            0.1113    0.3594    0.5905X       VGC 
   3            0.1284    0.7302X   0.1218        VGC 
   4            0.4973    0.5922X  -0.0382        VGC 
   5            0.0426    0.6485X   0.3246        VGC 
   6            0.1418    0.6160X  -0.3364        VGC 
   7            0.5117    0.5966X   0.1975       COCOF 
   8            0.1461    0.3503    0.4405X     COCOF 
   9           -0.1539    0.0409    0.6259X     COCOF 
  10           0.3582    0.4061    0.3804        COCOF 
  11           0.5336    0.0057    0.5846X      CCC 
  12           0.4738    0.0047    0.5818X      CCC 
  13           0.7614X  -0.0071    0.1717       CCC 
  14           0.5983X   0.3344    0.0652       CCC 
  15           0.4720    0.0686    0.5905X       BCR 
  16           0.4988X   0.2967    0.1354        BCR 
  17           0.5614X   0.3372    0.1297        BCR 
  18           0.8271X   0.2099    0.1990        BCR 
  19           0.8447X   0.0889    0.0417        BCR 
  20           0.4397    0.0474    0.5901X       BCR 
  21           0.4330    0.2719    0.4673         BCR 
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Annex 6.6: Factor Arrays  
In the table below, the relationship between each factor (or group of individuals) and 
each statement is identified. In other words, the table identifies where each collective of 
individuals placed the Q statements. (eg. statement one would have been placed in the -
1 category by interviewees in factors 1, 2 and 5. Factor 3 would have placed it in the +1 
category and Factor four would have placed it in the -4 category)  
 
                            Factor Arrays Belfast 
Factor 
number 
Brussels 
Factor 
number 
No. Classification  Statement                                                   F1    F2 F3    F4   F5 
1 Efficiency If a government employee is forced to choose 
between the most efficient policy and the most 
equitable policy, the most efficient alternative 
should be chosen 
-1 -1 1     -3     -1 
2 Efficiency Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally 
trained, technically competent individuals. The 
most qualified person should always get the job 
    
0      2 3      2      3 
3 Equity I recommend or actively advocate in favour of 
policy positions that address the needs and 
concerns of minority citizens 
 
1 -1 0     0     -1 
4 Efficiency I advocate the allocation of resources according 
to technical criteria only – those who need the 
service should get it 
 
0     -1 1    -1      1 
5 Political My role is to carry out the wishes of urban 
government 
 
1      3 0     1      2 
6 Equity Given the cultural diversity within my city, equity 
and fairness between various ethnicities is more 
important than efficiency 
 
1      0 0     0     -1 
7 Political Resources should be allocated according to the 
wishes of the political elite, regardless of my 
opinions 
-1      0 -3    -2      1 
8 Neutral My role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy 
at all times no matter what the circumstances        
-2     -1 -2    -2      1 
9 Political I value the views of the urban political elite, and 
those positively influence my personal opinions 
0     -1 -1     0     -1 
10 Political My role is to serve as an expert within my policy 
area, serving ONLY to provide advice to my 
Minister/Council Committee 
-1     -1 0    -1      1 
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11 Professional I recommend or actively advocate in favour of 
policy positions that I perceive represent the 
needs and interests of the entire urban public 
3      2 1     3      1 
12 Political In my daily work I represent the elected 
government of the city 
1      3 2      1      0 
13 Neutral My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures 
established by law and/or secondary legislation 
0      3 2     0      0 
14 Professional My role is to mediate conflicting interests and 
find a course of action that satisfies everyone. 
2      2 0      1      0 
15 Equity  Given the cultural diversity of my city, a 
prerequisite for good governance would be 
recruitment from all sectors of the community, 
even if this means that the best person does not 
always get the job. On the job training can correct 
this imbalance. 
0     -2 -1    -3     -3 
16 Personal I actively encourage procedures that give my 
community the greater access to the public 
services that the deserve 
-2     -3 0     1     -1 
17 Professional Administrators are not neutral. They should be 
committed to good management and social 
equity as values  
3      0 1     3      0 
18 Pro-state 
facilitation 
of services 
I believe that by putting the interests of business 
first, benefits will flow to citizens 
-1     -2 -3    -3     -3 
19 Neutral In contemporary social and economic affairs it is 
essential that technical considerations be given 
more weight than political factors 
-1     -1 2     -2     -1 
20 Equity Given that I operate within a contested city, 
resource allocation should balance technical 
criteria (those who need it get it) and 
demographic criteria (if one community gets a 
resource, the other should get it too – regardless 
of necessity) 
-1      1 -1    -1     -3 
21 Efficiency Public employees should aim for governance that 
works better and costs less 
3      2 2     2      2 
22 Political My decisions are legitimate as I only follow the 
decisions of the political level 
1      0 -2    -3     -3 
23 Neutral In my daily work I represent my department and 
the wider civil service  
1      1 1     2      2 
24 Personal In my daily work I value the views of community 
interest groups with whom I share a personal 
political affinity       
-2     -2 -2    -1     -2 
25 Political When a conflict of interests arises between the 
wishes of the urban government and my own 
0      2 -3      0      1 
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technical beliefs or the wishes of the political 
leaders of my personal community, I 
automatically and unquestionably follow the 
wishes of the government 
26 Professional Elected officials rarely pressurise me to alter my 
personal expert decisions 
1      1 2    -2      1 
27 Efficiency I see my role as to devise solutions that are 
technically feasible and efficient 
1      2 3     3      2 
28 Neutrality I believe that neutrality and impartiality should be 
the primary values within a bureaucracy 
2      3 3     0      3 
29 Neutrality My decisions are legitimate on the basis of my 
technical expertise and by the fact that I provide 
technically feasible solutions 
0      0 2     -1      0 
30 Personal My role is to achieve the goals of the elected 
political representatives of my own community        
-3     -3 -2     1     -1 
31 Equity As I am involved in the policy making process, I 
ought to do so in a manner that advances the 
interests of those less well off in society, 
regardless of their background 
3      1 0      3      3 
32 Pro-state 
facilitation 
of services 
The best way to ensure efficient public service to 
the entire urban community is to facilitate the 
private sector in service provision 
-1     -2 -1    -2     -2 
33 Pro-state 
provision of 
services 
I believe that citizens needs are best advanced 
through directly putting their needs first 
1      0 -1      1      2 
34 Neutral I am reluctant to assume a leadership role in 
divisive policy issues. This is the prerogative of 
elected officials 
0   0 0     0      0 
35 Personal My decisions are legitimate as I represent the 
interests of my community 
-3     -3 -1    -1     -2 
36 Professional I take the initiative in proposing policies, 
mobilising support for them, and questioning 
policies that may run counter to the general 
public interest 
2      1 1     2     -1 
37 Neutral I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to 
what is legal 
0      0 2     0      3 
38 Pro-state 
provision of 
services 
The best way to ensure efficient public service to 
the entire urban population is through public 
sector reform so that services may be provided 
equitably and efficiently by the public sector 
2      0 1     2      2 
39 Personal Given the recent history of the city, I can of 
course empathise with the needs of my 
community – My loyalty is to them and I work for 
their interests within the legal constraints of the 
-3     -2 0     0      0 
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bureaucracy 
40 Professional When a conflict of interest arises between the 
wishes of the political level and my personal 
expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as 
long as politically possible 
2      1 2     2      1 
41 Professional In my daily work I value the views of international 
and specialised organisations such as the IMF, 
World Bank, EU, OECD, Policy specific think tanks 
and NGOs.  
2      0 0      1      0 
42 Political In my work I try to substitute my own political 
values with those of the political elite       
-2      1 -2    -1      0 
43 Personal My community pay taxes; it is my duty to 
represent them within the bureaucracy. Other 
bureaucrats advocate the allocation of resources 
for their communities, it is my duty to provide 
resources for my community 
-3     -3 -1    -1     -2 
44 Professional My loyalty is first and foremost with the policy 
area, then to my department 
0      1 -3     1     -2 
45 Personal Although it is rarely necessary, when needs be I 
do stand up for the rights and interests of my 
personal community 
-2     -2 -1      0      0 
46 Personal I find it easier to relate to Councillors/Ministers 
from my own personal community. It is only 
logical – we share a common background 
-2     -1 -2    -2     -2 
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Annex 6.7a: Where Factor One fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.7b Where Factor One fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.7c: Agree/Disagree statements factor one 
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Annex 6.8a: Where Factor Two fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.8b: Where Factor Two fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.8c Where Agree/Disagree statements factor two 
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Annex 6.9a: Where Factor Three fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.9b: Where Factor Three fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.9c: Agree/Disagree statements factor three 
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Annex 6.10a: Where Factor Four fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.10b: Where Factor Four fit with the conceptual framework 
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Annex 6.10c: Agree/Disagree statements factor four 
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Annex 6.11a: Where Factor Five fit with the conceptual framework 
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Graph 6.11b: Where Factor Five fit with the conceptual framework 
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Graph 6.11c: Agree/Disagree statements factor five 
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